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The aim of this research is to challenge Islamic extremists’ worldview and address cognitive 
extremism in the cultural sphere. Counter-narratives were once believed to be capable of 
thwarting extremists’ narratives yet have been proven inefficient and even counterproductive. 
A growing body of evidence supports the positive effect of dramatisation of identity-related 
content on violent extremism. However, defining this content is neglected in literature. This 
research sets to identify the themes needed for this content and the language best suited to 
articulate it. With Egypt as its case study, the textual review of cultural practices targeted skin-
in-the-game scholars producing video content to challenge extremism. Three themes common 
in their discourse were identified: historical narratives, women’s status and minorities’ rights. 
Following a practice-led methodology, representation of these themes was studied via a series 
of video-essays in films. The findings of this practice are presented in a framework for a thematic 
approach to cultural productions as counter-narratives. The framework was discussed with 
media practitioners; a model was then developed to support future practitioners in their 
decision-making process and consequently to define their product as counter or alternative 
narrative in the content development phase. Practitioners using this model will be able to define 
their product and select their outputs depending on their interest. The product is a counter-
narrative if it addresses the transnational aspect of the Islamists’ narrative and it is an alternative 
narrative if it focuses on promoting local identity anchored in the singularity of the national 
culture. The implications of this study can go beyond the media practice of counter-narratives 
to reach policy makers responsible for developing cultural policies and film funding bodies who 
finance international co-productions.  
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A letter to you, dear Reader 
 
A warning before you start. What follows is a difficult discussion of a current topic. The discourse 
around Islamic extremism is polarised to the point that accusations can be attached to anyone 
who expresses an opinion regardless of his/her position on the spectrum. In the West, critics of 
Islamic extremism may get the ‘fascist’ tag attached to them - even el-Qemani was not spared 
(September 8, 2018) - and westerners who defend Islam are accused of the racism of low 
expectations, meaning they are not holding Muslims to the same standards they uphold 
themselves (Nawaz 2016; Box of Islam 2017). In their homeland, dissidents or Muslim reformers 
may face assassination (Foda, Khashoggi) or attempts to silence them via death threats (Abdel-
Samad, el-Qemani) or via law courts (el-Behiri). In this climate, a real debate that has a real 
impact on the situation can be very difficult if not impossible.  
 
It is worth noting that there is an important distinction between the western perception of Islam 
as just a religion, and the Arabic scholarship depiction - as well as the grassroots’ common 
understanding - of Islam as a political state as well as a religion (Fatwa; el-Itijah el mouakess 
2010). Distinction between politics and Islam is hard to make in the public debate (Sultan 2012). 
Although jihadi recruitment relies on the religious element capitalising on the Islamic ‘heaven 
hypothesis’ (Hamid 2017), the Islam mentioned here is not the religion but rather the political 
Islam inherent in Islamism discourse. This study is not concerned with Islam’s God hypothesis, 
its route to heaven, the ‘pornotopia’ sold to its jihadi fighters (Abdel-Samad 2016) or even with 
how women are depicted in the afterlife, nor by how it regulates the day to day activities of the 
devout. What is of concern here is how the effect of this inherent political element on the civil 
laws shapes local culture and identity construct. It aims to understand the role that art, engaged 
scholarship and popular culture can play in challenging the status quo and reshaping the 
discourse.  
 
Challenging extremists’ narrative becomes more complex due to the reliance of moderate 
Muslim establishments as well as fundamentalist jihadi groups on the same texts to shape their 
worldview. Both defend the suitability of an Islamic Caliphate [or state] as a form of governance 
and of Sharia as source of laws. Moreover, most governments use Islam to claim legitimacy for 
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their rule: Hashimites in Jordan; Amir el mo’minin in Morrocco (Daring Question 2015; Hiwarat 
Hisham 2017) 
 
In the West, Rizvi (cited in Box of Islam 2019) claims that in Western politics, the right is wrong 
about Muslims and the left is wrong about Islam. Indeed, the anti-Muslim bigotry hidden in the 
Western far-right discourses should be recognised, [recently reports of Polish far-right rally 
calling for Islamic holocaust were retracted (The independent 2017)] as well as the threat to 
Muslims’ lives and wellbeing from campaigns like Punish a Muslim Day. However, this bigotry 
and fear cannot silence the debate. While conversations around this topic revolve around 
security, Hamid (2017) coined in a book title the underlying issue in Western discourse: Muslim 
Migration and Christian Charity.  
 
Geopolitics and failed foreign policies may have direct impact in amplifying the appeal of 
extremists’ discourse. However, if ISIS had limited its activities to resisting the American troops 
in Iraq, this project would not been needed. Instead, they established a Caliphate in a different 
country, bulldozed national borders, de-rooted minorities and re-established slave markets. 
While terrorism is not by any means cultural, this reaction to foreign interference was not 
observed in other cultures. This is why the cultural aspect of this extremism is addressed, out of 
concern for those it is affecting. When reading this thesis, you will find some of the harshest 
critics. Including their comments does not signify agreement, it is due to acknowledging the 
necessity of analysing their narrative and identify the themes they consider problematic.  
 
Again, the Islam if mentioned here is not the religion as in the western definition of a personal 
relationship with a God; it is the inherent political component in it as recognised by Middle 






1.0 Introduction:  
 The thesis  
This thesis consists of a practice exploration and a written exposition. Counter-narratives are 
the standard in challenging extremists’ messaging yet empirical data on their effectiveness is 
lacking (Glazzard 2017; Nafees 2018; Bélanger, Nisa et. al 2020). However, Ferguson (2016: 2) 
suggests that a growing base of evidence supports the positive impact of the dramatisation of 
identity-related content, reconciliation and tolerance on public attitudes and behaviour. The 
quest of this research is to present a practical guideline for practitioners and to fill the research 
gap by identifying the themes needed for content development. The findings for this research 
are presented as a framework for a thematic approach to cultural productions as counter-
narratives aims to target extremists’ worldview and challenge cognitive extremism in the 
cultural sphere. 
  
Since this thesis aims to influence the nature of media practice, its methodology was conceived 
as practice-led. Chapter 2 details the steps followed to fulfil this process. Seven video-essays 
studied representation in Egyptian popular culture; their topics were identified from the textual 
review of cultural productions. These video-essays are the building blocks of this research’s 
framework which was then discussed with practitioners working for leading media organisations 
in the Middle East. In Chapter 3, I present an overview of the practices of counter-narratives 
from the critical lens of Western literature as well as draw on experiences from Arabic-speaking 
media for a better understanding of the inefficiency claims. In Chapter 4, I discuss the seven 
video-essays, the product of the practice inquiry presented alongside this written exposition. 
The framework for cultural productions as counter-narratives is presented in Chapter 5; it offers 
a model for practitioners to support their decision making and the themes needed for their 
content development, but most importantly it gives them suggestions to consider for 
representations in their practice.   
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This section is structured under 4 headings: the problem, the context, the method and the 
outcomes. First, I will explain the problem of radical extremism and how it affects the social 
fabric before moving into more in-depth contextualisation of the frameworks already in place. 
The method summarises the steps followed to reach the research’s outcome. Finally, in the 
outcomes section, I summarise the framework.  
The Problem  
There are more than one billion Muslims, yet media discourse seems obsessed with a few 
extremists. To understand this, one must consider the idea of the minority dictatorship 
theorised by Taleb (2018), where he argues that an inflexible and active minority is the one that 
dictates the values of a society since the flexible majority tends to accommodate inflexibility. 
Using his wedding example, the bride and groom will have to accommodate the strict 
requirements of their guests whether dictated by their ethno-religious or personal choices. They 
would have to make sure they provide for their Hindu, Jewish and Muslim guests’ alternative 
meats for beef, Kosher food and drink and Halal. The flexible majority would not care if they 
consumed Halal or Kosher drinks. Diversity and accommodating difference are possible in the 
wedding settings because inflexibility of the intransigent group is self-imposed and not imposed 
on the other (ibid). However, a Salafi grandfather will argue that serving non-Halal meat and 
alcohol is haram - or illegal - and would attempt to make them adhere to his religious values; a 
young hot-headed youngster may agree and would threaten the organisers to impose his way. 
The question is who is more likely to succeed in imposing his vision: a peaceful grandfather who 
can use the cultural values to gather support from family members or a threat of violence that 
their family might find extreme?   
Islamic extremism (Islamism) represents a threat to modern civilisation’s ideals of equality and 
diversity. Azza Karam (2004: 4-7 Cited Ahmed 2011: 9) defines Islamism as the ‘quintessentially 
political agenda’ of Islamising society. To be an Islamist is much more than being a Muslim: ‘an 
Islamist must be committed to active engagement in the quest for a more Islamic and Just 
society. All Islamists will share this ultimate aim.’ 
Since 9/11, the terrorist attack lead by al-Qaeda on the Twin Towers in the US, topics like 
terrorism, Islamic extremism, fundamentalism and political Islam was featured in media 
globally. There is a consensus that Jihadi groups are born from political Islam and precisely the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Trager 2017; Abdel-Samad 2016; Box of Islam 2016c; El-Hadad 2017; 
Daring Question 2015). The Brotherhood according to Gerges (2005:2 Cited Ahmed 2011:9) is 
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‘the most powerfully organised movement in the world of Islam’ and they were successful in 
transforming Egypt, ‘the epicentre of the Islamist movement’, according to Leila Ahmed 
(2011:13) in less ‘than 3 decades from a majority non-veiled non-Islamists society to a veiled 
Islamist society.’ The organisation was created to restore the Caliphate and advocate the 
reliance on Sharia law in government. Islamic political groups are only considered radical if they 
reject democracy and adopt violence to establish their political agendas (Ashour 2010). 
However, the Trump administration entertained the possibility of listing the brotherhood as a 
terrorist organisation (Hosenball 2017; Mohamed 2019) even if the organisation is mainstream 
and has a presence in many countries (Arraf 2017). 
 The Internet enables jihadi groups like ISIS to recruit worldwide. A counter-narrative is a 
‘message that offers a positive alternative to extremist propaganda, or alternatively aims to 
deconstruct or delegitimise that of extremist’ (Silverman, Stewart et al. 2016 :5). A consensus is 
reached among governments that counter-narratives will be effective in eradicating their danger 
(Glazzard 2017) and that the Internet is the space for de-radicalisation as well as radicalisation 
(Ashour 2010). Countries worldwide mobilised to counter the threat. For example, the European 
Union created the Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN] who sampled counter-narratives 
produced to address Islamic and far-right extremists. Glazzard (2017) argues that these counter-
narratives are ineffective and lack theoretical basis and empirical data, hence the billions spent 
on strategic communication to ‘win the battle of hearts and minds of young Muslims’ have been 
largely unsuccessful (Schmid 2014a: 11). Nowadays there is a shift in viewing Islamic extremism 
as local insurgencies instead of a global phenomenon (Hassan 2018). Therefore, the role of local 
culture and skin-in-the-game activists should be very central to these narratives. However, this 
is not always the case. Taleb (2018) defines skin-in-the-game as ‘the central pillar for the organic 
functioning of systems, […]. Unless consequential decisions are taken by people who pay for the 
consequences, the world would be vulnerable to total systemic collapse.’  
Counter-narratives are reactive in their nature meaning that extremists are the one who are 
leading the discourse. Another consensus in literature is the necessity of an alternative-narrative 
with the counter-narrative (Schmidt 2014; Glazzard 2017). An alternative-narrative showcases 
what ‘we stand for’ instead of what we are against (Brigs, Feve 2013 cited Reed, Ingram et al. 
2017 :10). Its key points are limited to promote what is important to the West, focusing on 
values of democracy. However, most political Islamic parties do not necessarily reject 
democracy even if some argue it is means to an end (Daring Question 2015).   
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Andrius (Box of Islam 2019f) argues that the biggest danger of Islamism is not the threat of 
violence, but their abilities to change the social relationship between Muslims and their 
surroundings. Tiflati (Box of Islam 2019b) divides extremism to behavioural (where violent 
extremist and illegal acts are committed) and cognitive (where thought is radicalised). Earlier in 
the wedding example, the dramatisation aimed to imply that the grandfather (cognitive 
extremism) has better chances of success in creating social change, like in Egypt, than the violent 
cousin (or behavioural extremism).  It seems that counter-narratives like online ad campaigns 
are unable to change minds, but they do solidify affiliations ((Stein December 9, 2020; Bélanger, 
Nisa et. al 2020). Hence an alternative approach is needed. Since cognitive extremism precedes 
behavioural extremism (Box of Islam 2019b), I argue in this research that it needs to be 
addressed in the cultural sphere. For that I present a framework for cultural productions that 
can fulfil this aim.  
 
The context  
From Somalia to Kashmir, countries face threats of terror attacks conducted by various Islamic 
Jihadi groups. Although the problem is not particularly new (Egypt faced terror attacks since the 
80s) the 9/11 attacks on the twin towers in the United States made jihadi groups a priority 
security problem. In 2014, ISIS rose to fame by abandoning al-Qaeda and declaring their 
Caliphate. This is a goal shared by many Islamic organisations; hence they gained support and 
received the bay’a [pledged allegiance] from 42 different organisations from Nigeria to the 
Philippines (Eleftheriou-Smith 2015). Having mastered online radicalisation techniques aided by 
an increased ease of reach credited to social media platforms, ISIS managed to recruit mostly 
youth worldwide - with 70% of their recruits age range 17-30 years old (Box of Islam 2019b) – 
inspiring them to travel to Syria and Iraq to fight among their ranks of 20000 fighters  (Van Ginkel 
2015a) or become Jihadi wives in the case of women. It rebranded itself Islamic State and 
introduced to the world a Qorachi as its caliph [in correspondence with Islamic tradition the 
ruler always should be an Arab from the tribe of Qoreich]. It coordinated terrorist attacks in 
Paris, Beirut, Egypt, Pakistan and London. ISIS managed to hold its fort for a long time 
considering that its assets are a badly trained army ranging from 20000 to 30000 against The US 
Army and Air Force, Kurdish forces, The Iraqi army, Turkey, The IRGC (Iranian Revolution Guard 
Corps) with Hezbollah and the Russians without forgetting the Syrian army and SDF (Syrian 
Democratic Forces) (Whip 2017). Their success (ibid) is credited to the absence of central 
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command in the fighting bodies and a lack of coordination that will ensure their survival for the 
coming three years and asserts that while their military death is imminent, getting rid of them 
is not as easy since ‘some ideas die slowly’.  Western military experts recognised that they need 
to conduct a battle of ideas against the Islamic extremists. The US government financed PR 
campaigns targeting Muslims from Middle East and African heritage while the British campaigns 
targeted its Pakistani community living in the UK (Van Ginkel 2015). In 2019, ISIS territory is very 
limited. However, according to a report from central command it remains active, is ‘regenerating 
key functions and capabilities more quickly in Iraq than in Syria’ and is ‘likely to resurge in Syria 
within 6 to 12 months and regain territory in the absence of sustained [counterterrorism] 
pressure’ (Kube 2019). 
 
Extremists’ message is usually subsumed under four categories: political, historical, socio-
psychological and instrumental; in the case of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and other Jihadi groups there is an 
added theological dimension (Ashour 2010). The mix and match between these elements 
provides a worldview that offers simplistic solutions to complex problems. It is an attractive 
narrative that is full of cultural and historical symbolism; therefore, Ashour (2010) argues that a 
generic counter-narrative cannot work (ibid). Terrorism was understood in terms of political 
violence and gradually became communication and propaganda. If violence coerces, 
propaganda persuades, and terrorism is a combination of the two (Schmid 2014). Propaganda 
is badly viewed in the west due to its association with Nazism and communism therefore 
‘democratic government uses terms like “public affairs,” “public diplomacy,” “psychological 
operations” and “strategic communications” to describe their information-based influence 
operations’ (Schmid 2014 :1). The Pentagon’s billion-dollar strategic communications against al-
Qaeda was defined as ‘a systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across 
strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables the understanding of target audiences, 
identifies effective conduits, and develops and promotes ideas and opinions through those 
conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behaviour’ (Tatham 2010: 19 cited Schmid 
2014: 11).   
Holtman (2012: 14 cited Schmid 2014: 29) states the obvious in saying ‘the jihadist propaganda 
will cease to be effective, if it finds zero acceptance among Muslims, which requires the 
development of freedom and human rights in Muslim countries and better integration policies 
in the West.’ To be able to fulfil these recommendations, dissidence and criticism need to be 
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permitted in Muslim majority countries and not be punishable by death. Critics like el-Qemani 
received threats from extremists and called a fascist by Western intellectuals. El-Behiri, who 
argues that terrorism is anchored in Hadith and that it contradicts the prophets’ teachings was 
jailed for insulting Islam following a lawsuit filed by el-Azhar for challenging their mainstream 
Islamic narration. Khashoggi (2017) claims that political Islam cannot be discounted from the 
political scenes if true democratic representation is wanted in the Middle East, a claim that 
recently cost him his life. While governments in many Muslim majority countries justify their 
rule by Islamic jurisprudence (Daring Question 2015; Hiwarat Hicham 2017) they simultaneously 
silence critics of Islam and arrest Islamists even if it breaches their human rights [Abdel-Nasser’s 
regime persecuted the Muslim Brothers and they were tortured in jail, the massacre in Rabaa 
committed by Egyptian army when Sisi ceased power (Hamid 2016)]. These governments often 
control state media; hence voices of reform found a space to express their ideas on the Internet. 
These dictatorships utilise the threat of Islamists to justify their power grip (el-Qemani 
September 8, 2018).  
 
 In the jails of Egypt, the Jama’a Islamiya - Islamic Group (IG) - relinquished violence and moved 
away from al-Qaeda modus operandi after having trained with them. This prompted Ashour 
(2010; 2007) to argue that de-radicalisation is possible. He presented the first framework for 













Ashour (2010) Van Ginkel (2015) Tuck & Silverman (2016) 
 Target audience: vulnerable 
individuals  
Target audience: vulnerable 
individuals  
Message: Comprehensive 
and multi-layered  
Message: tailored for the 
identified group 
Message: facts, emotional 
appeals of impact, satire and 
humour, positive stories 
Messenger: Credible Messenger: teachers, 
parents, former extremists  
Messengers: credible former 
extremists or survivors etc 
Online propagation  Multiplatform/ Medium  Medium 
  Table 1 Counter-narratives' different frameworks 
 
There is a consensus in western government that counter-narratives will alter extremists’ 
behaviours (Glazzard 2017). As Ashour (2010) puts it, successful counter-messages do not 
require the reinvention of the wheel, i.e. the ideas are already there.  However, stemming from 
this framework, most counter-narratives are reactive in their nature (Schmid 2014), ineffective 
(Glazzard 2017) and completely neglect the attachment of the Muslim community in the host 
countries to their respective ‘pays de Coeur’ (referring to their country of origin) advocated by 
Benzine (William 2018). Even after recognising that this is a battle of ideas, most of these 
initiatives are Western-centric, with the strategic communications showcasing Muslim families 
living in the West (Van Ginkel 2015). There is a lot to say about the Euro-centricity of counter-
narratives’ conceptualisation and the vulnerability of the messenger to personal attacks and 
discretisation instead of enabling engagement with their ideas. However, the most important 
problem is that counter-narratives do reduce support for violent extremism but not in their 
target audience and that exposing people who are at risk of radicalisation to counter-narratives 
is predicted to increase their support for ISIS (Bélanger, Nisa et. al 2020). 
 
The dramatisation of identity-related content corresponds to Nafees’ (2018) argument that 
extremism recruitment fails when the targets have an anchored identity expression. Abdel-
Samad’s (2016) diagnoses an identity crisis in the Muslim world due to the single-identity 
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construct aggregated by Islam. Secular political parties conceptualised a single identity as well: 
Arab, which is perceived as identical to Islam (el-itijah el-mou’akess 2012) and was adopted by 
Abdel-Nasser and both Baath dictatorships, Syriac adopted by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
and an Aramaic identity (el Tamimi 2017). It is worth noting that Abdel-Samad (2016) is not 
alone in his assertion that Islam posits itself the sole provider of identity. Shiraz Maher, a former 
membership in Hizb el-Tahrir, wrote with his co-author Martyn Frampton (2009:18)  
Islamism (or “Political Islam”) is a worldview, which teaches its adherents 
that Islam is a comprehensive political ideology and must be treated as such. 
Its proponents believe that Islam must be placed at the centre of an 
individual’s identity, as either the overriding or the only source of that 
identity. The Islamist outlook is one that essentially divides the world into 
two distinct spheres: “Muslims” and “the rest”. […] Muslims are presumed 
to be members of a de-territorialised, globalized ummah, in which allegiance 
is defined through the fraternity of faith alone. Islamists suggest that 
Muslims are under constant attack, and it is this perceived perpetual danger 
that drives the Islamist narrative of victimhood and grievance (cited in 
Schmid 2014:15-16).  
 
The Arabic media discourse does not draw a distinction between religion and politics in Islam; 
it is even dismissed by some Islamic scholars as a Western misconception (Fatwa 2003; el-Itijah 
el-Mou3akess 2012; Daring Question 2017c). Identity is an organic and complex construct, and 
Islamists’ discourse seems to render a multiplicity of identities impossible. This is where this 
framework for cultural productions hopes to create an impact. Theoretically, media has now 
replaced the role of traditional literature and art in shaping cultural and personal identities 
(Dziemidok 2003). The media act as distributors of ideology, as they facilitate the imagination 
of a nation (Gitlin 1980) by representing the imagined community that is the nation (Anderson 
1991). However due to the ‘nowness’ of the TV discourse, the maintenance space for this 
imagined community has to be cinema (Anderson 1991) where the film acts as ‘identity stories’ 
(Shapiro 1999). Historians used films to understand the mentalities and imaginary of a society. 
Films’ national singularity is perceived immediately because they are soaked in easily 







This research is concerned with counter-narratives’ initiatives relying on film aesthetics. The 
importance of media is recognised by the Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN] which 
included the following in their 2012 policy recommendations:  
Media production: Work with media agencies which proactively make film 
and TV material for broadcast channels which reach target audiences. This 
TV and film initiative could identify stories which challenge the extremist 
version of the world […]. This material could focus on, for instance, the al 
Qaeda story and how it is failing to deliver on its promises to the Muslim 
world;  
Online channel: Create an innovative online platform designed to provide 
pathways away from extremism for at-risk individuals (Schmid 2014: 23) 
 
Most importantly, Ferguson (2016) argues that TV and radio dramas that address issues of 
identity, reconciliation and tolerance have a positive impact as long as they are not seen to be 
linked to a political agenda. Hence, the quest of this project became to identify the themes of 
content that can have that positive impact. It is designed as practice-led in order to present a 
practical guide or a framework for future practitioners.  
 
To identify the stories that ‘can challenge the extremist version of the world’ (Schmid 2014: 25) 
this research used textual analysis of online content, primarily video outputs available on 
YouTube, and perpetuated by skin-in-the-game activists. This refers to Arabic native speakers, 
Muslim (or from Muslim background) apologists, scholars and critics who are putting their lives 
at risk to change their community. The representations of the themes identified from their 
discourse were studied in Egyptian popular culture. A framework for content development was 
then built and discussed with practitioners, directors and producers with work experience in the 





Pellerin (2016:11 cited Bélanger, Nisa et. al 2020) sums ISIS propaganda under ‘four distinct, yet 
entangled narratives’: (1) social  (establishing a better society), (2) political (bringing a new world 
order through global Caliphate ), (3) religious (using the Quran to legitimise violence) and (4) 
moral (destroying the West symbol of moral decay). Political Islam shares these four aspects in 
their narratives with extremists while dropping the violence from their discourse (Box of Islam 
2019). Andrius (Box of Islam 2019a) dismisses the success in destroying the West but highlights 
the high ability of Islamists to influence the social fabric (ibid), a success already observed in 
Egypt (Ahmed 2011). Bélanger et. al (2020) suggest that political narratives yield the best results 
for counter-narratives. This may be the way forward for counter-narratives, leaving the changing 
of minds or addressing cognitive extremism for cultural productions. This research proposes a 
framework for a humancentric cultural productions that targets cognitive extremism in the 
cultural sphere.  
The framework is presented herein as a media strategy for content development; hence it is 
structured around production and distribution. The thematic content: historical narratives, 
women’s status and minorities’ rights is common to produce both counter and alternative 
narratives. It envisages that counter-narratives are produced by academics and shared via video-
essays and documentaries. It aims to deconstruct the transnational aspect of Islamists’ 
narrative. Alternative narratives promote a local identity construct; thus, they are entrusted to 
cultural practitioners to produce films and Tv series. Content stemming from this framework can 
be distributed on different platforms online and on mainstream media to reach a general 
audience.   
 
This framework is devised with Levantine and North African creators in mind (both residents 
and expatriates). That said, it is by no means exclusive of anyone from any background on the 
condition of adhering to its fundamental principles of recognising the values of cultural and 
individual in the society and cherishing the cultural heritage of Muslims and other communities 
represented in the work. These values may seem similar or aligned with principals of cultural 
policies, and this research hopes it offers some ground work for policy makers to develop 
effective policies.  
  
 19 
2.0 Methodology  
Ferguson (2016) claims there is evidence for dramatic treatment addressing issues of identity, 
reconciliation and tolerance to have a positive impact on violent extremism. Since there were 
no guidelines advising on the types or themes of content they need to develop, this thesis 
attempts to fill that gap and present a practical guide or a framework to practitioners. It is 
devised as a practice-led inquiry with a written exposition. It engages with contemporary 
political discourses of fundamentalism, Islam and human rights as consumed on media outlets 
and social media. To fulfil its advertised aim, this research is therefore conceived as a 
transdisciplinary research following a rhizomatic approach to its methodology and terminology. 
Fundamentalist discourse divides the world into us/them, believers/unbelievers. A binary is 
advocated - in the Deleuzian-Gattari philosophy - to be the spiritual logic of the ‘root book’ which 
depends on ‘foundations, linear logic, imitation, plotted points, fixed points, fixed order and a 
reflected image of the world’ (Clarke, Parsons 2013: 38). To counter the root book, Deleuze and 
Gattari ‘posit the rhizome book that morphs, redirects, and moves in multiple directions at once’ 
(Clarke, Parsons 2013: 38). The selection of a rhizomatic research is due to its dynamic, non-
linear, nomadic nature (Carpentier et al., 2003 cited Cammaerts 2007) where ‘any point can 
connect to another’ (Deleuse, Gattari 2004: 19) and that it ‘establishes connections between 
semiotic chains, organisations of power and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences and 
social struggles’ (ibid: 7).  As the methods of ‘doing the research and the data or findings of the 
research shape the researcher identity’ (Clarke, Parsons 2013: 37), becoming a rhizomatic 
researcher is not separate from being a filmmaker-storyteller since the research process mirrors 
artistic inspiration by forming solid interconnections in the interwoven web of theories that 
covers religious beliefs, history and their socio-political consequences as well as feminist 
theories and cinematic language structures.  
In a nutshell, the research needed to identify content relevant to the dramatisation hypothesis 
and define the language to articulate in order to share it with practitioners. Hence it is designed 
as practice-led. To identify the themes for content development, I conducted a textual review 
from selected cultural productions. The practice aimed to study the representation of these 
themes in Egyptian films in order to identify problems in representation that need addressing 
and attempted when possible to find creative solutions. This resulted in seven video-essays. The 
reflection on this practice led to formulating a framework that was then discussed with 
practitioners. In what follows the selection criteria and the steps followed are explained in 




Candy and Edmonds (2018: 64) defines the difference between practice-based research (PBR) 
and practice-led research depending on the centrality of the artefact. ‘If the creative artefact is 
the centre of the knowledge, the research is practice-based,’ and it is practice-led if the research 
‘leads primarily to new understandings about practices.’ Since this research ‘carries out studies 
into the nature of that practice and identifies the relative effectiveness of existing approaches 
from which new practice is developed’ (Candy, Edmonds 2018: 65) it is designed as practice-led. 
One of its defining features is its foundation in practice without depending on the creation of an 
artefact, and it aims to share its outcomes in the form of a framework (ibid). 
This framework is constructed following Schön (1994) model of a reflective practitioner. Its 
design is constructed as ‘a conversation with the situation’ based on Dewey’s pragmatist 











Video-essays are an integral part of the methodology of this research. The representation 
studies underscore the impact of Islamist narrative on the local and cultural, the main domain 
for this study being Egyptian films.  By choosing practice-led research, this project embraces the 
‘experimentation in arts practices insofar as play is a method of inquiry, aiming not to establish 
findings by way of data […] but to put in play elements in bricolage which afford insights through 
deliberate and careful juxtaposition’ (ibid :109). Like most practice as research projects, it aims 
 Editing video-essay: take 




Action Sifting the essay to take into account 
new information or theoretical 
perspective as a result of the 
processes   
 21 
to discover ‘what works’ or what invites critical insights through a dialogic engagement, rather 
than what is true adjudged by the criteria of scientific rationalism (ibid:109). Moreover, this 
study aligns itself with emerging attempts to solve the film analysis paradox as identified by 
Martin (2016) where ‘a single-channel medium (written language) is pitted against an almost 
embarrassingly rich and profuse multi-modal form.’ 
  
The textual review informed the practice inquiry precisely on what to focus in studies of its 
representation, a line of inquiry that is common in media literature. Video-essays enable the 
embedding of the theory in practice and finding creative solutions to issues identified in 
literature. The video Women in Arabia is an example on what this research aims to achieve. In 
its first part, it studied the representation of women adopting a feminist critical lens. In its 
second part its creative exploration embodies the theories deployed in this research, particularly 
the poetic validity (Man 2003) in an abstract reconstruction of women as missing images. It was 
unrealistic to deliver more on this approach in the timeframe of a doctoral research.  
 
Textual analysis:  
The key, for a cultural approach, is to find the ideas emerging from within a certain community. 
Hence, the first step was to identify the themes that organically emerged in the discourse of 
skin-in-the-game practitioners. This means taking personal risks and having a personal 
attachment to the cause in question (Taleb 2018). Prevent 2.0 took its current shape under skin-
in-the-game experts from Quilliam among others. Counter-narrative as Ashour (2010) puts it is 
not a reinvention of the wheel and extremism resurfaced throughout Islamic history (Daring 
Question 2015; Box of Islam 2016).  
All of the above favoured the selection of Native Arabic speaking practitioners. However, the 
counter-narratives’ selection reviewed in this research is mostly of Western initiatives. This is 
due to availability of academic literature that defines the framework for this practice, an 
assessment of what is considered a success story and most importantly the lack of counter-
narratives relying on film aesthetics in Arabic. Also, extremists used the Internet to radicalise 
the youth and Ashour (2010) claims that de-radicalisation can happen online. Abdel-Samad 
(2016) suggests that Zuckerberg’s [as in social media] effect on Islam will be similar to 
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Guttenberg’s on Catholicism. This meant that videos of skin-in-the-game practitioners need to 
be available online, hence YouTube became the primary source of data.  
Selection criteria 
To identify the themes necessary to conceptualise the framework, the data subjected to scrutiny 
cannot be accused of not understanding Islam or of having a shallow knowledge of the Arabic 
language. In this context, skin-in-the-game experts is interpreted as: a native ‘Arabic’ speaker 
favouring Egyptians (since Egypt is the case study); a practising Muslim or from a Muslim 
background; has engaged with the general audience; has videos available on YouTube even if 
they are produced for a mainstream media outlet to ensure that audience have unrestricted 
access to their ideas and the number of views can be identified. 
The selection corresponding to these criteria is summarised in the table below. It includes a 
description of the shows selected. These shows have stopped broadcasting before this research 
concluded. It also summarises the angle followed by the scholars mainly Hamed Abdel-Samad, 
Islam el-Behiri, and Sayid el_Qemani.  
 
Program  Description  Angle  
Ma3 Islam  This was a free to air show by 
Islam el-Behiri on Egyptian 
private channel el-Kahira wal 
Nass. Videos are still available on 
YouTube. The court has ordered 
his show to cease its broadcast.  
Reviewed Ma3 Islam on el-Kahira 
wal Nass and all his articles 
available on el-Hiwar el-
Moutamadin  
El-Behiri presents himself as a 
researcher; his views are dismissed 
by el-Azhar as western inspired due 
to his studies in the UK.  
He argues that the reliance on 
historical texts (Hadith and Sunna) 
and veneration of the first caliphs 
are the source of violence today. 
However, the Prophet is a higher 
moral authority and that the Quran 
should be the compass for accepting 
or rejecting these texts. He also 
called, among others, to purge the 
curriculum in el-Azhar from violent 






TV Show on al-Hayat TV, a 
Christian apologetics channel and 
show.  
What is of interest herein is their 
method they follow to change 
minds, relying mostly on critical 
thinking to question the faith of 
the receiver without necessarily 
applying the same rigour to the 
texts they are promoting. The 
show relies on YouTube 
viewership as it is banned from 
most countries.  
The research does not endorse 
Muslim conversions. Hence the 
research was only interested in a 
selection of episodes, mainly 
defined by the guest.  Episodes 
with Christian conversion stories 
or explanation of the faith were 
overlooked.  Unfortunately, 
when the research debuted the 
shows addressing these issues 
were scarce. Nowadays, al-Hayat 
produce historian Mohamed el-
Messayeh solely on YouTube and 
Facebook, his show would have 
been preferable since his 
presentations delivers historical 
facts on the Quran and early 
Islam.  
This channel recruit apologists who 
converted from Islam. The show has 
a defined structure. The host, 
Brother Rachid is from Morocco, 
rarely engages in performance 
emphasis with his guests, and never 
pushed his phone-in audience to 
pray.  
It tackles jurisprudence and the 
Islamic God hypothesis. The show 
aims to demonstrate the heavy 
impact of Islamic texts on the society 
putting the blame on the texts. It 
relies on academic research to 
debunk some of the historical claims 
in mainstream Islamic narrative. 
Although the channel addresses the 
whole region and is not specifically 
Egyptian, it addresses issues 
relevant to the Coptic Church and 
community. 
Box of Islam  An online show by Egyptian-
German Scholar Hamed Abdel-
Samad, distributed by his 
YouTube channel Hamed.TV. The 
show started early enough in the 
research process to be 
immediately adopted. It stopped 
in 2019 forcing the host to launch 
it under a new title. I reviewed all 
episodes of Box of Islam. 
Abdel-Samad has a secular 
approach. He rejects the idea of 
modern life being regulated by the 
values of the 7th centuries. He 
promotes critical thinking and 
explains academic research in his 
show asking his audience to conduct 





Sayid el-Qemani is an academic 
and a historian. Although he is 
not a media figure, his lectures 
and books are very sought after 
from the secular parties and 
atheist online programs (like el-
Bat el-Asswad). 
I reviewed his TV interviews and 
all his articles output available in 
full on el-Hiwar el-moutamadin.   
He positions himself as a Muslim 
historian. His angle is to find from 
Islamic tradition, prophetic stories 
that can facilitate acceptance of 
liberal and secular values to the 
general population. He claims this 
enables him to reach the common 
man who may reject discussing 
Islam with a non-Muslim.  
 
These scholars follow different approaches in challenging extremism. Their outputs showcase a 
certain balance in offense techniques that challenge a certain set of ideas while defending 
others, a concept that is needed for counter-messaging according to the LIBE report (Reed, 
Ingram et al. 2017). The same themes and techniques, identified in the main scholars’ work, are 
also recurrent in other non-Egyptian channels. The following list is an example of YouTube 
channels reviewed but were not selected for this research: 
• The Gad Truth: A channel by Neuroscientist Jewish scholar Gad Saad, originally from 
Lebanon, but currently broadcasting from Canada 
• Kafer Magherabi and Hiwarat Hicham: Hicham is an Atheist from Morocco; the main 
interest was his interviews with people fighting for change 
• El Bat el-Asswad: an atheist channel from Egypt, the founder has been arrested  
• Fakir: A channel with Iraqi hosts.  
• Ghayeth el-Tamimi: A Shia Imam from Iraq who fled Iraq to the UK having adopted a 
critical line after being shaken with the Ezidi genocide.  
• Wafa Sultan: Syrian Alawi doctor who joined a Christian apologist channel.  
 
To be able to address common values between extremists, moderates and local culture, the 
textual analysis also considered films and extremist materials. 
Films selection for representation studies 
As mentioned earlier, the practice of this thesis studied thematic representation in films. Films 
act as ‘identity stories’ (Shapiro 1999) that help historians to understand the mentalities and 
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imaginary of a society since they are soaked in easily recognisable currents (Lagny 1992). Hence, 
despite the presence of other media in these essays, films remain the main medium to 
understand the society and contextualise the problems raised by the YouTuber activists. 
 
Popular culture and national cinema affect the shaping of personal identities. Naturally, feature 
films are selected rather than medium or short films due to the professionalism and the rigid 
production structure they endure (Sojcher 2011). The selection of movies for the research aimed 
to ensure a wide audience reception due to broadcast repetition or a presence of a star power. 
A brief description of each film storyline is included in the appendix under the heading: List of 
films included in the essay. 
 
According to el-Mouji (2017) nine movies are usually repeated every Islamic religious holiday. 
Al-Shayma’, Al-Rissala and Hijrat al-Rassoul are singled out in the title of his article. Hence, they 
are featured in the video-essays since they shaped the perception of early Islam and polytheistic 
Arabic in the public’s eye (Box of Islam 2017a). Al-Rissala corresponds to the same criteria, as 
the director claims his movie shaped perception of Islam in the West as well since it was shown 
to American troops to teach them about Islam (Al-Mouji 2017). 
 
Due to their representation of extremists, Al-Irhabi (Galal 1994), Touyour el-Zalam (Arafa 1995) 
and Al-Irhab wal Kabab (Arafa 1992) were selected for this study. The movies rely on the star 
power of Adel-Imam. This is also the case for Al-Massir (Chahine 2000). It features Nour el-Sherif, 
Mahmoud Hemeida, Leila Elwi and Mahmoud Mounir. On top of this star cast, Chahine received 
an award in Cannes which contributed to the film’s marketing campaign. Ussama Fawzi’s films 
Bahib Issima (2004) and Janat el-Chayatin (2000) are included due to their depiction of Copts. It 
is worth noting that Dunia (Saab 2005) and Bahib Issima  (Fawzi 2004) have the star power but 
they were badly received by the Egyptian audience. Nevertheless, Dunia’s subject matter is 
hardly represented in Egyptian cinema so it was imperative to include them in this study as an 
example of the contribution of the foreign funds and migrant artists in the national discourse. 
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Extremist media material:  
Unfortunately, due to the time limitation of the PhD, and the lack of security expertise, extremist 
materials are not acquired first hand via infiltrating their Telegram channels. However, @Carl 
(2016) had shared privately with me his experience on these channels and discussions he 
conducted with ISIS women recruits. This has given first hand insight that could not be acquired 
from Jihadology, Jihadoscope or academic papers. 
Case study: Egypt 
Even if the conceptual nation of Islam does not recognise national borders, relying on national 
theory to a certain degree may prevent cognitive resistance in accepting the counter-message. 
This takes into consideration, political positions made in 2011 by British Prime minster, German 
Chancellor and French president who claimed that multiculturalism had gone wrong (Schmid 
2014:5).  
Egypt adopted an Arab identity and is a Muslim majority country. It is the case study firstly 
because it dubs itself Arab Hollywood (Khatib 2006a). The country has a strong cinema industry 
that is funded locally but is controlled by the government (Azzi, Tannous 2021). This cinema is 
responsible of the shaping of early Islam in the psyche of the MENA region. Like most states in 
the Middle East it is a Muslim state that mixes in its constitution Sharia law and the French 
constitution (el-Qemani September 8, 2018). Most importantly it is home to el-Azhar, one of the 
most prestigious Sunni authorities in the world, and the institution in which founders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda studied their Islamic degree (Daring Question 2017c, Daring 
Question 2015a; Daring Question 2017d). This institution is accused to have vetted a thesis of 
el-Mawdoudi that became the blueprint of al-Qaeda (el-Qemani September 8, 2018; Daring 
Question 2017).  Shia Cleric Sayed Jamal el-Din (Daring Question 2017) pinpoints to al-Azhar Shia 
graduate who theorised Wilayit el Fakih, the system currently in place in Iran after the Islamic 
revolution. Egypt is also the birthplace of the Muslim Brotherhood, the organisation that is 
accused of inspiring all modern-day jihadi Sunni extremist groups. Furthermore, Khomeini co-
wrote with the Muslim Brotherhood founders their vision for theocratic statehood (Abdel-
Samad 2016).  Egypt struggled with extremism since the 80s when Jama’a Islami committed 
assassinations and terrorists’ acts on its soil. Ashour (2010) claimed they were successful in 
taming them to become a moderate Islamist political party. The success of this taming is 
questionable since they rescinded their discourse after being released from prison.  
Furthermore, ISIS is active in Sinai Peninsula.  
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It is worth noting that this research recognises the problem of Arabic as a language and an 
identity. Film studies use the term Arab cinema candidly to group films from different countries 
in the region. Khatib (2006a) uses it for Egyptian, Tunisian and Algerian cinema yet Dickinson 
(2016) uses it to group Syrian and Palestinian films. This tends to homogenise populations and 
dilute national, cultural and economic structures. Hence this research selection of film and 
Media mostly has limited itself to Egypt as it posits itself as Arab Hollywood (Khatib 2006a), and 
it was Egyptian studios that fed the whole region for a long time (Khatib 2008).  
 
Interviews with practitioners  
Once the framework was complete, I reached out to 20 practitioners: producers and directors 
working across the Middle East and serving the Egyptian market. Three people accepted to 
contribute. Nabil Asmar is a director working at MBC, a Saudi channel based in Dubai. Sanaa 
Azzi, is an independent producer who worked and lived in Egypt and produced social 
programming. Toni Tannous is an independent producer for advertising and social campaign 
manager in Dubai and the Netherlands. As Mishler suggested (1986) these interviews 
are viewed as a ‘form of discourse’ and will be conducted as ‘a jointly constructed conversation 
of the practice’ in order to achieve ‘an acceptable level of shared agreement’. In these 
discussions, I aimed to understand how they perceived the media role in countering extremism. 
After gathering their impressions on the status quo, we delved into an in-depth discussion of 
the framework’s themes and the problems this content might face focusing on representation 
issues and funding. Transcriptions of the interviews are included in the appendix. 
Limitations: 
This research like any other is not without limitations. The timeframe of a PhD and the limitation 
of the budget have put restraints on the quality of the material used in the video essays. Sourcing 
material that is accessible to English speakers was not always easy and translation, while able to 
transmit the message, does not always reflect authentically the discourse. Translating from 
Arabic using a translation software is tricky since there are 14 characters that are rarely written, 
without factoring in the differences in local dialects.  
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I attempted to join the AVE Network and access the resources made available to them by the 
Hedayah Center. However, these attempts were not successful which prevented reviewing the 
material available to the civil society. This restriction is understandable if it is due to security 
concerns; however, it may result in limiting the involvement of people from different 
backgrounds. Certainly, security concerns cannot be taken lightly, especially when the risk of 
assassination is real. Abdel-Samad’s address was released by the Brotherhood in Egypt with a 
wanted dead or alive headline (Daring Question 2013a), the prominent journalist Nahed Hattar 
and a potential interviewee for this research was assassinated by the end of the first year of 
research, the jail sentence of Islam el-Behiri has limited the reliance on his ideas and proposals, 
and el-Qemani recused himself from public life out of fear of assassination and to avoid the 
media. All this has stirred this research’s design away from conducting interviews. 
 
It is also worth noting that deleting violent extremists’ accounts can be a hindrance for research. 
Social media policies resulted in suspending several accounts on Twitter that were relevant to 
this research, like @CopticNationalism. YouTube also deleted some videos, and even suspended 
the channel Hamed.TV where Abdel-Samad publish Box of Islam episodes. However, since he is 
well known, German politicians got involved and his channel was restored the next day. To 
comply with the YouTube rules Box of Islam was replaced with Box of Insan (human). 
 
  
Picture 10 Hamed Abdel-Samad tweet announcing the deletion of his channel 
Furthermore, this research did not include audience research or reception in its methodology. 
This is mainly because it is concerned with content in the development phase of production. 
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Reception studies for products stemming from this framework need to be considered on a 
project-based basis. That said, it has noted audience comments and engagement in TV shows 
and YouTube videos. The impression gathered from public engagement with Daring Question 
and Box of Islam seemed consistent with their own assessment discussed in special episodes. 
Their factual approach to history, especially Box of Islam, resonated positively with many 
audience members, who sent questions and suggestions for episodes. Needless to say, there are 
plenty of audience members who rejected the angle and verbally assaulted the hosts on air and 
online. The shows seem to have gathered a faithful audience. However, more systematic and 
independent research into audience reception is needed. Algorithms can repress or support the 
propagation of the content based on the viewing habits of the individuals in question. When the 
redirect methods are absent for content creators, an understanding of this can have a positive 





After publication of the thesis, the video-essays of this research will be available on both 
YouTube and Vimeo. Links will be embedded on blog posts. Furthermore, these seven video-
essays and the spreadsheet tracking the textual review will be stored on Figshare, the cloud-
based data repository of De Montfort University.  
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3.0 Counter-narratives initiatives: A review 
Reports released by RAN – Radicalisation Awareness Network – and the LIBE committee – The 
European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs – assed the success 
of counter-narratives initiatives. In this chapter, I review the frameworks for the counter-
narratives and focus on successful initiatives identified in these reports with particular interest 
in those using film aesthetics to deliver their message. The criticism of counter-narratives 
discussed in this chapter draws on Western literature and contrasts it with the discourse of the 
skin-in-the-game scholars selected for the textual review. 
  
Definitions and Typology of Islamists: 
Ashour, the scholar who produced the first framework for counter-narratives, defined the 
different Islamist groups. The definitions introduced in this section are drawn from his work in 
order to have a basic understanding of the lingo common in counter-narratives’ literature and 
adopted in this thesis.  
 
Islamists groups are socio-political movements which base and justify their political principals, 
ideologies, behaviours and objectives on their understanding of Islam or on their understanding 
of a certain past interpretations of Islam (Ashour 2007: 598)  
 
A Moderate Islamist group is a group ‘that ideologically accepts at minimum, electoral 
democracy as well as political and ideological pluralism, and aims for gradual and social, political, 
and economic changes’ (Ashour 2007: 598). They accept the concept of working in a nation-





Radical Islamist groups ‘ideologically reject democracy as 
well as the legitimacy of political and ideological pluralism, 
aim for revolutionary social, political and economic changes, 
refuse to work within the established state institutions, and 
utilise violent means to achieve their goals’ (Ashour 2007: 
598). They are called also revolutionaries, extremists or 
exclusivists (ibid). Noting ideological and behavioural 
differences in conceptualising violence, this group can be 
divided to two subgroups: pragmatic militants who ‘perceive 
violent combat as a means to an end’ and extremist militants 
‘who perceive violence as a sacred end per se’ (Ashour 2007: 
599).  The latter group, which includes al-Qa’ida, ideologically 
legitimizes and practice violence against civilians and 
unarmed people. 
  
Radicalisation is ‘a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or 
behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of the democratic principles as well as 
the use of violence, or to an increase in the level of violence, to achieve political goals’. (Ashour 
2007: 599) 
 
De-radicalisation ‘is a process of relative change within Islamist movements, in which a radical 
group reverses its ideology and begins to de-legitimize the use of violent methods to achieve 
political goals as well as accepting gradual social, political, and economic changes within a 
pluralist context’. These groups do not always abide by democratic principles [the example of 
the IG in Egypt]. De-radicalisation can occur on the behavioural level, which means ‘abandoning 
the use of violence to achieve political goals without ideological de-legitimization’. (Ashour 
2007: 599) 
 
Moderation is a process of relative change within Islamist groups that can take place on two 
levels: ‘On the ideological level the key transformation is the acceptance of the democratic 
principles and the de-legitimization of violence. On the behavioural level, the key to 
 
 
Picture  1 Retrieved on 10 June 2017 
from a Twitter account support to ISIS. 
The account was deleted shortly after. 
The picture illustrates the single identity 
promoted by radical groups 
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transformation is the participation in the democratic process and the practical abandonment of 
violence as method to achieve goals’. (Ashour 2007: 600) 
 
These definitions reflect that the desired change in de-radicalisation is limited to abandoning 
violence and accepting democracy. El-Qemani (September 8, 2018) warns that accepting 
democracy is a means to an end for non-violent political Islamic parties who share the same goal 
and worldview of the violent extremists. Western literature is aligned with this observation.  
Fiore Geelhoed’s (2011:368 cited Schmid 2014b :9) claims that ‘militant groups are usually the 
offshoot of more moderate movements and that the difference between mainstream 
movements lies not in their ideology and objective, which is the creation of an Islamic state, but 
in what they regard to be the appropriate strategy’. Although the difference in the strategy is 
very important, one must not forget that most Islamic political parties’ advocate that:  
‘Shariah (Islamic law) should be implemented, either within existing nation-
states or in the context of a pan-Islamic theocracy (often referred to as the 
‘Caliphate’). The absence of a purist Islamic state is judged to be responsible 
for the current problems of the Muslim world, and only if such an entity is 
re-established, it is argued, will the Muslim world be restored to global pre-
eminence.’ (Maher, Frampton 2009: 18 cited Schmid 2014b: 16) 
 
These goals are debated extensively on Arabic-Speaking media. Having engaged in debates 
defending secularity Vs. Islamic theocracy, El-Qemani (September 8, 2018) claims quite bluntly 
that any Muslim who considers the Quran a timeless guidebook is ipso facto a terrorist. Like 
many apologists’ programmes, Daring Question (2007) showcases Islamic jurisprudence and 
traditions that support extremists’ actions and ideology in the aim to inform many Muslims, 
precisely the moderates, who are not aware of their existence. These same texts are pinpointed 
by many moderate Muslims as problematic; one of these voices is Islam el-Behiri. Sam Harris 
claims that:  
moderates in every faith are obliged to loosely interpret (or simply ignore) 
much of their canons in the interest of living in the modern world. Religious 
moderation is the product of secular knowledge and scriptural ignorance and 
it has no bona fides in religious terms, to put it on par with fundamentalism 





Salafism is pinpointed as the route to terrorism in Western literature. Schmid (2014b: 16) 
suggests that  
in the view of knowledgeable observers, even peaceful, apolitical, quietist 
Salafism can be served as an “antechambre” to terrorism, acting de facto as 
a “conveyor belt” by facilitating socialisation to violent extremism in the form 
of terrorism. In the words of the former Dutch Deputy National Coordinator 
for Counter-Terrorism: “for most of the known Dutch terrorists, the non-
violent variety of Salafism was the first step towards acceptance of jihadist 
Salafism.” (Schmid 2014b: 16) 
 
Causes of radicalisation  
Tiflati (2016: 8-9) points to ‘major disagreements among academic and stakeholders on the 
meaning, nature and the threat of radicalisation’. In relation to ‘radicalism’ as in expression of 
political thought, the term radicalisation becomes problematic. The theories deployed here are 
concerned with radicalisation as ‘state of mind that precedes terrorism acts’ as defined by 
Mastors and Siers (2014: 379 Cited Tiflati 2016:8). 
 
The causes of radicalisation are divided in literature to two broad approaches: the structural-
psychological and the political process approaches (Ashour 2010: 600). The structural approach 
posits ‘a linear causal relationship in which [socio-structural] strains produce psychological 
discomfort which in turn, produce collective action’ (Wiktorowicz 2004: 6). Different types of 
socioeconomic strains include: ideational/cultural strains, where the hypothesis is that Islamists 
uphold religious and religio-national identities in response to ‘cultural imperialism’; and political 
strains, in which some argue that the more severe the socioeconomic, identity and/or other 
political crisis are, the higher the levels of violent radicalism (Ashour 2007: 600-601). However 
structural strains (in socioeconomic, political, ideational types) exist in all societies without 
always leading to violent radicalism. Even if most literature on Islamist radicalism is confined to 
this theory, it is also criticised for ‘its static nature and hence the validity of its vision of linear, 
casual relationships’ (Ashour 2009: 14). 
The political process approach addresses several limitations of the structural-psychological 
explanations. Hafez (2003:19) claims that this theory is developed ‘in response to 
socioeconomics and psychological theories of social movement’ and that it attempts to explain 
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Islamist radicalism and or/moderation by ‘analysing the political environment in which Islamists 
operate, the mobilization structures through which Islamists acquire and allocate movement 
resources, and the ideological frames with which Islamists justify and motivate collective 
actions.’ (Ibid) The main critique for this approach is it is a catch-all approach which includes too 
many variables like ‘domestic institutions, regime types, international/regional actors, political 
cultures, and historical peculiarities’ (Ashour 2007: 602).  
Recent studies gave more details on the models of radicalisation. King & Taylor (2011:609 Cited 
Tiflati 2016:9), ‘described emotions, cognitions, and social influences that can lead individuals 
to engage in terrorism’ under 5 models (featured in the table below) with two main factors that 
reappear are ‘relative deprivation’ and ‘identity-related issues’ (ibid). 
 
 
Table 2 Models of radicalisation Tiflati (2016:9) adapted from King &Taylor (2011) that sees radicalisation as a 
transformation based on socio-psychological processes. Hafez & Mullins (2015: 20 Cited Tiflati 2016:10) assert that 
there are four factors that lead 
 
Hamed Abdel-Samad (2005 cited Box of Islam 2019b) argues that several causes need to coexist 
over a period of time to push an individual to join an extremist militant group. Hence ‘producing 
cross-regional, generalisable theories of radicalisation’ is a very difficult if not impossible task 
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(Ashour 2007: 602). This lack of knowledge ‘on why and how propaganda of al-Qaeda and ISIS 
attracts audiences makes it difficult to construct attractive counter-narratives’ even if the 
audience is identified (Hemmingsen, Castro 2017: 6). However, Tiflati (2016; Box of Islam 2019c; 
2019g) argues that there are two types of radicalisation: behavioural radicalisation (expressed 
in terrorism acts) and cognitive radicalisation. Most of the studies focus on behavioural 
radicalisation because the illegality of the committed acts offers a ground for operation. 
Thoughts - regardless of how radical they may be - are not illegal (ibid). Hence radical narratives 
that are taught in schools or in mosques (Box of Islam 2019e) are not illegal. 
What is a Narrative? 
Before diving into assessing narratives, let’s start by defining it.  Corman (2011: 36 cited Glazzard 
2017: 3) defines a story as a ‘particular sequence of related events that are situated in the past 
and recounted for rhetorical/ideological purposes’, while a narrative is a ‘coherent system of 
interrelated and sequentially organised stories that share a common rhetorical desire to resolve 
a conflict by establishing audience expectations according to the known trajectories of its 
literary and rhetorical form’. Finally, a master narrative is a ‘trans-historical narrative that is 
deeply embedded in a particular culture.’ 
What is a counter-narrative?  
According to Brigs and Feve (2013: 6), counter-narratives target individuals, groups and 
networks advanced on the path to radicalisation regardless of their passive or active 
involvement status. Furthermore, they ‘explicitly deconstruct, delegitimise and de-mystify 
extremist propaganda in order to achieve a number of aims, from de-radicalisation of those 
already radicalised to sowing the seeds of doubt among “at risk” audiences’ (Brigs, Feve 2013:6). 
 
The idea of the counter-narrative is confusing. This is due to the term encompassing both 
counter and alternative narratives (Reed, Ingram et al. 2017) and that ‘a common understanding 
of the new lexicon is yet to emerge’ (Ferguson 2016: 2). Hence Brigs and Feve (2013 cited Reed, 
Ingram et al. 2017:10) created the counter-messaging spectrum summarised in the table below. 
It is reproduced from the Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN] (2018: 422), the European 
network for counter-narratives practitioners: 
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Table 3 Different types of Counter-narratives  
 
This thesis abides by these definitions since they are the ones adopted by the practitioners and 
the literature of the field. Counter-narratives deconstruct extremist narratives, alternative 
narratives focus not primarily on ‘what we are against’ but on ‘what we are for’ (Brigs, Feve 201: 
1-2 cited Schmid 2014a: 30), and governments explain their policy and rationale. An effective 
counter-narrative will have elements from counter and alternative narratives (Reed, Ingram et 
al. 2017).  
Counter-narrative campaigns became the norm and were deemed successful if they were 
‘comprehensive, integrated and multi-dimensional, including both offensive and defensive 
messages. To merely respond to terrorist groups who have relatively sophisticated propaganda 
strategies is both naïve and doomed to failure’ (Reed, Ingram et.al 2017:12).  
Alternative narrative as proposed by Jenkins (Schmid 2014a) is meant to strengthen the home 
front. However, he acknowledges its potential to affect the jihadist adversary indirectly and 
thereby it can develop a certain deterrent potential.  Schmid created an aspirational list for the 
values and norms cherished in the West and yet to be achieved in it:  
democracy, separation of state and religion, majority rule with safeguards 
for minorities, merit-based upward social mobility, rule of law, respect for 
human rights (including women’s rights), pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, freedom (including freedom of thought and expression as well as 
freedom of religion), equality, education for all, the search for individual 
happiness in this world, human security, good governance, peace for all, 
openness to argument, readiness for dialogue, the search for peaceful 
solutions through negotiation and compromise, and the improvement of the 
human condition for all. These ideals – some of which have yet to be fully 
realised in the West itself – should be the cornerstones of the Western 
alternative narrative (Schmid 2014a: 30) 
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In the third category, the government strategic communication the narrative, is understood 
slightly differently. Narrative as understood by military experts (ibid) is a ‘simple unifying easily-
expressed story or explanation that organises people’s experience and provides a framework 
for understanding events.’ The military’s definition is relevant herein since terrorism has been 
understood in terms of political violence but gradually evolved to became communication and 
propaganda; if violence coerces and propaganda persuades, then terrorism is a combination of 
the two (Schmid 2014). Propaganda is badly viewed in the west due to its association with 
Nazism and communism therefore, ‘democratic government uses terms like “public affairs, 
public diplomacy psychological operations” and “strategic communications” (Schmid 2014:1). 
The Pentagon spent one billion US dollars for its 2012 strategic communications against al-
Qaeda, which was defined as 
 A systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across 
strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables the understanding of 
target audiences, identifies effective conduits, and develops and promotes 
ideas and opinions through those conduits to promote and sustain particular 
types of behaviour (Tatham 2010: 19 cited Schmid 2014:11).  
 
In the fight against ISIS, the coalition established a Twitter account and engaged directly with its 
followers, disputing and explaining stories. The following is an example of such interaction. On 
the left, the BBC broke a story as an exclusive coverage of a secret evacuation of ISIS fighters. 
On the right, the coalition’s spokesperson pinpoints that a press release was issued and sent to 
the BBC radio to communicate the arrangement negotiated by the SDF (the Syrian Democratic 
Forces) to curb extensive fighting in Raqqa. 
 
Picture  2 Tweets from the coalition spokesperson commenting on a BBC report 
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Practices of counter-narratives 
This section explores trends and organisation, the frameworks of counter-narratives campaigns 
in literature with some example of successful initiatives before refocusing the discussion on the 
video-content.  
Trends and organisations  
A study commissioned by the LIBE committee – The European Parliament committee on civil 
liberties, justice and home affairs (Reed, Ingram et al. 2017) - thoroughly details all the 
international organisations that are involved in fighting Islamic extremism from the UN, NATO 
and the coalition fighting ISIS to tech companies and different European agencies. The report 
(Reed, Ingram et al. 2017: 7) categorises the practices in countering extremist propaganda under 
four categories: 
 
i. Disruption of propaganda distribution: by taking down propaganda from its source 
and deleting offending accounts from social media; for example, Europol and its IRU 
(internet referral unit)  
ii. Redirect method: Pioneered by Jigsaw and Moonshot CVE. It attempts to redirect 
those who are searching for jihadist material to counter-messaging in order to 
nudge their behaviour  
iii. Campaign and message design: Provide information and skills to civil society 
organisation (CSOs) to develop communications campaign typically based on 
counter-narratives or alternative narratives 
iv. Government communications and synchronisation of message and action: the 
synchronisation approach prevents exposing a narrative’s “say-do-gap;” the 
approach ‘aims to link messages and actions, and to coordinate messaging with 





Redirect and One-one-intervention 
 
The redirect method relies on AdWord recognition for Google searches. It redirects internet 
searches to non-extremist material (Helmus, Klein 2018). Ad campaigns, mostly less than five-
minute videos, are constructed in order to pierce through the extremists’ narratives and support 
this method. The method is deemed successful (ibid); however, it can be disrupted by ISIS 
extremists who are experts in digital insurgency. They advise and share with their supporters 
tricks on how to stay safe and anonymous online and direct them to the Dark Web to access 
their propaganda (Jihadoscope tweet May 16, 2019).  
 
 
Picture  3 Tweet from Jihadoscope divulging ISIS advice to stay anonymous online. An older version is included in the 
appendix 
 
The one-on-one-intervention requires a former extremist to directly contact a person who is 
browsing extremist material. Setting aside the breach of privacy for these users, this 
intervention requires the target to accept engaging with the messenger.  However, it is deemed 
successful because ‘although many refused to engage with the outreach provider, 60% of those 
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contacted did engage in sustained contact and many made progress in addressing their 
extremist views.’ (Counter-Narratives.org).  
 
Framework for counter-narrative campaigns  
The table below summaries the three frameworks offering guidance for counter-narrative 
campaign creators. Ashour’s framework is the only one that predates ISIS. The remaining 
frameworks are published for counter-terrorism agencies. Van Ginkel is published by the 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism at The Hague. Tuck and Silverman drafted the 
Counter-narratives Handbook for the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). The institute created 
counter-narratives.org that offers support in the form of a toolkit to create campaigns. 
  
Ashour (2010) Van Ginkel (2015) Tuck & Silverman (2016) 
 Target audience: vulnerable 
individuals  
Target audience: vulnerable 
individuals  
Message: Comprehensive 
and multi-layered  
Message: tailored for the 
identified group 
Message: facts, emotional 
appeals of impact, satire and 
humour, positive stories 
Messenger: Credible Messenger: teachers, 
parents, former extremists  
Messengers: credible former 
extremists or survivors etc 
Online propagation  Multiplatform/ Medium  Medium 
Table 1 Counter-narratives' different frameworks 
Ashour’s suggested framework is based on previous research he conducted on the Al-Gama’a 
al-Islamiya [The Islamic Group, IG], the largest armed Islamist group in Egypt. Against all odds, 
the IG declared a ceasefire in July 1997 after a violent struggle they started in the late 1970s to 
topple Mubarak’s regime. They ‘renounced its radical literature, published new books, and 
replaced its curricula with those of the relatively moderate Muslim Brothers’; this was deemed 
successful as ‘it took around 15,000 to 20,000 IG militants away from the Salafi Jihadi camp of 
al-Qa’ida’ (Ashour 2007: 596-7).   
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Based on this, Ashour (2010) argues that online de-radicalisation is possible and suggests 
building an effective counter-narrative of violent extremism on 3 pillars: (1) comprehensiveness 
of the depth of the multilayers of the message; (2) credibility of the messenger; and (3) 
promotion and the propagation. It is important to note that the IG members were in prison while 
this change of strategy occurred. They rescinded their reform when they were released.  
 As shown in the table above, his framework is the basis of counter-narratives, and recent 
frameworks expanded on his ideas. The ISD framework is conceived as a handbook for 
practitioners asking fundamental questions ‘Who is your audience? What is your message? 
What medium are you going to use? Who will be your messenger?’ (Tuck & Silverman 2016:7). 
But since both frameworks share a similar structure, a brief exploration of their main ideas is 
discussed under the headings: target group, message, messenger and medium.  
 
The target group  
According to Van Ginkel (2015b:8) the target group includes ‘sympathisers, followers, active 
facilitators, active believers who take the lead in debates, religious leaders, foreign fighters, 
former fighters, and recruiters’ etc. (Van Ginkel 2015b:9). To identify this target a certain 
amount of surveillance may be needed where  
vital elements that need to be taken into account include the profile of the target group, 
the question of with whom its members are in contact, the background that its members 
come from, the level of education or professional experience that they have, their 
(former) interests, and the sources used to find information (Van Ginkel 2015b: 9).  
 
This certainly entails a certain level of expertise and funding, meaning it will exclude small 
initiatives and may require legal powers to implement it (ibid).  
 
Tuck and Silverman (2016:18-19) assert that the characteristics of the audience determine all 
other components hence ‘understanding how your audience acts both online and offline helps 
you to figure out who they are and how to reach them.’ They advise to talk to audience, co-
create with them or conduct focus group, ‘research the content and profiles that your audience 
engage with online […] learn from former extremists about why extremists messaging appeal to 
them […] contact similar organisations or people who run similar counter-narratives campaigns.’  
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Both frameworks focus on addressing youth, this is because, as Tiflati (Box of Islam 2019b) points 
out, ISIS is a youthful phenomenon with most of its recruits’ age range between 17 and 30. 
 
The message  
The message should be tailored for the identified target group. Van Ginkel (2015b:10) suggests 
analysing what needs to be countered since ‘the extremist narrative might contain elements 
that are humanitarian, ideological/religious, or identity oriented,’ advises a ‘multidisciplinary 
input in order to understand the sociological, psychological, criminological and religious 
elements in the narrative,’ and also advises consultation with experts in communication, 
anthropologists and regional experts with the language used determined by the (sub)culture of 
the group in question.  
 
Tuck and Silverman (2016:19-20) define a story as a message with a purpose stressing that the 
‘most effective message offer the audience something to think about and reflect’, aiming for a 
strong reaction  The types of the message are ‘facts from credible source to demystify and 
discredit extremists messages, emotional appeal highlighting impact of extremism and violence, 
satire and humour to de-glamorise and undermine [their] rebellious appeal, positive stories 
from […] your audience or someone they admire’ (Ibid).  
 
The messenger  
Credibility of the messenger is essential in order for the message to be well-received. However, 
this depends on the recipients. What follows is a list of potential messengers according to Van 
Ginkel (2015b: 10-13): 
 
Government actors, either on the central level, regional or local levels, communicate 
public information campaigns that focus on the Western narrative of a rule-of-law-
based society that respects pluralism and human rights; also explain the foreign policy 
choices made, as well as the policies and measures that are adopted to address 
national security risks. 
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Religious leaders and religious associations are far better placed to address 
alternative interpretations of the Quran and other religious texts in response to 
extremist interpretations of Islam. 
 
Associations representing minority groups of migrants, like religious leaders can 
communicate an alternative narrative and contribute to a public information 
campaign about Western values. 
 
Former jihadists, after a proper rehabilitation and reintegration process, can talk from 
experience and share their disappointments about how they might feel misled or 
cheated, thus undermining the camaraderie narrative of jihadists. 
 
Victims of terrorism: can counter the dehumanization strategy followed by extremists 
by giving a face to the victims. 
 
Educators can recognise early signs of radicalization, address the problem and 
underlying causes in an open debate with their pupils and students. 
 
Family members and direct neighbours and friends, they can pick up on early signs of 
radicalisation and conduct a dialogue with the individuals to address the alternative 
narrative and the counter-narrative.  
 
In the same line, Tuker and Silverman (2016: 11) list examples such as ‘former extremists, 
survivors of violence, respected charities or projects [relevant to the target audience], 
individuals that your audience respect such as sporting figures, actors or singers, 




The medium  
According to Van Ginkel (2015b: 14) ‘multiple platforms [should be used] at the same time and 
in a timely and responsive manner to events. These communication strategies thus need to aim 
for long-term effects and should therefore consist of a continuing output of messages’. The idea 
is to mirror the extremists’ behaviour online while using the same keywords to ensure higher 
ranking in the counter-message. 
  
For Tuck and Silverman (2016:17-18) a campaign can be one medium or a combination of two 
or more. It can be videos as in short films or animations, images as photos or memes, texts as in 
slogans, hashtags or open letters, online literature like brochures or informative posters, audio 
recordings such as podcasts or short audio-clips, comics like manga, short panels or graphic 
novels. They are more practice-oriented and suggest that videos and pictures work well on social 
media while text-based campaigns work better on blogs or forums (ibid).  
 
Example of successful campaigns 
RAN’s website lists different initiatives deemed successful, and their report contains a collection 
of approaches to practices (Radicalisation Awareness Network 2018). These approaches look 
into practices in schools and prisons (like Forsee), campaigns aimed at the far right (like Trojan 
Shirt and EXIT in Germany), campaigns created by the Youth in schools against radicalisation 
(C4C) and social media campaigns to ridicule extremism. 
 
The LIBE report (Reed, Ingram et al. 2017) focuses on initiatives mostly created by Breakthrough 
Media, a public relations company that designs campaigns for RICU [Research Information 
Communication Unit] in the UK and the European Commission. The company’s mission 
statement states that their campaigns ‘tackle some of the world’s toughest issues, helping 
clients counter misinformation and prevent violent extremism’ which has resulted in products 
like the campaign Educate Against Hate, the multimedia platform Ummahsonic and a 
documentary titled My Former Life (Reed, Ingram et al. 2017:23).  
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The successful examples discussed below are selected from both the LIBE and RAN reports. The 
selection of successful is limited to the focus of this thesis. Since it is a multimedia platform, 
Ummahsonic is included. However, its main concern is discussed under the heading video 
campaigns. It is divided into 2 sections a- Animated short films containing I am Abdullah X and 
Average Mohamed and b- Live action: the lives affected which includes Not Another Brother, 12 
Echoes of ISIS, My Former Life and La Voix des Victimes. 
 
Ummahsonic 
It is a multimedia platform that ‘celebrate{s] everything Muslim’. While the platform aims to 
celebrate Islamic culture, it plays directly to the single identity problems where an African Somali 
and Asian Pakistani are addressed as being a priori Muslim if not limiting the identification to 
being Muslim. This plays directly to Islamists’ strength since their narrative dissociates the 
personal identity construct from a specific land and culture and posits Islam as the sole provider 
of identity (Abdel-Samad 2016; el-Qemani September 8, 2018). Even if the website targets 
Muslims and aims to celebrate the multicultural nature of London, closer attention should be 
given not to feed the hate speech of the far-right (Box of Islam 2019f). For example, in a section 
titled Islamic history there is an entry titled Five Surprising Facts about Islam in London. It states 
that ‘London is a more Islamic city than much of the Muslim world put together’ (Ummahsonic 
2015). The far-right groups already refer to the city as ‘Londonistan’ and claim the city has no-
go to zones for non-Muslims (Bawer 2018). The far right identify Muslims only by their 
Muslimness; this was showcased by their campaign titled Punish a Muslim Day. Flyers were 
distributed in London encouraging their supporters to pull the veils off of women’s heads. 
Video-campaigns  
Henceforward, the focus is on counter/alternative narratives that uses film aesthetics in 
communicating their messages. This section will discuss different initiatives under two headings: 
Animated short films and Live action: the lives affected.   
 
Animated short films: 
The following campaigns are considered a success despite the high cost of its production and 
the difficulty of its sustainability. Two projects are discussed below: Abdullah-X (2012) and 
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Average Mohamed (Ahmed 2015). Since these videos have the most watch viewership on 
YouTube, they will feature as example in the discussion of framework.  
 
Abdullah-X:  
This is an animation initiative launched in 2012 in the UK. 
YouTube shows 1679 subscribers and 22 videos with the 
most recent dating back to 2016. The character is a young 
Muslim with changing appearances who can be ‘anyone 
struggling with Issues of identity, faith, belonging, a sense of 
duty, grievance, injustice, confusion etc.’ (Radicalisation 
awareness network 2018: 429). Abdullah does not just 
address extremism; he speaks for young Muslims as well. 
For example, in the video addressing the Charlie Hebdo attacks, when extremists gunned down 
and killed the cartoonists in the French satirical magazine for drawing the Prophet, Abdallah 
complains about the world wanting him to stop his life and apologise for extremists’ actions 
while he has his finals to worry about on top of everything.  
 
Average Mohamed: 
The campaign was launched in the USA in 2015. The YouTube 
channel is multilingual (English and Swahili) and shows 763 
subscribers and 29 videos. It is also available on their blog, 
Facebook and Twitter. The initiative states that ‘it takes an idea 
to defeat an idea’. Average Mohamed according to its creator is 
‘a counter-ideology mechanism that uses the creator popular 
culture engine tools to prevent indoctrination at the point of 
inception’.  Average Mohamed is a likable middle-aged figure. 
However, he might come across as slightly preachy. In the slavery 
episode, the core value advanced is slavery is bad this is why it is banned in most of the Muslim 
world. He continues asking the viewer ‘who do you want to be like: Muslim governments or 
ISIS?’ It is worth noting that extremists accuse the governments of the Muslim world of apostacy 
(el-Qemani September 8, 2018; Ahmed 2011). ISIS was upfront in its support to slavery 
 
Picture  4 A screenshot from YouTube 
representing the character Abdullah-X  
Picture  5 Average Mohamed   
screenshot from YouTube 
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restoration, their justification relied on the 70 Quranic Ayas [Quranic Verses] regulating it (el-
Qemani September 8, 2018). 
                                                                                                
                                                                                          
Live action: the lives affected 
This section describes: My Former Life, Not Another Brother, 12 Echoes of ISIS and La Voix des 
Victimes contre la radicalisation.  
My Former Life 
My Former Life is a documentary featuring four stories of former jihadists and was 
commissioned by the Peace Foundation. However, the documentary is not available for open 
access and the Peace Foundation has a restricted access for members only. This raises the 
question whether the initiator of this approach has real confidence that it will deter on its own 
without it being contextualised in the classrooms.   
 
Not another Brother:  
This is a short art video by Quilliam launched in 2015. The short version at 1’41” has been viewed 
more than 67,000 times. In contrast of ISIS propaganda films where the fighters are filmed 
walking in the sunlight, Not Another Brother features one man hiding from the bombs in a 
bunker. The voiceover narrates a letter from his brother regretting getting extremist material 
home. The caption on the YouTube channel asks viewers to share the video and ‘to show ISIL 
that their extremist views has no place in our community.’ The channel also features Negotiate, 
a short video that quotes teenagers’ words about pressures and factors (social media, identity, 
sexuality, faith etc.) that might make them vulnerable to poisonous ideologies. It is attached to 
a funding campaign that gathered 6% of its target budget.  
 
12 echoes of IS:  
This is a web documentary available on a YouTube Channel. The film clips feature 12 people 
whose lives has been affected by ISIS. The stories vary from Syrian refugees in the Netherlands 




La voix des victimes contre la radicalisation (AFVT) 
L’association Française des victims du terrorisme (AFVT) launched this online campaign ‘to 
amplify the voices of survivors and tell their stories in order to counter the dehumanising 
narratives of extremists’ (Counter-narratives.org). However, if little attention is given to the 
representation of these groups’ cultural heritage, this angle can risk anchoring the victimhood 
into the narratives of these groups and rendering it a prominent feature of the perception of 
their identity.  
 
 
Criticism of counter-narratives 
Hemmingsen and Castro (2017: 20-21) suggest that the focus on narratives and counter-
narratives is tied to the assumption ‘that becoming convinced by an ideological cause 
[intellectual radicalisation] is a process through which the individual or group is manipulated or 
even brainwashed with misinformation’. Therefore, the counter-narratives intend to correct 
misunderstandings and lies. The authors acknowledged it may be the case but warned against 
overestimating these cases. They added if individuals are using the ideology as means to an end 
then providing them with another course of action works better that narratives (ibid). However, 
even in cases where addressing the ideology or the narratives may be relevant, ‘it is unlikely that 
doing so in a confrontational manner by correcting, exposing or ridiculing it will have the desired 
effect’ (ibid). 
Furthermore Glazzard (2017: 16) argues that ‘policy makers and practitioners need to look 
beyond their tools of strategic communication, public diplomacy and social media campaigning, 
and rediscover the potential of cultural production - including literature - in offering an 
alternative to the seductive creativity of violent groups.’ Glazzard argues counter-narratives 
gained a consensus among policy-makers and civil society practitioners and are largely produced 
by these groups rather than academics; therefore, they lack a fully articulated theory and very 
little evidence supports them (2017:3-5). Counter-narrative theory reflects a broader set of 
assumptions ‘particularly pronounced among governments about the causal factors of extremist 
violence’ and that there is a  
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 wont to emphasise ideology, especially ideology deriving from overseas as 
the principal source for the corruption of the minds of those who turn to 
violence. By leaving out other factors or explanations, from socio-economic 
grievances to the lure of adventure to the primary human need for survival, 
the ideological explanation is at best a gross over-simplification (Glazzard 
2017: 6) 
 
Even counter-narratives as a notion is ambiguous according to Reed, Ingmar and Whittekar 
(2017:10) since it can refer to 
 government-led initiatives, de-radicalisation strategies, or grassroots and 
civil society movements and can be speaking to a number of different 
audiences – such as extremists, those vulnerable to extremism, members of 
communities that include extremists, or the general population at large.   
 
Their criticism revolves around three points: the novelty of the field; the non-conclusive nature 
of the correlation between exposure to extremist content and committing violent activities; and 
the defensive nature of counter-narratives.   
 
Recognising that the study of counter-narratives is a new field, the authors (Reed, Ingram et al. 
2017) highlight the gap between the volume and quality of counter-narratives produced in 
comparison to ISIS’ sophisticated propaganda. Van Ginkel (2015) noted this problem and 
suggested that training needs to be provided for the practitioners.  
 
The correlation between exposure to extremist content and future violent extremist activities is 
inconclusive. Kate Ferguson (2016: 9) states that  
the picture is somewhat mixed: while there is some evidence suggesting 
patterns of discourse and communication such as hate speech, 
dehumanisation, and identity-based narratives (or propaganda) can 
contribute to conditions where IBV [Identity Based Violence] or VE [Violent 
Extremism] becomes more likely, the causal relationship remains unproven.  
 
So, in term of empirical research in terrorism studies, ‘not all those who develop extreme beliefs 
become terrorists, and that many terrorist actors do not “radicalise” in any traditional sense’ 
(ibid). Reed, Ingmar and Whitekar (2017:11) point to the length IS goes to in order to create 
their propaganda and stress the great deal of evidence suggesting that messaging has an effect 
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on consumers’ recruitment prospects since this is the premise of TV advertising. It is worth 
noting that TV advertising has a predefined product to sell and arguably ISIS posits itself as a 
product with the tag line ‘Baqiya wa Tamadad’ (Remaining and Expanding). This is not the case 
for counter-narratives as Nafees (2018) defines them as: 
public service announcements that will likely have the same impact as anti-
drug PSAs, which have been shown to have no effect in the short-term and 
may even have adverse effects in the longer term. And alternative narratives 
are essentially advertising with no product to sell: even if the messages reach 
and resonate with the target audience, if they subsequently do not offer the 
viewer something they can actually do, or some offline group they can 




The defensive nature of counter-narratives means that it can barely respond to the opposing 
messaging, allowing it to set the ground for the communication battle to control the narrative 
(Reed 2017 cited Reed, Ingram et al. 2017 :12). As discussed earlier, the advice given to 
practitioners directs them to respond and even to co-create when possible. To identify content, 
they are advised to ‘carefully consider the message and ensure you know precisely how your 
content will convey it. Consult your audiences if possible’ (Tuck & Silverman 2016:19). This 
suggests that practitioners are creating content in response to their perception of radical media 
consumption.  
 
Radical media consumption 
In the early stages of this research, I sought to understand how radicals approach recruits in 
general and women in particular in online forums. @Carl (2016), a Kurdish activist who infiltrates 
jihadi channels, asserted that the first contacts were always benign discussions about Islam, how 
to be a good Muslim without any reference to violence. Violence is present in the media 
consumption of convicted extremists in the UK, i.e. those who were planning to carry out 
domestic attacks, but it is only 31% of their consumption (Holbrook’s 2017). This figure below 




Figure 1 Percentages of violent material in the media consumption of ISIS recruits. Figure 3-b (on the right) gives a 
closer look on extreme material. Extreme 1: limited to combatants; 2: justifies violence on civilians and 3: specific 
targets. 
        
Moderate material did not  promote hatred or endorse violence; fringe material perpetuated 
isolationist material and hatred towards outward groups with no reference to violence; extreme 
material was an endorsement and glorification of violence in the modern context and was 
divided to three levels, with Level 1 mentioning violence vaguely or limit it to combatants, Level 
2 justifying violence against civilians, and Level 3 going further to give specific facilitating details 
such as the preference of specific targets (Hollbrook 2017: 8-9). These media publications were 
in ‘different formats: published written material (including books, pamphlets and articles 
published online); audio recordings; and video content’ (ibid). The prominence of audio content 
(sermons and Arabic Nasheeds with English subtitles) remained consistent throughout the 
cases, and user-generated videos from YouTube increased in popularity (Holbrook 2017: 11-13). 
Although fundamental, this research leaves some questions unanswered, particularly to how 
these texts - violent and non-violent - interrelate to construct the extremists’ worldview. 
 
Counter-narratives framework 
This section discusses the framework component, focusing solely on how it affects the video 
outputs of counter-narratives. It contains four headings: content and target audience, message, 
messenger and online propagation. 
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Content and target audience  
The guidelines usher practitioners to understand their target audience’s behaviour online. It 
presumes that understanding extremist online consumption facilitates creating counter and 
alternative narrative. These are the titles of the videos posted on Average Mohamed YouTube 
channel: (1) What does the Quran say about suicide bombings? (2) Boston Strong, (3) Islamic 
state job description, (4) What does the Quran say about ISIS? (5) What does Voltaire has to do 
with Charlie Hebdo? (6) A Muslim in the West, (7) Identity in Islam, (8) Be like Aisha, (9) What 
does Islam have to say about slavery? (10) The bullet or the ballot, (11) Being A student video, 
(12) Dealing with Islamophobia, (13) Immigrants video, (14) Soccer star, (14) Family video, (15) 
Save the world, (17) Car homicide and Islam, (18) Madness. Average Mohamed is mentioned 
herein since it is still posting videos with the latest one addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.  
While the campaign creator claims to address radicalisation at the point of inception, its output 
seems to focus more on behavioural extremism. The plurality of these videos explicitly tackles 
violence when the plurality of the texts consumed by convicted violent extremists is non-violent 
and even ‘condemns the use of violence’ (Holbrok 2017:14). Tiflati (Box of Islam 2019g) explains 
that the law presented a framework to address behavioural extremism since violence or joining 
an extremist group is illegal. Most fighters recruited by ISIS are under 30 years old, therefore 
there is plenty of advice to target young age groups. Naturally, migration to Syria was a topic 
that was treated by both animation counter-narratives. It is undeniable that the proto-state 
established as a Caliphate in the promised land constituted a pull factor (Box of Islam 2019g). El-
Qemani (September 8, 2016) states that Shahada (martyrdom) is the only guaranteed way 
particularly in Sunni Islam to be admitted in heaven. Yet this heaven hypothesis is mostly 
discounted from the radicalisation studies (Hamid 2016). However, according to Imam Zaid 
Shakir (2016)  ‘one of the most powerful recruiting tools of ISIS has been its ability to create an 
apocalyptic appeal around the prophesied destruction of a “Crusader” army at Dabiq.’ ISIS 
named its first magazine after the town in Northern Syria with a clear reliance on the 
geographical location. It will be difficult to foresee if land grabs will be the route to follow in the 
post-ISIS era; however, as their land eroded, they are expected to ‘be brilliant at digital 
insurgence’ (Twitter @Gluck 6 Feb 2016).  
 
Going forward, counter-narratives are a communication tool which will need to adapt to the 
extremists’ changing discourse, particularly in the West. Said Shoaib, an Egyptian journalist, 
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founded the Canadian Institute for Islamic Studies to track the Muslim Brothers and other 
extremists’ offences against Muslims and non-Muslims (Al-Ain 2020). He points out that even 
though the violence discourse is avoided in Canadian extremists’ mosques, the country hosts 
one of the eight most radical mosques in the world (Box of Islam 2019e). However, the non-
violent material available in these mosques and Canadian public libraries promotes political 
Islam’s worldview. To pierce through this narrative, he donated some books to the public library; 
the library returned them under the banner of Islamophobia. Shoaib and Abdel-Samad (Box of 
Islam 2019e) both point out that the funds of political Islam and their activism in the public 
sphere have posited Islamists as the speakers of Muslim community.  
Democracy features in Schmidt’s list reproduced earlier as well as counter-narratives reviewed 
for this research. Separation of state and Islam is very difficult due to the inherent political 
element in the doctrine as well as the ongoing attempts by political Islam to reshape the modern 
state upon the model of the confederate established by the religion’s founder (el-Qemani 
September 8, 2016). Furthermore, moderate political parties seem to be very successful with 
the public (Ottaway, Muashar 2012). Khashogji (2018) claims that true democratic 
representation cannot exclude from political Islam from the political process.  The Bullet or the 
Ballot video asks Muslims to make a choice between the bullet, the knife, the bomb or the ballot. 
Naturally, it promotes the use of the ballot ‘because we are Muslims not fools.’ El-Qemani 
(September 8, 2016) claims that many political Islamic parties see democracy as a mean to an 
end, which is to reach the government. Abdel-Samad (Box of Islam 2016l) reminds his audience 
that people voted for the Iranian theocracy despite Khumaini’s prior publications of his vision 
and plans. Taleb (2018) argues that an inflexible minority needs to be around 11% to win an 
election due to shared values with the flexible majority. This goal is easily achievable for Islamist 
parties as demonstrated by the events after the Arab Spring. So is the likelihood of a post-
democratic power grab by an Islamist party being considered and how it might affect people’s 
lives and their human rights?  
Schmidt’s list aims to challenge a worldview organisational structure instead of a narrow focus 
on the violence. While addressing a worldview, campaigns need to be more subtle than the 
counter-narratives’ discourse. Otherwise campaigns tend to be dismissed by the intended 
audience as a ‘deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and 
direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist’ 
(Schmid 2014a:6-7). Unfortunately, this was the reaction of the counter-narratives’ intended 
audience (Bélanger, Nisa et al. 2020). 
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It is worth mentioning that voices of victims like those documented AFVT can keep running for 
years to come, considering the amount of suffering ISIS inflicted. While the damage that ISIS 
inflicted on certain communities should be discussed and recorded in historical records, 
victimhood cannot be the sole defining factor of any community. Dehumanisation of certain 
communities can be fought with promoting their culture, particularly the Yazidi community [as 
commonly spelled in Western media referring to Êzîdis in Kurdish and Izidiyin in Arabic, an 
ethno-religious minority of Iraq. They should not be confused with the Yazidiyin in Arabic, an 
Islamic group].  
 
Eagleman (2018) claims that the brain craves novelty so it loses interest when presented with 
the same thing over and over again, even if that novelty it craves should be anchored in the past 
or the familiar. This concept is very familiar in addressing consumption risk in film industry and 
the reason why successful formulas are replicated for a limited life cycle or until the next hit 
emerges. Even if their content is reactive to their audience’s interests, this still may cause a 
problem for counter-narratives. Terrorism and Islamic extremism topics are not novelty topics 
to begin with since they have been discussed globally since the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Most 
importantly, as the offer of content is having a negative effect on its target audience, the 
question should be raised if that content is adequate to begin with. 
 
 
The Message:  
The website Counter-narratives.org presents a toolkit for practitioners to develop a message. It 
advises to offer their target audience something to think about and reflect on, instead of 
lecturing them. This message can  
 deconstruct, discredit and demystify an extremist message with facts. Make 
an emotional appeal to the audience to consider the impact of extremism 
and violence. Undermine extremist propaganda through satire or humour. 
Choose a specific aspect of an extremist narrative to counter or undermine. 
Offer a positive alternative message or narrative (Counter-narratives.org).  
 
From a practical perspective, deconstructing a lie requires way more time and structure than 
the lie itself. For example, the moon landing is considered by some to have been faked as the 
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flag can be seen flapping. Despite the live broadcast, some people still discredit the moon 
landing. While these claims have been discredited, the Royal Museums Greenwich’s website still 
has a page debunking this conspiracy theory. In the flag case they had to explain that NASA had 
set it up that way and points to the telescopic pole extended to hold it together which is actually 
visible in the picture (Royal Museums Greenwich). 
Since extremist counter-narratives are not new (Ashour 2010), Islamists’ knowledge in the 
subject matter can predispose them to ready-made convincing answers to their followers. 
Hadaya Centre (Zeiger 2016: 3) claims that ‘these counter-narratives refute and dismantle the 
religious and ideological elements of the violent extremist narratives, utilising religious texts and 
religious leaders to refute religious claims.’ On face value this is ideal according to Paul Graham’s 
essay on how to disagree. He places refuting the central point as the best way to disagree. The 
figure (Ratner 2018) below shows an illustration of the hierarchy of disagreement. However, 
refuting misinformation is difficult enough with factual evidence. Sharot (2017) claims that 
people have the ability to spin even factual evidence to reaffirm their existing belief. This 
stemmed from an experiment where researchers shared facts and information about climate 
change with two distinct groups of people; they noted if the facts did not coincide with existing 
beliefs then they were disregarded, however, in the opposite case it makes their existing beliefs 
more extremist (ibid). Religious beliefs may be more challenging to refute than factual data.  
 
Figure 2 Hierarchy of disagreement according to Paul Graham (Big think 18 March 2018) 
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Abdel-Samad (2016) points out that extremists’ narratives are anchored in the Quran, 
jurisprudence and historical practices. Hence when attempting to refute their claims, they have 
the upper hand in their presentation since they do not need to cherry-pick verses to support 
their claim (ibid).  This caption from Abdullah-X (YouTube 9 October 2014: 1’31) highlights this 
problem. Responding to his question ‘in between the 
Islamophobia and the Fatwa bots there is actually 
something for us young people to aspire to?’ and the 
answer he gave is ‘it’s the Sunnah… It’s the way and 
actions of the beloved…’ 
Many argues that Islamism is born out Wahabism and 
the Muslim Brotherhood (Daring Question 2016; 2016i; 
Ahmed 2011), with Ibrahim (2015) claiming that there is 
a historical evolution that links el-Baghedadi (ISIS) to el-
Najedi (founder of Wahabism). Salafism is the main 
ideological drive behind Islamism; their core principle according to Mansour (Daring Question 
2011r) is to follow the footsteps of the Prophet in actions and lifestyle as narrated in Hadith and 
Syra. This is the message of Abdullah-X. Despite the difference in their discourse, both Abdel-
Samad (Box of Islam 2019) and Sultan (2011, Daring Question 2013aa; 2015ai) put the 
responsibility of creating ISIS on Mohamed himself.  
Reform is presented as the solution, drawing on the history of reforming Christianity. Ayan Hirsi 
Ali (2015b) calls on the US to support Islamic reform due to her belief that Islam is a threat 
otherwise. According to her, this endeavour is challenging because of (Ali 2015a, 2015; 2015c) 
Islamic teachings as well as its decentralised structure of power vs. the hierarchal centralised 
structure of the reformed Catholic Church. Ramadan (92nd Street 2010) cites this decentralised 
structure as a hindrance to reform. Abdel Samad (Box of Islam 2017b; Box of Islam 2017c; Box 
of Islam 2017d; Box of Islam 2017; Daring Question 2017a, Daring Question 2017b)  believes 
that reform is a futile endeavour, nevertheless he debated the topic with Mohannad Khorshid 
leading to publishing their exchange of ideas in a book and in a series of episodes in his show. 
The dialogue between Abdel-Samad and Khoreshid summed up the status of the discourse: 
reformists accuse critics of adopting, like ISIS, the most radical interpretation of Islam; critics 
accuse reformists of whitewashing Islam and cherry picking what supports their argument 
without being truthful to the text (ibid). Abdel-Samad (ibid) questions the success of the 
Christian reform experience since it fragmented the Catholic Church and led to the birth of new 
 
Picture  6 Abdallah-X Extract from the video 
titled Road of realisation part 2: Islamism 
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Christian sects. He also questions the logistics of carrying out the reform considering the power 
that political Islam holds as well as the resistance it may face from Islamic religious institutions 
since they consider Ibn Taymiya, Salafism and Wahabism as reformist (Box of Islam 2017ag; 
2017ah). The modern-day reformists are mostly Western based (Khorshid) or studied in the 
West (El-Behiri). 
When discussing Jihad in Madness, Average Mohamed simply called out the madness of going 
into a Kosher shop and shooting peaceful Jews who did not harm anyone. El-Qemani (September 
8, 2018) recounts that when he was in school, preachers from el-Azhar taught his generation 
that Jihad is the struggle to get closer to God. Enlightenment ideas, crucial to the Catholic 
experience, are already present in Islamic traditions (Box of Islam 2019h). Assid (Daring Question 
2015ah) argues that the Muslim Brotherhood took over el-Azhar and these enlightenment 
discussions were aborted. More recently, President el-Sisi gave a speech in el-Azhar (28 
December 2014) asking for ‘tajdid el khitab el-dini’ or reforming the religious discourse.  The call 
divided opinions. Some applauded it as necessary, some voices questioned the suitability of el-
Azhar to conduct reforms and still others, like Coptic activists Majdi Khalil, dismissed it entirely 
as a stunt to appease the West (Daring Question 2016f). El-Azhar did respond to the president’s 
call and purged the curriculum, but according to el-Behiri (Kol Yom 2016a; 2017a) they only 
deleted references to cannibalism and absolved themselves from taking further steps. 
Therefore, a reform as understood in the Eurocentric experience of the Catholic Church is 
unlikely. This unlikelihood, according to Rabboudi (Box of Islam 2019a; 2019b; 2018h) is due to 
the West having a Church, but the Muslim society being the Church and the lack of the 
enlightenment foundation to enable Islamic reform.  
However, little attention is given to a concept that occurred organically in Islamic history which 
is Ta3til, an approach pinpointed by Brother Rachid (Hiwarat Hicham 2017). Ta3til simply means 
suspension, which entails considering some Ayas’ ruling irrelevant or incompatible with our 
modern life. El-Qemani (September 8, 2018) cites the organic suspension of 72 Ayas in the Quran 
that regulate slavery. This embodies Haris’ (2004 :17 cited Schmid 2014b: 8) definition of 
moderation discussed earlier since the majority of the Muslims accept the abolition of slavery. 
However radical groups like ISIS believe in abiding by all the rulings eternally, hence they brought 
back this practice and enslaved, raped and sold Yazidi women in markets and drove this 
community to near extinction.  Like all other religions, Islam is clashing with modernity (Abdel-
Samad 2016). The desire to reconciliate laws regulating old Arabia with modern dates can be 
found among moderates too. For instance, a scholar from el-Azhar issued a fatwa decreeing 
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woman in the workforce should breastfeed their male co-workers (Al-Bawaba 2007; Daring 
Question 2007; Ashraf 2019). It drew heavy criticism and al-Azhar abolished it.  
It is worth noting that Mahmoud Taha, a Sudanese Imam, already gave Ta3til its theoretical 
framework. He advocated that timelessness of the Quran is in the universal teachings of Islam 
found in the Meccan verses and that the violent sword verses of the Medina were a special case 
only applicable to the Prophet (Daring Question 2015g). However, Taha was tried and found 
guilty of apostacy which is punishable by death. El-Azhar was accused of being responsible for 
Taha’s death upon a fatwa they issued concerning him on 6 May 1972 (ibid). The institution is 
now asked to apologise for their role and retract the Fatwa (al-Taghyeer 2020). It is worth noting 
that both Shia and Sunni Islamism refer to the same text; the difference between the two lies in 
the blood lineage of the ruling elite on the Caliphate (el-Tamimi 2018a; 2018b).  
The messages of counter-narratives such as Abdullah-X rely on the peaceful Quranic verses to 
challenge behavioural extremism. Extremists can undermine their messaging by using the 
concept of abrogation, which means newer verses repeal older ones. Abdel-Samad (Daring 
Question 2016) pinpoints that Ayat-Assayf - the ‘sword verse’ (9:5) which commanded to fight 
non-believers - is the last one revealed, and abrogation therefore means it is the ruling to follow. 
Furthermore, refuting extremists’ claims or even challenging abrogation requires transparency. 
However, according to Mahmoud Rasmi (2018) ‘Islamic preaching is a bit convoluted, because 
it takes different forms when it is taught internally to religious people, versus when it is 
professed externally vis a vis non-Muslims.’ This is another layer that counter-narratives might 
have to consider on top of the necessity to adapt to the changing discourse, address non-violent 
Islamism (Box of Islam 2019e, Schmid 2014) and possibly engage with extremists’ counter- 
messaging. Since moderate Islamic institutions uphold the idea of abrogation and refuse to 
question the depiction of the Prophet in Hadith and Syra, the narrow focus on certain aspects 




The three frameworks stress the importance of a credible and trustworthy messenger. 
Bestowing a face on a campaign has merit considering the disparity in numbers of Twitter 
followers of Majid Nawaz, a former extremist, and the organisation Quilliam he co-founded 
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(182,000 vs 49,000 retrieved on 20 February 2018). However, Nawaz is a frequent panellist on 
the BBC and has his own radio show on LBC. Hence, deeper reflections need to be made on the 
role played by mainstream media beyond reporting the news and keeping the public informed 
as suggested by Van Ginkel (2015) in her framework.  
Ashour (2007) relates the pride of Egyptian government when they successfully ‘tamed the lions’ 
of IG. He attributes IG’s change of heart to receiving the message from a messenger they know 
and trust (ibid). This successful experience underpinned the belief that if the message is 
delivered by a trusted messenger then it will de-radicalise as well as deter. While it lasted, this 
peculiar change of heart took place while members of IG were in jail following a harsh crackdown 
from the Egyptian government. This controlled environment may have ensured the safety of the 
messengers or at least a limited engagement from their audience. Replicating this setup 
successfully with a limited number of persons might be more aligned with theatre experiences 
like Odd Arts in the UK or even Lucien Bourejeili in Lebanon.  
While counter-narratives’ videos are produced for an intended audience, once they are online 
little control can be had on who views them. As observed in the media discourse, once a status 
quo or a certain narrative is challenged or criticised, the speaker is subjected to discrediting 
tactics. From Facebook to the NRA, the tactics are similar even if the content differs. Graham 
(Ratner 2018) defines argumentum ad hominem as when the characteristic and authority of the 
person is attacked and not the substance of the argument, and name calling is when personal 
insults are deployed. Although he puts them in the bottom of the pyramid in Figure 3, these 
techniques can deter many from engaging in the conversation. Van Ginkel’s list of messengers 
includes parents, teachers, educators and former extremists. Some are more vulnerable than 
others to discretisation. Certainly, as an authority figure in the classroom the chances are less 
for teachers to be abused than messengers engaging online. The following sections look at the 
techniques deployed in the public domain and extremists’ private messaging channels. 
 
In the public domain 
In order to challenge an ideology or to reform a religion, critical thinking and voicing opinions 
needs to be possible. Islamists issued death threats to many people who dared to talk about 
them: Sayid el-Quemani (September 8, 2018), an advocate of a secular state over an Islamic 
theocracy, had to retract previous statements to protect his family. Film star Adel Imam received 
several threats for portraying a violent extremist in The Terrorist (Dunia el-Watan 2017). After a 
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lecture on Islamic fascism in Cairo, an Imam called for the death of Hamed Abdel-Samad, a 
political scientist, writer and host of Box of Islam on YouTube; they published his address in Cairo 
and he is now under police protection in Germany (Daring Question 2013b). Following his book 
on terrorism in the 1980s, Faraje Foda was assassinated; an Imam from el-Azhar, and a member 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, defended his killer (Ahmed 2011).  
Moderate religious institutions, such el-Azhar, rely on refined ways to suppress criticism. They 
dismiss the premise of the argument as old news and that this criticism to Islam has been dealt 
with. They dismissed Islam el-Behiri’s ideas claiming it is plagiarised from an American who used 
to reside in Cairo (Allah A’lam 2015). They used the Egyptian justice system to repress his 
criticism.  Two lawsuits were filed against El-Behiri. He was found innocent in one court case and 
guilty in another; he was sentenced to five years in prison, serving only one before receiving a 
presidential pardon in the last 40 days (Daring Question 2016a; Kol Yom 2017b; 2016a; 2016b). 
The poet Fatma Naout was sentenced to serve one year in jail and pay 20,000 Egyptian pounds 
for a tweet criticising a mass animal slaughter to celebrate Adha (ibid). While Arabic speakers 
must deal with Islamic-related pressure, Western based critics and messengers face other types 
of pressure from left and right. As a former extremist, Majid Nawaz, the founder of Quilliam and 
a radio host on the British radio station LBC is a perfect example of messenger; he received 
death-threats from Islamists and is under police protection.  
Moderate Muslims constantly find themselves stuck between extreme Islamist movements and 
the far right (Rasmi 2018). Unfortunately, Muslim critics find themselves de facto allied with 
the right and far right movement. For example, Ansaf Haydar, the wife of Raef Badawi the 
imprisoned Saudi blogger, tweeted congratulating Tommy Robinson upon his release from 
prison following a UK court conviction of hate speech. This is giving the far-right discourse 
legitimacy and presenting them as defenders of their identity. Bawer (2018) claims that 
‘Robinson became the face of resistance against Islamisation’, implying it is the reason ‘the Brits 
took to the streets to protest his arrest.’ It is worth noting that counter-narratives are also 
aimed at the alt-right. In the UK, a counter-narrative to far-right extremism is reclaiming the  




                 
Picture  7 Sample of Haidar's tweets defending Robinson. Robinson is the founder of the English Defence League and 
convicted for hate speech in the UK 
 
While facing radicalisation, a society must define if intolerance should be tolerated (Taleb 2018). 
However, liberals now are accused of intolerance since they deploy words such as ‘we will not 
tolerate’ and ‘this is not a debate’ to avoid discussions of taboo issues in order to protect 
vulnerable people from hate speech (Fox 2018). Clair Fox (2018) states that the   
so-called progressive liberals are often intolerant, calling for official censure 
against anyone perceived as uttering non-progressive views. They openly 
despise everyone from Trump-voting “deplorables” and Brexit-voting 
“Gammons” (those “others” who dare to vote the wrong way and won’t 
espouse their “tolerant” values) to those in their own ranks who refuse to 
toe the liberal line.  
 
Ultimately the goal is to protect a group that is victimised in the name of diversity and creating 
a tolerant environment. However, ‘its implementation has been rash and ill-advised because it 
lumps all potentially victimized groups, including Muslims, into one category’ (Rasmi 2018). This 
tendency in media discourse plays into the extremists’ goals by defining Muslims only by their 
Muslimness and othering them from society. The hashtag #Alt-right-ctr-left-Delete started by 
Majid Nawaz summaries this drama. People on the right are called Nazi due to their hate speech, 
like Robinson. Racism of low expectation is attributed to the left of the political spectrum where 
Muslim men are not held to the same standards of white men (Box of Islam 2019l). For example, 
in the wake of #MeToo movement Tarik Ramadan was accused of rape by two women; before 
he was convicted, Prof Eugene Rogan claimed Ramadan was being smeared for being a 
prominent Muslim (Yorke, Lawford 2017). El-Qemani (September 8, 2018), who identifies as a 
Muslim scholar, claims that he was accused of being fascist for expressing his views.  
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Political polarisation or ideological differences have grown steadily between left and right to the 
point that ‘meanings of some words are now polarised’ and ‘viewers from different news 
channels are, in a way, speaking different   languages’ (Spice 2020; Simchon, Brady et. al 2020). 
The controversy around the term Islamophobia attests to that. EQUINET, the European Network 
of Equality Bodies, developed a toolkit of counter-narratives to Islamophobia. Ten dominant 
narratives are listed on the website which are: ‘threat to security, unassimilable, demographic 
threat and proselytization, theocracy, threat to identity, gender inequality, ontological diversity, 
innate violence, incomplete citizenship and homophobia’ (Law, Easat-Daas et al. 2018). On the 
other hand, Nawaz and Abdel-Samad do not deny the anti-Muslim bigotry, preferring the term 
to Islamophobia since the term is argued to be used by political Islam to silence them. Reflecting 
on the status of the discourse around Islamism, Rizvi (Box of Islam 2019f) claims that the right is 
wrong about Muslims and the left is wrong about Islam.   
Similarly, media programs addressing these topics are also subjected to huge backlash. For 
example, a satire show titled The Wives of ISIS caused backlash in the UK (Larner 2017). Mixed 
views are reported, saying the programme was ‘making human suffering light entertainment’ 
and that it ‘fanned Islamophobia and crossed well past the boundaries of good taste’. This 
naturally caused a counter-backlash that denounced political correctness and argued that 
freedom of expression — including pungent satire — is the best line of defence against 
extremism (Bilefsky 2017). Satire is not unique in soliciting backlash; Channel 4 cancelled Islam: 
The Untold Story, a documentary by Tom Holland, after Ofcom received more than a thousand 
complaints (O'Carroll 2012; Sweney 2012). The documentary is based on Holland’s academic 
research questioning if Mohamed had anything to do with the Quran. Polarisation is a hindrance 
to conducting a constructive debate about Islam, extremism and Muslim integration in the West. 
 
The messenger is central to the different counter-narrative frameworks. However, visibility in 
the public domain can render them targets of argumentum ad hominem technics of personal 
attacks or online abuse. It is does not necessarily affect their control of the narrative. This 
overview does not aim to question their ability in such environment. It simply points out the 
inherent vulnerability of identifying them in the public sphere. Since extremists control the 
narratives to begin with, an effective smear campaign may affect the public reception of the 
messenger’s ideas.  
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In the private telegram extremists’ channels 
Since extremists’ messaging is being disrupted on social media, they relied extensively on 
Telegram, the messaging app. In this setup, messengers are only facing extremists’ counter-
narratives. ISIS is believed to have been born out of Al-Qaeda, however Hamming (2019) argues 
that this notion needs to be discarded since its founder al-Zarqawi, a hardliner, had theological 
differences with al-Qaeda and their merger was ‘due to the strategic gains both groups hoped 
to benefit from.’ Moreover, in May 2014, ISIS spokesperson Abu Mohamed Al-Adnani states, 
‘the conflict between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda is one of method’ (ibid). This difference is 
highlighted in a communiqué released by ISIS to its supporters on telegram on 14 December 
2017. It was shared with me by @Carl (2016), a Kurdish activist who infiltrates Jihadi channels; 
he is been marked as a target for ISIS hence his identity and the data acquired from him is not 
divulged by this research. The communiqué may shed some light on the conflict between the 
two organisations. But most importantly, it addressed spies who infiltrate ISIS communication 
channels in order to challenge their narratives. Aimed for ISIS supporters, it warns them about 
spies employed by intelligence agencies. The communiqué divides spies into two categories; the 
first category’s job is to criticise the Caliphate and its media outlet, the second one, mainly 
‘Zawahiri’s orphans’ [al-Qaeda], criticises its methods and the third attacks the supporters. The 
first category was easily dismissed by questioning their motives for inquiring about ISIS as 
personal and accusing them of creating news channels to ‘report on fake battles that were not 
mentioned by the official ISIS channels […the argument concludes] anyone who publishes a 
picture of a mujahid in the Caliphate , accuses him of anything or mocks him is a spy serving 
crusaders and aims to gain from them.’ 
Their response suggests that some al-Qaeda personnel questioned the Caliphate ’s ruling and 
jurisprudence, arguing it disagrees with Sheikh Zarqawi or Abu el-Omar el-Baghedadi and 
criticised the Caliphate ’s methods; therefore, the ISIS communiqué accuses them of working 
with intelligence agencies and criticises their limited animosity with Shia clerics. Al-Qaeda’s 
criticism was easily dismissed: ‘By God, this is ignorance. Do we take our religion from men or 
from the book and Sunna, so we say Allah said and the prophet of Allah said (pbuh)?’ The 
communiqué alluded to ‘fake beard’” in Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula before directly 
threatening to completely crush a certain Abu Lahab as they did to el-Makedessi and Abu 
Kumama. The last part consists of praise to their 
 flood of true supporters…the true voice of the Caliphate … its virtual army 
all over social media, that manages to debunk all accusations from TV 
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channels and accounts. Supporters kept control over social media and any 
pig or mercenary for the crusaders has to think 1000 times before writing 
one sentence to slander the Caliphate and its leaders. 
 
This research cannot confirm if the spies were truly al-Qaeda or messengers infiltrating these 
channels. The aim is to focus on the talking points in their response. This raises the question if 
this infiltration played to their strengths rather than damaging their credibility to their 
supporters. Furthermore, they highlighted their direct reliance on the Quran and Sunnah and 
not on preachers. These texts are the reference for both extremists and moderates. Further data 
or advice is needed on averting the risk of radicalisation that messengers can encounter from 
infiltrating channels or being directed to chat forums to conduct audience research. Tuck & 
Silverman (2016:9) list Stormfront as a resource to knowing the interests of far-right extremists.   
Additionally, in the unlikely case this communiqué was triggered by messengers posing as al-
Qaeda fighters, extra care needs to be given to curb tendencies of normalising al-Qaeda’s or any 
other moderate Islamist group’s modus operandi even if they are less violent than ISIS.    
 
Online propagation:  
Tuck and Silverman’s counter-narratives guidelines advise that the videos need to be short for 
online campaigns and to have the first seconds of their movies to be as attention grabbing as 
possible (2016). This section will discuss some problems that may prevent maximum reach 
under two sections: Online echo chambers and Dark web.  
 
Online echo chambers 
 
The different frameworks did not advise on increasing online reach. The newer ones stressed 
the necessity for using multiple platforms (Van Ginkel, 2015) and advised on using an adequate 
medium to platform (Tuck & Silverman 2016). However, the counter-narratives’ videos, 
reviewed here, will still be available on YouTube and they can still attract viewership. Abdel-
Samad (2016) claims that the Internet will be to Islam what print was to Christianity in Europe, 
in the sense that it will bring enlightenment ideas to be discussed by the general public outside 
the hold of religious institutions. In practical terms, social media facilitated connecting 
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discriminated communities like Atheists in the Middle East who are denied space on mainstream 
media. Ahmad Harkan, a prominent Egyptian Atheist, was forced to leave a TV set with the 
presenter shouting that Atheists are not welcome. When he was arrested with his wife, the 
Egyptian police was accused of beating them to the point that his pregnant wife miscarried 
(Daring Question 2015q; 2015r).  
It is worth noting that algorithms can play a positive or a negative role in promoting a message. 
Without the redirect initiative, web surfers receive content suggestions based on their 
consumption history; this can be noted on YouTube, social media websites and even media 
streaming website like Netflix. The maximum reach guaranteed by manipulating algorithms does 
not guarantee their target at-risk individuals. While the number of views sourced by this 
research from YouTube is indicative of consumption, it cannot guarantee the videos were 
viewed in full. Facebook and YouTube count views after a certain number of seconds of the 
video were played. Securing a loyal audience is very important to create the change of minds 
believed to be needed for true success. In order to do this, longer campaigns (as in number of 
outputs) are needed and the output needs to be appealing to new audiences. In its three years 
on YouTube, Echoes of ISIS gathered 591 views. However, the internet traffic could be directed 
to the website of the project instead of the YouTube video. The videos on the AFVT channel have 
fluctuating numbers of views.  The playlist with the Arabic subtitles has only 2 videos exceeding 
100 views. Videos from Box of Islam exceed tens of thousands of views. Even if the reliability of 
these numbers is questioned, the difference raises the question if there is interest in the topic 
to begin with.  
 
Dark web:  
The Internet does not cause radicalisation; it offered extremists a tool to reach those who can 
be radicalised and invite them into the dark web to complete the process (Van Ginkel 2015). 
With the successful campaign to take down the extremist propaganda from the web, they had 
migrated further to the dark web. Telegram became a favourite app. Accessing extremist 
propaganda requires action from the recipients (Macdonal et. al 2016 cited Hemmingsen, Castro 
2017: 25). This personal effort to retrieve their propaganda can add an appeal to their pull 
technique (ibid) and questions if counter-messaging can carry the same appeal. To infiltrate the 
dark web, the messenger needs to be technically savvy and have a very reliable Internet security 
as well as a deep knowledge of Islam or jihadi cells structure. This structure according to Nesser 
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(2015 cited Hemmingsen, Castro 2017: 20) has four distinct types: entrepreneurs, protégés, 
misfits and drifters. Each type may require a different approach to de-radicalise or deter. It is 
unclear if different factions need different approaches or how will they interact with the 
counter-message as the data still lacking.  
 
Finally 
Since counter-narratives are failing to fulfil their purpose and may be pushing their target 
audience towards ISIS (Glazzard 2017; Nafees 2018; Bélanger, Nisa et. al 2020) a different 
approach is needed. Nafees (2018) recounts social anchors that prevented recruitment of some 
youth compared to others. They were ‘members of action-oriented groups that provided… 
[them] with values, an identity, and a sense of brother or sisterhood’ or they possessed a 
political aim like ‘fighting against discrimination or helping refugees. Other times they were part 
of local youth centres that actively fostered local identity building and social activism.’ If this 
engagement, local identity and attachment to environment and community prevent 
radicalisation then counter-narratives needs to nurture it by promoting a multiplicity in identity 
construct. Extremists’ narratives dissociate the personal identity construct from land and culture 
and asserts Islam as the single source of identity (Abdel-Samad 2016; el-Qemani September 8, 
2018).  
After pinpointing that counter-narratives are counterproductive, Bélanger et. al (2020) suggest 
that campaigns are more successful when addressing political topics. Certainly, this should be 
taken into consideration and practices can test this direction. However, it worth noting that 
political campaigns particularly on social media do not swing opinions (Stein 2020). In the 
common practice, these campaigns aim to promote a politician and most importantly they are 
meant to push people to action as increase turnout of supporters.  
Since a change of minds and hearts is needed, another approach is needed. Glazzard (2017) 
stresses the importance of the inspiration caused by the creative writing or storytelling of radical 
authors like bin Laden, or Sayid Qutb who was a novelist before creating the Muslim 
Brotherhood. This inspiration needs to be countered by similar inspiration; in practical terms he 
is suggesting relying on cultural products to counter Islamists’ narratives. Since Ferguson (2016) 
cemented the necessity to produce identity-related content on mainstream media, we will move 
to discuss the themes needed and most importantly the quest to identify a positive 




4.0 New studies: the practice inquiry 
My practice inquiry looked closely at representation. The quest was to identify how the language 
and the thematic content needs to be articulated to the wide audience. The textual review 
identified the themes. Representation of these themes was subjected to an in-depth analysis in 
order to recognise stereotypical representations and understand where the change is needed.  
Hall (1980:131) suggests that ‘discursive “knowledge” is the product not of the transparent 
representation of the “real” in language but of the articulation of language on real relations and 
conditions.’  Conducting a practice inquiry and reflecting on the process was necessary in order 
to build the framework. This adhered to the skin-in-the-game principles espoused in the 
methodology as well as the process where the ‘practice nearly always comes first, and it is only 
later people theorize about practice’ (Pears 1971: 29 cited Nelson 2006 :105) 
 
The practice inquiry resulted in the creation of seven video-essays: Nahed Hattar, FGM, 
Islamists’ Representation, Hijra and Jihad, Dance, Women in Arabia and Coptic Representation. 
They are discussed under two headings: media discourse and representation studies. In the 
media discourse section, mixed media texts are the primary source of data. Each video-essay 
has its own impact on the framework, Nahed Hattar established the need for addressing a 
general audience and the human-centric approach to the products of this framework was 
theorised as a result of the FGM video. 
 
In the representation studies section, films were the main source of data. The five remaining 
vide-essays are titled: Islamists’ Representation, Hijra and Jihad, Women in Arabia and Coptic 
Representation. The study conducted in these video-essays identified problems in the current 
representation such as casting Islamists as an ‘other’ instead of dealing with them as a problem 
within. Furthermore, the practice attempted when possible to conduct a stylistic inquiry into 





In this section, I discuss the two video-essays looking at the media discourse. They are titled 
Nahed Hattar and FGM 
 
Nahed Hattar 3’23” Vignette  https://youtu.be/kzriXlc8eFk 
Impact on framework: This video imposed the need to address a general public and challenge 
extremism in the cultural sphere 
 
This video features clips from TV shows, news websites and social media entries. It explored 
reporting on the violence exerted on a public figure and how it was received. Although this was 
the first video started in this project, it was revisited more than 12 times to its current edit.  With 
the minority angle emerging from the literature review, Nahed Hattar drew my interest as a 
potential skin-in-the-game scholar. He is a Jordanian journalist, expert on Salafism and a 
Christian born to a native Jordanian tribe. His stance was nuanced. He wrote in a newspaper 
close to Hezbollah and supported their politics yet has little tolerance for the Muslim 
Brotherhood; even his apology tweet quoted in the video equated them with ISIS (ikhwanje-
Da3esh). Since I was planning to interview him on the political alignments on minorities, the 
discussion would have probed if his political alignment is stemming from the absence of 
Hezbollah influence in Jordan or shaped by his personal or national experiences with the 
Israel/Palestinian conflict. It is worth noting that this research project started after Hezbollah 
published footage confirming their involvement in the Syrian war in 2014 after denying it for 
several months (Future TV News 13 September 2014). Before the Israeli army withdrew from 
Lebanon, Hezbollah anchored their image as resistance to an occupying army targeting their 
troops. This perception was challenged once their involvement in Syria became public. 
Hattar shared a Cartoon that mocks the depiction of heaven in extremists’ texts. This triggered 
a court case against him for insulting Islam. He was assassinated on the steps of the court house. 
This tragic event shifted the focus of this video from the interview’s plan probing minorities’ 
selective tolerance of political Islamist parties to their great influence in setting the tone in the 
cultural discourse. The presenter who condoned the assassination was an example of the wide 
tolerance and even justification of the violent act. While the tweets shared on Daring Question 
reflected the public acceptance of his murder, they were anonymous, and it was not possible to 
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verify their methodology in sourcing and assessing anonymous online comments. I should add 
that living in the UK at the time did not warrant first hand access to local media outlets to 
observe the day to day reactions and evolution of the discourse.  
The prosecution and execution of the assassin exemplifies Tiflati’s suggestion (Box of Islam 
2019g) where laws offer a framework for punishing behavioural extremism, since killing or 
joining a jihadi group are illegal but cognitive extremism is spared since thoughts are not illegal. 
Therefore, it is acceptable to express support for a murder based on scriptures even on national 
TV. The reflection on final edits defined a target audience of this approach as a wider audience 
than just those vulnerable with radicalisation. Hence this became an inquiry to theorise how to 
address cognitive extremism in the cultural sphere in a way that helps eradicate Islamic 
behavioural extremism or militant Jihadi groups.  
 
FGM : 9’ 26" Vignette https://youtu.be/shIraY2aUSY 
Impact on framework: The necessity of a human-centric approach; and the importance of foreign 
funds in addressing certain issues 
 
This video features clips from TV outlets, media clips discussing female genital mutilation (FGM), 
news websites, social media entries and the movie Dunia (Saab 2005). The film is included since 
it was set in Egypt and is one of the rare movies that treats the topic; it was made possible by 
French funds and coproduction. The Egyptian government control the movie productions, and 
movies addressing the issues are very scarce. This highlights the importance of foreign funds in 
addressing subjects avoided by the national cinema. It also raises the question of how much 
cultural impact can these funds have if they considered the national audience of the foreign 
films, they are financing.   
 
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) poses a serious danger to the sexual health of young girls. The 
National health Services (NHS 2017) clitoridectomy suggests there are four types of girls’ 
circumcision: Type 1 removes part or all of the clitoris; Excision (Type 2) removes part or all of 
the clitoris and inner labia with or without removal of the labia majora; and infibulation (Type 
3) narrows the vaginal opening by creating a seal formed by cutting and repositioning the labia. 
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The NHS defines (Type 4) as ‘any harmful procedures to the female genitals including pricking, 
piercing, cutting, scraping or burning the area’ (NHS 2017) 
 
Since its early days, this research paid close attention to the role of women’s narratives in 
countering extremism. This role is recognised in Van Ginkel’s (2015) framework pointing out to 
the important roles of mothers in this fight. Early edits were looking at FGM from the angle of 
representation of women and contextualised in feminist theories, particularly Islamic feminism.  
Ths had to be reflected on the editing of this video-essay. On 12 June 2017, FGM trended on 
Twitter due to the news of arrest and trial of the American doctors mentioned in the video. 
American-Egyptian journalist Mona ElTahawi was at its centre of the Twitter storm, attempting 
to stand up for Muslim women and calling for eradication of the practice without mincing words. 
She was also attempting to counter a narrative that limits FGM practice and blames it on Islam. 
It is worth noting that FGM is not an exclusively Muslim problem. The video opens with a report 
from the Guardian featuring white Christian American women who were circumcised and a 
tweet highlighting FGM is spread in the Coptic community. 
The video juxtaposes discourse from Western and Egyptian media to highlight the difference in 
their approaches. It is not surprising that conservative FOX News anchor Tucker Carlson would 
present FGM as a Muslim problem, or an unwanted cultural import saying, ‘I don’t want that in 
my culture.’ However, it was indeed part of Carlson’s culture as shown in the report from the 
Guardian who gave the victim, the White American, the space to voice her experience. Despite 
the plethora of studies on FGM victims in Western academic institutions, there were no 
attempts in that show to relate their voices. Carlson’s guest’s technique in defending the 
practice aimed to minimise negative perception by replacing the term mutilation with cutting. 
However, claiming that circumcising girls is an embodiment of an egalitarian culture brings to 
mind el-Tahawi’s (2016) comment that feminist tools are being used against women rights and 
wellbeing. This puts to question the ability for a feminist angle to make a difference in the 
discourse. To be clear the issue here is that there is a harmful procedure conducted on young 
girls without their consent. It is expected from feminist discourse to prioritise women’s health 
over cultural sensitivity. The choice should be respected if the adult woman took a conscious 
decision regarding her own body and the procedure was administered safely in a medical facility, 
like the guest.  
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This video-essay showed how the Muslim community are denied mobility as in the right to 
express opinions that are different from popular perception.  Linda Sarsour’s tweet calling FGM 
barbaric was met with a lesson on Hadith, and her adherence and knowledge of Muslim 
teachings were put to question. Moderation per Harris’ (2004 :17 cited in Schmid 2014b: 8) 
definition is the ability to loosely interpret texts. Muslims, or even Islamists, should be able to 
express free opinions without being trapped by a predefined interpretation of what Islam is or 
shamed by their preachers for wanting an immediate change to culture or tradition, like 
Ramadan attempted gently to do.   
 
One of advantages of using video-essays in this research, is the multiple levels of communication 
that allow the audience to pick instantly on subtle differences that otherwise would be missed 
in a written description. For example, a woman that presents herself in an ultra-conservative 
costume (a complete body veil with gloves as if she considers her hands to be Awra), i.e. Zahra 
the Egyptian Muslim scholar, spoke with passion and called FGM an institutionalised crime. 
Conversely, the modern looking American scholar used feminist values of equality to reserve the 
right to circumcise girls and boys. Nawal el-Saadawi argues that circumcision should be equally 
abolished for both genders. Furthermore, the ability to watch the outlandish conspiracy theories 
first hand and recognise the broadcaster may render dismissing the claim as Islamophobia more 
difficult. The baseless conspiracy theory claims that the Jews want to eradicate FGM to corrupt 
Muslims communities. The Jewish community feature in the heart of most conspiracies 
including 9/11 where 5000 Jews were supposedly alerted by the Mossad to skip work on that 
day. This news featured in Teshrine, a Syrian newspaper. This video is sourced from MEMRI. The 
organisation scouts Arabic speaking media for controversial videos and translates them for a 
western audience. They have a project dedicated to the Jews. The effectiveness of MEMRI’s 




More importantly, this is an opportunity to address the reliance on conspiracy theory in Islamist 
discourse. Usually the narrative of conspiracy theory is built around a small group of people who 
want to subdue or exterminate a larger group (Priory of Zion, 
Feminist plan to eradicate family) or even want world 
domination (illuminati, New World Order) (Bert 2015). Abdel-
Samad (2016) points out the overwhelming belief in conspiracy 
theory in Islamic circles and the Middle East in general. As seen 
in its usage in the video-essay, a conspiracy theory can 
successfully dismiss engaging with criticism and consequently 
delay dealing with problems. Considering the wide 
consumption of conspiracy theories in these circles (Samrani 
2014, Bert 2015, el-Saad 2015, Daring Question 2014ag), 
counter and alternative narratives alike need to avoid empowering these dangerous discourses. 
The Jewish community has paid a heavy price for this tendency. They were purged out of their 
home countries in Iraq, Morocco and Egypt as a response to the creation of Israel (Abdel-Samad 
2016). 
Conspiracy theory features as one of the reasons in a Vox pop segment of a TV episode asking 
about the causes of terrorism. This was aired on 25th of April 2017, by the television station ON. 
Some answers pointed out to an education crisis. But mostly, they attributed terrorism to 
indoctrination by a foreign ideology (refereeing to Saudi Wahabism) and felt that terrorists are 
hired by Israel and America to wreak havoc in Muslim countries (Kol Yom 2017a). The guest, El-
Behiri, had to debunk these misconceptions and pointed to the Islamic tradition books, the 
Hadith, taught in el-Azhar and by extension in most schools in the Muslim majority countries, as 
the basis of this behaviour.  
Comedy is considered a successful approach in tackling extremist issues as per the advice given 
to counter-narratives’ practitioners. The show titled Dawlat el-Kharafa (State of Superstition) 
aired on al Iraqiya, a mainstream TV channel in Iraq. It took 
a similar angle to the Hungarian Facebook page that 
ridiculed ISIS. Its opening credits features the devil’s 
wedding to a Jewish woman – she was wearing the star of 
David [top picture] – and they gave birth to Daesh (ISIS). On 
the right, the picture depicts the wedding’s guests: Dracula, 
the Joker, a cowboy who is a friend to the devil and a woman 
 
 
Picture  8 From the show Dawlat el-
Kharafa, in reference to IS. The show 
features the wedding of Satan to a 
Jewish Bride giving birth to ISIS  
 
 
Picture 9 From the show Dawlat el-
Kharafa featuring the wedding Guests: A 
cowboy, the joker and a woman modelled 
after Sheikha Moza 
 73 
whose dress code brings to mind Sheikha Moza, the Qatari former princess as a friend to Satan’s 
wife. Hiding behind conspiracy theories hinders addressing some Islamic texts that absolve if not 
promote extremism (Kol Yom 2017a). Conspiracy theories empower the binary of 
victimhood/supremacy that is inherent in fascist theory and in Islam according to Abdel-Samad 
(2016) and they negatively affect the lives of Muslims according to Wafa Sulta (Daring Question 
2016aa). 
 
As Linda Sarsour correctly pointed out, the Quran does not mention FGM, and its preservation 
is founded on Hadith. While it is acknowledged that FGM predates Islam – excision (Type 2) is 
called the Pharaonic circumcision – the counter-argument anchors the necessity to preserve the 
tradition but to regulate the practice. Most importantly, when the victims of FGM are mentioned 
in the debate between the two sheikhs, there was a change of tone from the defender of the 
practice. While he still upheld the preservation of tradition stance, he acknowledges that there 
are problems that can be addressed by regulation.  
This video-essay brought forward the necessity for a human-focused approach. This hopes to 
redefine the focus of the debate from general ideas into making the lived experience better.   
 
Representation studies 
This section focuses on the video-essays conducting representation studies in Egyptian films. 
This section discusses Islamists’ Representation in Egyptian cinema. Under the heading Thematic 
representation, I discuss the representation of the three themes. Hijra and Jihad corresponds to 
historical narratives. Two videos are discussed under women’s status: Dance and Women in 
Arabia. Finally, the video-essay in the theme of minorities’ rights is titled Coptic Representation 
 
Islamist representation 9’16” Film Analysis https://drive.google.com/open?id=1-
qZBRfjZny69RRCt8QQ-KGTAdZOD7mlQ 
Impact on framework: avoid the othering in representing Islamists; avoid the just a movie 
reception or an unrealistic setup to deliver messages in the form of monologue  
 
The films featured in the essay are: Al-Irhab wal-Kabab (Arafa 1992), Al-Massir (Chahine 2000), 
 74 
Touyour el-Zalam (Arafa 1995) and Hello America (Galal, Abu Zekri 2000). Their inclusion is due 
to their representation of extremists in their narrative. 
 
The major threat of Islamism according to Antonius (Box of Islam 2019f) is the success of 
changing the nature of social relationships. This is a goal arguably already achieved in Egypt. 
Politically, the Sadat era is linked to the rise of fundamentalism in Egypt; however, Ramadan 
(Daring Question 2012d) argues that it was Abdel-Nasser that made Al-Azhar a partner in the 
judiciary process, paving the way to the current status quo. Mubarak’s era inherited all this and 
‘attempted to restore control of the cultural sphere, as a way of countering the rising Islamist 
wave and recapturing a modern secular image’ (Mehrez 2012:144). 
Given its long struggle with extremism, it was essential to understand how extremists were 
represented in Egyptian cinema. Khatib (2006a; 2006b:64) argues that the West represents 
Muslim/Arab as ‘other’ and so does Egyptian cinema to fundamentalists. This mythical other is 
viewed as an enemy in a battle of us v. them, hence it was never looked at as a ‘problem within’ 
(ibid). She claims that this representation follows the classical view that it tells more about us 
that it does them (Khatib 2006b:66).  
Egypt’s identity is constructed on combining Asian with African, Muslim with Pharaonic and Arab 
by different proportions (Abdallah 2000 cited Khatib 2006b: 67). ‘The world of fundamentalism 
is a world of deceit and contradiction’, and even if it may be based on Egypt’s experience it casts 
them as ‘an extreme other’ while asserting a national identity of a homogenous anti-
fundamentalist monolith (Khatib 2006b: 72). However, in this monolith, the Copts are also the 
other (Mezher 2012). Khatib (2006b:68) claims these films prefer ‘selective integration’ with 
Copts celebrated as nationalists in contrast to the intolerance of the extremists. 
Egypt identifies as a mother (Khatib 2006a). These movies use women as symbols of nation, 
hence the normal Egyptian woman can pursue any moral career while a fundamentalist one is 
confined to executing orders from her male superior (in Al-Irhabi, the sheikh eats with his four 
wives and communicates with them using gestures and shouting) (Khatib 2006b).  
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Contrasting the dramatization of fundamentalists with images from the mainstream media, 
sometimes dedicated religious channels, reflected that the culture of othering extremists is 
somewhat a misrepresentation of this society. This is where the choice of video-essays comes 
in handy over written texts due to its multilevel communication.  
Abdel-Samad (2016) compares political Islam and the Nazi party. He claims that supremacy is an 
intrinsic shared value between Islam and fascism (2016; Box of Islam 2016aa; 2016 b; 2016c; 
2016d). He demonstrated el-Banna’s (founder of the Brotherhood) fascination and tight link 
with fascism. El-Banna regarded Mussolini’s idea of an army state to go hand in hand with the 
teachings of Mohamed but Mussolini’s earthly goals did 
not reach the divine goals of Islam (Ibid). Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf is adapted as the Islamic Jihad, the swastika 
became the double swords of the Brotherhood; 
furthermore, the highest-ranking Brother is called el-
Morshid (guide) a direct translation from Führer, the title 
was adopted by Khomeini in Iran who was influenced by 
the Brothers and co-wrote a book with el-Banna and 
Mawdoudi (Ibid). Nazi propaganda demonised the Jews; 
this earned them collaboration from El Husseini, Imam of 
the Al-Aqsa Mosque, who helped diffuse Nazi 
propaganda via the Berlin based Arabic speaking Radio throughout the Middle East (Ibid). 
Most importantly, he argues that Germany was reborn by owning up to an ideology that is no 
longer acceptable and rising above its past, while the Muslim world still holds dear to a 
worldview that cannot be compatible with the modern world. The othering of the Islamists in 
the representation and the reliance on conspiracy theories exemplify this unwillingness to 
address extremism as a problem within, ideologically and culturally.  
Al-Irhabi features an assassination that brings to mind the assassination of the writer Faraje 
following a fatwa from the IG. The Azhari scholar who defended the murder was a Muslim 
Brother (Ahmed 2011); this is why discussing the Brotherhood is relevant here. The parallel 
drawn to Germany is important. This study will rely on Mann’s (2003) article What is wrong with 
Nazi movies? to understand and avoid repeating the same mistakes in its recommendations for 
future representations. Mann warns against movies that can be easily dismissed as ‘just movies’. 
These movies can be dismissed by an audience that is used to Hollywood’s exaggeration; hence 
Picture  9The logo of Muslim Brotherhood 
retrieved from their Arabic website. It features 
the Quran highlighted by 2 swords and the 
word wa-a’idu in reference to a Quranic verse 
(8:60) ordering to be ready to battle God’s 
enemy 
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they dismiss the cinematic experience easily (ibid). In this context, the caricature of othering 
Islamists and the delivery of message fuelled monologues in extreme setups can cause the 
dismissal of the movie. The matriarch of the family hosting the terrorist challenges his 
extremists’ views when he is holding her family at gun point and the Egyptian SWAT teams are 
closing in in her house. Many mothers might have to have this conversation with their 
radicalised children, possibly using the exact words. However, the emotional impact is not fully 
sensed since the family member was set as an outsider since the beginning. So, while they 
mourned him, the impact on their lives is not as devastating as if he was one of their own. Al-
Irhabi’s premise diminished the loss of the terrorist. Al-Massir used the personal tragedy as a 
wakeup call to break with the extremist group. However, in a space of seconds, it showed the 
emotional struggle his adopted mother went through to accept his return.  
Going forward, it is important to note that Islamist discourse is shifting (Box of Islam 2019e). 
How Islamists are presenting themselves is different, and instead of the visual identifier of 
beards and the white thobes, nowadays the discourse can be presented in a hipster modern 
look (Azzi, Tannous 2021).   
Thematic representation  
The textual review identified three themes recurrent in anti-extremist discourse. In this section, 
I discuss the study of their representation in Egyptian films. 
 
1- Historical narrative: 
 Hijra and Jihad” 8’ vignette https://youtu.be/EiZBo0dy-mM 
Impact on framework: the necessity to debunk myth concerning the birth of Islam in the narrative 
of ‘establishment Islam’ 
 
The films included in this video essay are: El-Shayma’ (Mustafa 1972), Hijrat al-Rassoul (Amara 
1964) and Al-Rissala (Akkad 1976). Their selection is due to their role in shaping the perception 
of early Islam in the public’s psyche.  
 
This video-essay is conceived in relation to el-Baghdadi’s speech dated 4 Meharram 1439 or 24 
September 2017. @Carl (2016) shared a transcription with me circulated on Telegram hours 
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after the speech’s release. The essay aims to understand the representation of Hijra and jihad 
in early Islam as well as the polytheist in Jahilia [age of ignorance, usually means pre-Islamic 
Arabia]. 
The structure of the speech is carefully designed to tackle different concepts. It starts by praying 
on dead Muslims, then moves to discuss heaven claiming that Satan attempts to derail humans 
from embracing Islam and stops them from Hijra and Jihad. Al-Baghdadi dissociates the concept 
of winning and losing from retaining land. He blames Muslims’ historical loss of power for the 
attacks from apostate states ‘till the religion is lost’, praising el-Zarqawi for his jihad against the 
nation of the cross. He considered the ordeal to be a blessing, since it was followed by a victory 
and a Fatah where they [ISIS] erased the borders between Iraq and Syria. They ‘akaro el-Din’ 
[imposed Islam], therefore, the apostate states got angry and they had to put aside their 
differences to battle the Islamic state with little success. This is because America [colloquial for 
the US] who depicted itself as a superpower is now crumbling and Russia is taking advantage of 
this weakness. Russia is now responsible for Syria, after it emptied it from its people. Syrian 
Sunnis accepted the rule of the Noussayriah [derogative for Alawi]. Baghdadi also commented 
on Turkey’s fear of an independent Kurdish state and on the Arabian Gulf countries’ fear of Iran. 
El-Baghdadi still hopes to fight, praying for a victory like Bader [A war between Mohamed and 
the Meccans], since victory is unrelated to numbers as per Khandak [Another war]. Islam’s sons 
in the Caliphate proved that they are the nation’s shield despite the crusaders’ use of illegal 
weapons. Talking about dignity, el-Baghdadi claims it can only be reclaimed by fighting and 
calling on the Sunni in Iraq and el-Sham [Colloquial for Damascus or Syria] to revolt against 
humiliation, reminding them that the Prophet’s companions did not back out because of wounds 
and death. Stating the common belief ‘el-Islam ya3lo wala ya3lo 3alayh’ meaning that Islam is 
supreme, he stresses that a martyr is bestowed with six characteristics: he is given a seat in 
heaven, spared from the torture of the grave, spared from the ‘big fear’, crowned with respect, 
married to 72 of the hour-el-ein (heavenly virgins) and can intercede on behalf of his loved ones. 
In the end, el-Baghdadi used a Prophet quotation to assert that America cannot win against 
them.  
This speech showcases awareness of global political circumstances. It also portrays how 
important and present is heaven's hypothesis in the militant’s psyche (Hamid 2016). El-Qemani 
(September 8, 2018) attributes this to the non-guaranteed redemption in the Sunni 
jurisprudence except in the case of Shahada (martyrdom). Most importantly it shows the longing 
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for a connection with the Prophet in its attempts to identify with early Muslims fighting 
polytheists to establish the confederate state of Islam, as el-Qemani calls it (ibid).  
Abdel-Samad (Box of Islam 2017b) states that the perception of early Islam in the public’s psyche 
is shaped by these movies more than the actual historical texts. Referring to El-Shayma’, Abdel-
Samad argues that the movie is based on a Sufi conceptualisation of an idealised version of the 
Prophet that is divorced from historical accounts. Hijra is portrayed in these movies in a way 
that brings to mind images of Palm Sunday; even the song Tala’ el-Bader Alayna, according to 
Abdel-Samad (Box of Islam 2017ad) is an old Syriac hymn that celebrates Easter. From that 
perspective, he argues that the era should be looked upon from a cultural exchange perspective 
and understood as the mutual influences of different civilisations. 
El-Shayma’ does not shy away from stating that Mohamed initiated the feud with the 
polytheists, attributing that to a divine order. The Jews are represented as backstabbers who 
are lying since their books should reflect that Mohamed is the prophet awaited in Arabia.  
The movies misrepresent the polytheists of Arabia. El-Qemani (September 8, 2018) claims that 
in the time of Mohamed, women dresses would be sewn from the sides making cuts to 
accommodate the arms and the head. However, the movies showcase their fashion as if it was 
an Orientalist depiction of a harem in the Abbasside or the Ottoman era. Polytheists are 
portrayed as cruel, torturing their converted slaves with a bloodlust that is difficult to quench. 
The belly dancers signal the immorality and promiscuity of the polytheists, in contrast of the 
moral Muslim community where women are fully covered. El-Qemani (ibid) claims that Islamists’ 
morality is centred around women dress and sexuality.  
The images collected in the video-essay are in stark contrast from the images imagined from the 
textual review shows and lectures. Polytheists are argued to be an open society with multiple 
Kaabas, that welcome all form of faiths and even had icons of Jesus and the Virgin Mary (Daring 
Question 2007e; 2007i; Box of Islam 2017o). El-Qemani (September 8, 2018) argues that this 
inclusive feature was not an attribute to polytheism but a necessity for a town that needed to 
host traveling merchants from different backgrounds and faiths. The freeing of slaves is one of 
the big myths advanced in these movies, particularly Hijrat el-Rassoul, since there are 72 Ayas 
that regulate slavery in the Quran and deprive the slave who runs away from the master from 
heaven (el-Qemani September 8, 2018; Box of Islam 2018a). Abdel-Samad (Box of Islam 2019a) 
cites that 2 million African slaves were killed as the result of their revolt against their condition 
in the Abbasside empire. 
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 It is difficult to say if this representation is motivated by an ideological reasoning. However, it 
certainly influenced how the audience of these movies imagined old Arabia. Needless to say, the 
study of representation from a practice-led perspective is perceived as a way to inform future 
practices stemming from this research. This video-essay showcases that debunking the 
misinformation about polytheists in Arabia is a necessity since polytheism in general is depicted 
as immoral in popular culture, and this plays directly to the extremists’ narrative. On a more 
positive note, there is room for artistic exploration to factually represent early Arabia and 
correct the misperception in the public’s psyche.  
 
2- Women’s status 
Dance: 8’6” Film analysis  https://youtu.be/QvIYP4rUSSA 
Impact on framework: the role of French funds in artistic discourse; the story is the message; 
representation of Muslims in the West,  
 
The films featured in this video essay are: Singing in the Rain (Gene, Donan 1952), Imara’a 
Wahida la Takfi (Digheidi 1990) Dunia (Saab 2005) Sabah (Nadda 2005) Whatever Lola Wants 
(Ayouch 2008). These films were selected from different countries in order to note the 
difference in their treatment of the women body. 
 
This video put the female body central to its representation. This ‘female body’ constructs and 
“maintains a hierarchy along the lines of a sexual difference assumed as natural” (Doane 
2000:87). In certain setups, the belly dance performed by the female body monopolises the gaze 
of a male character. Belly dance is largely viewed as a feminine art form, with some few 
exceptions of male dancers.  
Each film has relied on this art form and the body performing it to communicate different signals. 
When representing the 7th century, the female body, and precisely the belly dancer is used to 
signals the immorality of the polytheists in Mecca. However, more contemporary films 
represent belly dance as a way of liberation in Dunia and communication or a cultural bridge in 
Whatever Lola Wants. It is worth noting that Dunia and Whatever Lola Wants are movies funded 
by Les Fonds Sud and are directed respectively by French directors from Lebanese and Moroccan 
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backgrounds. Les Fonds Sud, as an initiative that funds Francophone movies worldwide, is 
specific to France (Khatib 2008). Certainly, these funds are subjected to their own selection 
politics (Sojcher 2011). However, they present dance as assuming control of their character’s 
lives and body in contrast of the Egyptian film where the belly dancer could not refuse the sexual 
advances of the male onlooker.   
 
While the video aimed to look at the female body, Sabah gave an insight on representing 
Muslims in the West. Sabah is a veiled Syrian migrant in Canada. She fell in love and finally stood 
up to her brother claiming her voice and space in the family and society at large. Maintaining 
the realism of the situation, the focus of the feud with her brother on family matters without 
breaking into grandstanding monologues and more importantly the positive light of how it was 
resolved are considerations to keep in mind for future representations. Simply put, the movie 
tells a story of integration of a family that successfully preserved some aspect of their cultural 
singularity. Muslim representation in the Wests need to take into account the far-right as well 
as Islamist discourse, however they both subscribe to the single identity construct. Recognising 
and representing the cultural singularity of the different migrant Muslim communities can 
challenge this mono-construct.  
 
Normalising representations of dance, the female body and sexuality is important in order to 
challenge the worldview of Islamism. In their manifesto to stand in the Egyptian election, the 
Muslim Brotherhood called their national cinema immoral and plan to reform it in the model of 
Iranian cinema where there is no dancing and women are represented in accordance to Islamic 
dress code (Daring Question 2011; 2011i; 2013w). El-Tahawi (Daring Question 2013w) claims 
that cinema was an easier target than literature since Iranian cinema provided a model for them 
to follow. Abdel-Samad (Box of Islam 2018) argues that Islam, like any other religion, clashed 
with modernity. Islamism aims to control every aspect of the daily life, and women’s bodies are 
central to that control (el-Qemani September 8, 2018). He argues that Islamists posits morality 
as women-centric, focusing on her sexuality and dress code (ibid). The veil and FGM are central 
to this morality debate. Abdel-Samad (2016) argues that Islamism tries to control every aspect 
of human life and most of the oppression will fall on women as they are requested to eclipse 




Women in Arabia: 7’56” Vignette  https://youtu.be/R1_5L-4B5ns 
Impact on framework: the contrast between the different stylistic expressions of counter-
narrative and alternative-narrative 
 
The films included in this video essay are: El-Shayma’ (Mustafa 1972), Hijrat al-Rassoul (Amara 
1964) and Al-Rissala (Akkad 1976). Their selection is due to their role in shaping the perception 
of early Islam in the public’s psyche.  
 
Regardless where one might stand on women’s role in the Islamist narrative, as preventing 
mother (Van Ginkel’s 2015) or celebrating the martyrdom of their sons (Sultan 2016; Daring 
Question 2008s), developing human rights in general and women rights in particular are 
important in countering extremism (Schmidt 2014). It is already established that Islamism is 
particularly concerned with women’s bodies. Given the parallel between Islamism and Nazism 
(Abdel-Samad 2016) mentioned earlier, Mann’s (2003) What’s wrong with Anti-Nazi films? Is 
relevant to avoid an audience dismissing the cultural productions.  
 
Classed as a vignette, this video-essay has two components: first, a 7-minute analysis of 
women’s representation in films and second, a video-art exploring an abstraction of 
reconstructing the missing images of women in Islam. This process reflects the position of this 
research where researching representation studies has an impact the practitioner’s own 
practice. In a way the contrast between the two parts aims to suggest the contrast in language 
between the counter and alternative narrative. The counter-narrative is given in an analytical 
academic voice raising and analysing the question. The alternative narrative is more subtle and 
aims to engage emotionally. 
 
The video-art complies with the following constraints: no budget, filmed on a mobile phone, 
lighting relied on a free app from a different mobile phone and a free editing software. These 
limitations were devised to prove that this form of abstract creative output can be a tool for 
student and youth expression without it being limited to film schools. Tiflati (Box of Islam 2019g) 
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states that ISIS is a youth organisation with most of its fighters’ age range between 17 and 30. It 
is no surprise that most counter-narrative initiatives target youth. It is important to include 
youth’s art expression in cultural initiatives, hence since these constraints aimed to adopt the 
production structure accessible to them without any special measure. Encouraging students to 
get involved in cultural productions is an added layer to the role academia can play in countering 
extremism discussed later. Admittedly, this couple of minutes were the most enjoyable in the 
making. The complete freedom of juxtaposing images and sounds despite the severe constraints 
changed the relationship with the practice as well as the framework. Most importantly, this 
research raised the point of security concerns being responsible for excluding people from 
different backgrounds. Similarly, Nabil Asmar (2021) stressed the difficulty to break into the 
media industry. His suggestion to counter this difficulty was to run an open call creative 
competition. This little experiment shows that ideas can be communicated in extreme 
constraints without any funding support, however, the quality of the product may not be 
optimum which may be a hindrance to consumption.  
 
The first part of the essay raised the question: Are women the missing image of Islam? Missing 
image, as defined by Daney, is central to my practice enquiry, as in its philosophical 
conceptualisation. He calls 
 image what still relies upon an experience of vision, and "visual" the optical 
verification of a procedure of power, whatever this may be (technological, 
political, advertising, military), a procedure which only requires, as sole 
commentary, a "receiving loud and clear" (Daney 1999) 
 
The missing image is the image that we did not see. Daney gives examples of images from Iraq 
during the war since Saddam was opposed to sending in journalists and the image of the 
Palestinian village covered under an Israeli colony (ibid). The media ‘headed by TV’ forbids us to 
think there is a missing image, so the space is left empty. However, to love cinema is ‘to know 
what to do with images that are missing’ (ibid). This translates herein as advocating the 
reconstruction of missing images hidden in or by the mainstream narrative. Most importantly, 
the focus was on specific personalities that can be tracked in the texts. This human-centric 




The abstraction aimed to adapt Man’s idea of poetic validity. Man’s (2003:181) argues that 
realism does not ‘unmask the insanity of Hitler’s world conquering dream’ nor does it ‘leave an 
impression’. However, in The Dictator, Charlie Chaplin dances with a balloon; this ‘dance is 
unlikely, but it possesses what we may call a poetic validity.’ Visibility and its difference between 
young girls and women are the main topic, with the voice of el-Qardawi explaining the veil in 
Islamic tradition overtaking and silencing the poetry of Hind bint Otba. This espouses the angle 
of Islamic feminists that Islam was created by men and that women did not have a say in the 
process. 
Finally, the video presents a message that can be sensed by the viewer. In this case, the message 
may be abstract and does not claim to make a sophisticated argument however it proves the 
possibility of delivering a message indirectly without the need of a talking head. This process 
embodies the skin-in-the-game concept adopted in the methodology, meaning the practice 
delivered what the framework is asking the cultural practitioners to do. It can be argued that 
creative freedom adds a product dimension to academic video-essays, rendering them more 
accessible to a wider audience. However, this video-essay did not set to prove this argument 
precisely because of the severe constraints. Reception studies need to be conducted to explore 
the appeal of academic video-essays to a wider audience and how language and production 
values can impact their reception.   
 
 
3-  Minorities’ rights:  
Coptic representation: 8’30” film analysis https://youtu.be/O5YpR-VTIcg 
Impact on framework: making diversity central to representation; addressing the victimhood 
narrative by producing content that celebrates minorities’ contribution to the national narrative 
and acknowledges the atrocities they were subjected to 
 
The films featured are: Al-Irhabi (Galal 1994), Amir el-Zalam (Imam 2002), Janat el-Chayatin 
(Fawzi 2000), and Bahib Issima (Fawzi 2004). These films were selected due to their 
representation of the Copts.  
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Content representing minorities is extremely rare on mainstream Middle Eastern broadcasters 
(Asmar 2021). When they are represented there is a stereotypical image that is recurrent 
(Mehrez 2012; Azzi, Tannous 2021). This video-essay attempted to explore the representation 
from the position of a disgruntled Coptic migrant.  It is worth noting that there are grounds to 
challenge the angle presented by the video. However, this is an inquiry into what content can 
change a discourse, hence it is deemed more important at this stage to understand the 
undertone of that discourse than to challenge misconceptions when found.   
 
The Copts are the Christian community in Egypt, with around 18 million people (Daring Question 
2017a). The have an Orthodox majority with only 3% of Copts being Catholics and Protestant 
(Boles 2017). The Coptic Orthodox Church considers itself a founding Church, having led the 
debate in Nicaea when the Roman emperor Constantin recognized Christianity as a religion of 
the Roman Empire (Daring Question 2017a).  Like many other Christian minorities, they do not 
identify as Arabs but rather to be indigenous to Egypt with a language unrelated to Arabic (ibid). 
Some believe they are the descendants of the Pharaohs (Boles 2018; Boules 2016).  
The Coptic community is a recurrent target for Islamists (Reuters 2018, Guerin 2017; BBC 2018; 
Box of Islam 2017c). For groups such as ISIS ‘attacking Christians is a religious imperative’; in the 
double attacks in 2017 ISIS has ‘successfully morphed its insurgence against the security forces 
into a campaign against the Christians’ (Lynfield 2017). However, it is worth noting that 
Christians are not the only community targeted by Islamists.  
Despite being viewed as pro-Western due to their elite education, Copts were among the 
founders of the Wafd party – the nationalist party against British colonisation – led by Saad 
Zaghloul party (Mehrez 2012). In his government Zaghloul appointed Copts in key positions 
however there was a degradation of their status (Tzoreff March 31, 2019). It is true that the 
government continue appointing one or two Copts  
to ministerial and parliamentary positions, and by seeking the official 
representation of the Coptic Orthodox Church as part of a 
national/nationalist and secular public discourse… [but it actively sought to] 
underrepresent if not misrepresent the Copts in its public sphere [whether it 
is] educational curricula, or the cultural field in general leading to grave 
misconceptions within the majority Muslim community in its relationship 
with the Coptic one (Mehrez 2012:146).  
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The Sadat era witnessed the ‘rise of Islamic extremism [in Egypt] and Coptic fundamentalism as 
a consequence’ (ibid) which lead to the bloody clashes in the 80s and 90s between Muslims and 
Copts. This anti-Coptic violence is born out of the ‘intersection of religious discourse and 
authoritarian control’ (Brownlee 2013: 4). The recurrent official nationalist banner ‘Yahya l-hilal 
ma‘a l-salib’ (Long live the crescent alongside the cross) repeated at every national/religious 
crisis aims to ‘conceal a history of discrimination and marginalization, if not alienation of the 
Coptic community’ (Mehrez 2012: 146-147). Brownlee (2013:3) argues that the Egyptian state 
treats Copts as a ‘problem to be managed’ rather than citizens. Mehrez (2012: 146) claims this 
misrepresentation translated into two reactions: ‘a predominantly disgruntled Coptic Diaspora 
that exposes, at the international level, the discriminatory practices of the Egyptian state’ and 
an ‘equally disgruntled, visibly less docile, and dominated Coptic minority within Egypt’ (Mehrez 
2012: 146). Examples of this disgruntled discourse of the Coptic migrant minorities reviewed for 
this essay, is the blog Coptic Nationalism, and Coptic activist Majdi Khalil, who has a fair share 
of media exposure and currently has his own YouTube channel.  
More importantly, laws can be used to discriminate towards the Copts. El-Ezaby Pasha, the 
Deputy Interior Minister laid 10 questions in 1934 to regulate Church-building permits (Browlee 
2013: 8). Among other restrictions, the questions implied that ‘new Churches should be a 
reasonable distance from existing mosques [and Churches] and they should enjoy the consent 
of the neighbouring Muslim population…’ (ibid). In practical terms, El-Ezaby’s conditions 
prevented Copts from constructing or renovating their Churches (ibid; Daring Question 2009q). 
President Sisi, however, made his pledge to build new Churches ‘in the wake of a deadly attack 
in Central Egypt’ (The New Arab 2018). The president attended Christmas Mass in a Coptic 
Church (Daring Question 2016p) and in his tenancy a new cathedral was inaugurated (Reuters 
2018). Khalil claims that Sadat promised in an Islamic conference to impoverish the Copts to the 
point of rendering them beggars on the street (Daring Question 2009q). However, Khalil 
recognised there had been changes since the President Sisi attended the Mass, although he was 
not hopeful for real change (Daring Question 2016p). Khalil (ibid) argues that Egyptian state is a 
deep Islamic state, hence Copts are treated like dhimmis where their lives are not equals to 
Muslim lives; he also claims that the only time bombers targeting Churches received capital 
punishment only when Muslim blood is spilled. This tirade is reproduced to illustrate the point 
of this section: there is an aggressive discourse which carries the undertone of victimhood and 
resentment. Many scholars [(Mehrez 2012; Browlee 2013) as well as Rabboudi and Abdel-Samad 
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in Box of Islam] point to the infringement on the rights of the Copts and even call them second 
class citizens. El-Qemani (September 8, 2018) argues that since Egyptian law has to follow the 
Sharia it cannot give equal citizenship to Christians. Addin lilah wal-watan lil jami’ – religion is 
for God and the homeland is for everybody – is another slogan that has proven ineffective in 
creating this unity (Mehrez 2012). Rabboudi (Box of Islam 2019a) points out that the term 
Watan, although meant to signify Patrie or homeland, does not embody the full Western 
concept of homeland, let alone to embody the philosophical concept of states and democracy.   
 
The representation of the Coptic community is a reflection of their marginalization. Researching 
Coptic and Cinema in the library’s search engine of an academic institution, only one book 
chapter by Samia Mehrez was relevant to this topic; it discusses Bahib Issima. In order to be able 
to conduct this study, I had to actively seek films with Coptic representation while avoiding the 
stereotypical representation that includes, according to Mehrez (2012:149), ‘the exploitative 
calculating clerk, or the liberal/loose Coptic woman, or in sharp contrast, simply the good, 
devout cross-bearing Copt.’ Citing the movie Fatima wa Marika wa Rachel (Rafla 1949) where a 
Muslim man tries to seduce three different women by pretending to be of the same faith, and 
reproducing ‘various stereotypical markers of the faith to win over the girl’s family’ ends up 
marrying the Muslim woman as she is ‘morally superior to the Christian and the Jew’ (ibid). 
Hassan w Merqus w Cohen (Jazeirly 1954) similarly produces the stereotypical images of 
Christian and Jewish faith (Mehrez 2012).  The greedy Copt who exploits the underprivileged 
Muslim is also reproduced in the critically acclaimed Imarat Yaacobian in both the novel and the 
movie adaptation (ibid) 
This complicates the issue of the Coptic representation. They are present in the cultural 
discourse; they are visible on the screen but as ‘other’ (Mehrez 2012). In a way, the stereotypical 
representation makes Coptic representation a ‘visual’ as in the optical verification of a 
procedure of power that only requires the audience ‘receiving loud and clear’. (Daney 1999)  
 
Bahib Issima (Fawzi 2004) is the odd one out. But does this movie negate Copts as a missing 
image? In a way this movie translates personal oppression into a national one and there were 
several calls to read Adli as an Egyptian (Mehrez 2012). This is echoed in the Egyptian press with 
El-Shenawi (2019), who considered the movie to be the bravest in representing the Coptic family 
as Egyptian first. From the position of this research, this is the ultimate recommendation for its 
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alternative narrative when minorities’ representation is concerned: to have their image as a 
reflection of the national one.  
However, there was a problem in this case. The Coptic community, led by the Coptic Orthodox 
Church, rejected the movie, ‘called for its boycott and crippling it financially’ (Mehrez 2012: 163). 
The film was a commercial failure since it was labelled a festival film and condemned to a 
disadvantageous release time [June is exam time and adults were home bound with their 
children]. Furthermore, with all the negative coverage, the film was not deemed as clean 
cinema. 
Chronicled in her article, Mehrez (2012) detailed the procedures that Bahib Issima had to go 
through to get released. This is more indicative of the level of control the state exerts on the 
public representation and how it can successfully manipulate those involved in order to 
champion itself as a defender of artistic freedom. Before the filming, a higher committee for 
censorship approved the script, but the unprecedented realistic representation prompted a 
submission to a committee before its release date, which ‘routinely become a strategic way to 
diffuse such responsibility and to remap the limits of representation within the context of the 
official discourse on “freedom of thought and expression”’. (Mehrez 2012:157) One Copt was 
present who objected to several scenes. Voicing her objections prompted the creation of 
another committee which reflects ‘the hierarchy among various actors within the cultural 
sphere ranging from civil servants in the office of the Egyptian censor, to prominent intellectuals 
from both the Muslim and Coptic communities, and finally to the upper echelon of 
representatives from the Ministry of Culture’ (Mehrez 2012:157). Coptic objections were minor 
in the second committee. The third committee, comprised of predominantly Coptic intellectuals, 
expressed enthusiasm towards the film, but noted it will cause controversy and recommended 
another committee. Dr Gabir Asfur – who held the posts of secretary-general of the Higher 
Council for Culture, general director of the Office of the Censor and professor of Arabic literature 
at Cairo University – headed this committee. Caving to media pressure, he extended an 
invitation to the Coptic Church. This was prompted by the leak of the first member of committee 
to the Church, and the Church reproducing a pattern of ‘intervention of Muslim religious 
authorities and groups in cultural affairs’ (Mehrez 2012: 158). According to Rabboudi (Box of 
Islam 2019a; 2019f), the state upholds the rules of law, however Middle Eastern states are still 
in construction. As shown in this case, the inclusion of religious authorities aims to ‘reconfirm 
the state’s moral authority over its citizen’ (Mehrez 2012:158). The makers objected to the 
inclusion of the Church, arguing that the script was already approved; the press supported their 
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endeavour to block this intervention, reminding of the intervention of Al-Azhar in the cultural 
field. The creators then organised a private screening for journalists, intellectuals, filmmakers 
and critics, moving the debate from the private to the public arena and ‘high-jacking the state 
and the Church’s moral authority over the film’ (Mehrez:2012: 158). This prompted a series of 
enthusiastic and supportive comments from the audience. It proved effective, as the fourth 
committee met without the priests and recommended the release of the movie with a verdict 
to ‘remove the word religion from Layla Ilwi’s pronouncement in the film “Damn this world and 
religion” (mal‘un abu l-dunya ala l- din), cut the kissing scene in the Church tower, and shorten 
the rowdy family fight inside the Church’ (Mehrez 2012: 160). The film was branded adults only, 
which prompted Yusuf Usman, the young actor who played the lead in the movie, to question 
‘how a film starring a child [can] be released to adults only?’ (ibid). It is interesting to note that 
Yusuf is Muslim, and he had to leave his primary Islamic school since the headmaster persecuted 
him for committing a haram: acting in a film.  The makers asserted that their film ‘is against all 
forms of oppression where “cinema” in the title is synonymous to “freedom”’ (Mehrez 2012: 
157). The Coptic Church persevered; they filed a case against the film for contempt of religion 
in which it was claimed that the film  
misrepresents the reality of the Coptic community and its values insofar as 
the main character Adli (a devout member of the Coptic Orthodox Church) is 
married to Ni‘mat (a Protestant), a highly unrepresentative example of 
marriage in the Coptic community; the film represents the Copts as fanatic; 
the film misrepresents the principle of chastity within a Coptic marriage; the 
film advocates sinful relationships; the film misrepresents basic Christian 
teachings about sin and repentance; the film offers a highly negative and 
vulgar image of the Coptic extended family; the film misrepresents the Coptic 
religious authorities and the Church itself through scenes that violate the 
sanctity of the holy place; the film misrepresents Christ and ultimately, God 
himself and our relationship with him (Mehrez 2012: 162).  
 
Adding to this list, Usama Fawzi was accused of being a self-hating Copt since he converted to 
Islam to marry a Muslim woman (ibid). It worth noting that the Coptic Church used the national 
unity banner in their campaign against the film and called on their fellow Muslim religious 
authority for support, asking ‘Is that how our Muslim Brothers perceive us?’ (ibid:163).  
 
The Coptic Church followed a strategy from al-Azhar play book. They have failed in stopping the 
film’s release. It is unclear if the Church or the community believes that el-Azhar would have 
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succeeded in a similar case. Azzi (Azzi, Tannous 2021) claimed that minorities in the Middle East 
have an identity crisis. While living in Shobra, the town in which Bahib Issima was based, she 
recounted being able to recognise Coptic women from how they carried themselves, stating 
these women channel their conservative values without needing to wear a veil. On a final note, 
this extensive review of the media discourse and the fight undertaken by the Coptic Church to 
stop a movie aimed to suggest their malaise with this representation. The imagined image of 
Coptic community could not be constructed in this video from the available sources. Launching 
an investigation to produce these images was not possible due to a lack in funding. However, it 
is certainly a topic of interest that can be explored at a later stage.   
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5.0 Results: From counter-narratives to cultural productions; a framework and a thematic 
approach 
 
In this chapter, the framework for cultural productions as counter-narratives is presented. It is 
important to note that this is by no means a call to suspend the ad campaigns. They serve a 
different function which is to pierce through the extremists’ narratives in support of the redirect 
method (Helmus, Klein 2018). The premise of this framework is to strengthen the multiplicity in 
identity construct and challenge cognitive extremism in the cultural sphere. It is worth noting 
that in November 2019 a heavy crackdown on Telegram booted extremist channels from this 
application. Reports emerged on their discovery of the blockchain messaging (BCM) apps where 
they can create supergroups of 100,000 people (Gilbert 2019). This might complicate counter-
narratives efforts since BCM provide ‘secure, anonymous communication [no need to provide 
phone numbers], a tamper-proof repository for beheading videos and other ISIS propaganda, 
and perhaps most ominously, the ability to transfer cryptocurrency anywhere in the world’ 
(ibid). If extremists’ propaganda is going to become more difficult to intercept, then the shift in 
approach becomes more necessary. Since this framework is conceived for mainstream cultural 
productions, it the solution to this problem.  
 
Overview of the framework 
 
This framework adheres to the offensive and defensive techniques as suggested by Reed et. al 
(2017), where a counter-narrative deconstructs, and an alternative narrative promotes. The 
recommendations of this framework are built on the practice inquiry and discussions with 
practitioners. Needless to say, the product of counter-narratives should strive to promote 
critical thinking and share accurate historical fact without stooping to any attempts to insult 
Islam. The alterative narrative’s products are a celebration of the heritage of the area that is 
covered, whether Muslim or of other communities.  In a nutshell, this framework is advocating 
an indirect approach to addressing cognitive extremism and creating positive and emotionally 
engaging stories to assert values of democracy, diversity and human rights. 
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Model for practitioners  
The framework limits its advice and pointers to the early stages of content development. 
Afterwards, it trusts practitioners to adhere to standard practice in producing and distributing 
their content. However, in order to support practitioners in their decision making, I have 
developed the flowchart below.  
 
Figure 3 Model for practitioners: developed to support their decision making. The steps to follow to define their product 
are in rectangles. Other considerations are in the coloured cloud shaped forms 
 
This flowchart offers practitioners a step-by-step guide to defining the product they are 
developing based on their interest. Once that is established, it presents them with 
considerations to keep in mind. The following text discusses in further detail the content of the 
flowchart.  
- Find your voice: reflect on your storytelling strength and define your interest  
- Select a theme from the list: theme can be selected from: Historical narrative, women 
status or minorities rights.  
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- Define your product: if challenging the mainstream Islamic narrative is what interests 
you, then your product is considered a counter-narrative since it will focus on debunking 
myths and promoting facts and critical thinking. The mainstream Islamic narrative is 
transnational; it is the same across national borders and explains the stark similarities 
that can be found in discourses of Islamist preachers of different nationalities. If you are 
interested more in the local and the national, then the product is an alternative 
narrative. El-Qemani’s (September 8, 2018) suggests that Islamists’ narrative is 
dissociated from a particular land. A complex local identity is then presented as an 
alternative to the single identity of Islamists. Hence, the product of this section aims to 
promote the national singularity or cultural difference specific to a nation-state (Bhabha 
1990).  This needs to recognise the diversity of the population and the cultural exchange 
or regional shared history if and when it occurred. Research your local history, language 
and customs, your representation should reflect that picture. 
- Human-centric approach: focus on the human lived experience to build emotional 
engagement. In fiction, place your characters in situations that showcase their struggle 
(Orid Hallan, Sabah).  Your documentaries can debunk historical misconceptions from a 
historical figure’s perspective, recreate the historical scene in an accurate 
representation. Do not use films to illustrate the era unless they recreated the era 
accurately.  
- Think about your language: it is important to use language that does not incite hate, so 
it is political Islam and not just Islam, particularly in the West. This might not be needed 
since this framework is conceived to tackle their worldview indirectly. However, it is 
important to refer to the Ottomans as Ottomans not the Turks, Abbasside not the Iraqi 
etc unless using this lingo is needed to set your character as anti-hero. 
- Analyse your risks: choosing the alternative narrative might increase your financial risk. 
On the other hand, even if conducted indirectly and in the most respectful manner, 
there might be a push back from establishment Islam to your movies. This research is 
aware that the risk of losing commissions might deter cultural practitioners from 
counter-narratives; this is why academics are flagged as the primary source of content 
for them. Trusting their adherence to factual representation of data, research 
institutions may pose limited risk to academics’ job security. Academics can rely video-
essays or even documentaries to share their research data with a wider audience.  
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- Normalise representation: of successful women, diversity in the communities whether 
it is ethnic diversity, sexual orientation and/or religious beliefs. In the West, normalise 
the cultural differences between the Muslim communities. 
- Avoid: militarism, ill placed monologue that aims to deliver a preaching message to the 
audience, a group of pan-regional characters unless there is a valid storytelling reason. 
Be truthful to cultural singularities and similarities.  
- Your story is your message: This is an embodiment of the ‘show do not tell’ mantra 
repeated in film schools and scriptwriting books and seminars. To exemplify how this 
framework can be approached, I will discuss the example of democracy from Schmidt’s 
list. In the media discourse, political Islamic parties are already accused of wanting to 
exploit the democratic process to reach and monopolise power without having any 
governing plan (Box of Islam 2019b). Cultural productions should aim to exert a positive 
influence on that discourse. It should not create a story where the protagonist debates 
an Islamist on the value of secularity and democracy. These debates are better left for 
civil rights activists and political scholars. Instead, they should ensure an accurate 
historical representation of the life of a subject living in the utopia the Islamists are 
preaching about. These characters can be Muslim or non-Muslims, men or women, free 
or enslaved. Islamist discourse idealises the Caliphate and present the Caliphate as the 
only time when Muslims were proud and powerful, however they never touch on the 
rights of the subjects since these rights are the foundation of democratic states (El-
Qemani September 8, 2016). The collective work of cultural producers and academics 
in this angle aims to move the discourse away from an abstract discussion of an idealised 
past to a concrete discussion of a governing plan that is lacking in Islamist discourse (Box 
of Islam 2019). This example is simply meant as a guide on how to approach the theory 
and suggestions detailed in the section themes for thematic content. This framework 
advocates an indirect approach without talking heads delivering message. This does not 
mean the experts in documentaries or video-essays commenting on an artefact or a 
reconstruction from factual data. This means that fictional storytelling needs to embody 
the aim or the value you want to promote. Cast A-list stars if possible. Philadelphia is a 
good example of this. The film featured a gay lawyer (played by Tom Hanks) 
discriminated against for having AIDS and a homophobic lawyer (played by Denzel 
Washington) representing him in court. The film grossed $206 million, a strong indicator 
of wide audience reception and most importantly ‘helped foster awareness about AIDS 
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and compassion towards sufferers’, the aim set by its creator (Powel 2018).  
- Consider your audience user experience when choosing an online distribution platform. 
That said, online campaigns can be beneficial for promotion, especially if influencers are 
engaged to push the product or a specific character. 
Framework’s summary 
 
The table below summarises how this framework envisages navigating counter and alternative 
narratives in the cultural sphere. Since it is presented like a strategy for content development, 
it is organised in two sections: production and distribution.  The production section lists the 
themes of content: historical narratives, women’s status and minorities’ rights. They are 
relevant to counter and alternative narratives. However, since it takes production risk 
management into consideration, the framework recommends that counter-narratives be 
produced by academics via video-essays and documentaries. Alternative narratives are thus 
entrusted to cultural practitioners to develop films and television series. The distribution section 
discusses the target audience and the platforms to reach them.  
Section one - Production: themes for content development and content creators  

































Feature films & TV series 
 
Section two - Distribution: Medium and audience   
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Platform    Mainstream media  
  Online distribution platforms like Netflix, Amazon, Shahed etc  
  Blogs 
  Video-essays journals  
 
Audience    General audience (selection more project specific) 
Table 4 The framework for cultural productions as counter-narratives 
 
Section one: Production or Content Creation:  
This section details what is needed to be developed and by whom as summarised in the table 
above. It is divided to two sections: themes for content development and content creators  
 
Themes for content development   
Following Ferguson’s (2016) positive review of the impact of drama on violent extremism, this 
section aims to suggest the type of content needed. Three themes are identified: historical 
Islamic narrative, women status and minorities’ rights. In each theme, there is a theoretical 
discussion that summarises the discourse along with some notes on how to approach this angle 
discussed under two headings: the counter-narrative and the alternative narrative. Practitioners 
need to note that the theoretical discussion is an overview of media discourse and will need to 
conduct their own extensive research relevant to their productions.  
 
i. First theme: Historical Islamic Narrative 
The aim here is to challenge and correct the inaccuracies of transnational and national historical 
narrative and promote critical thinking 
 
Extremists’ narrative relies on history to achieve five goals according to Reed and Dowling (2008: 
100-101): (1) it expands the sense of crisis by linking the present one to an older crisis; (2) it 
supports the solution to prove its feasibility; (3) it reinforces the in-group out-group dynamics 
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by establishing lineage and connecting the current struggle to past one, giving the impression of 
a permanent struggle between them; (4) it strengthens the legitimacy and credibility of the 
messenger by linking them to a revered personality; (5) it uses historical prophecies that give it 
legitimacy by connecting past events to prophecies, justifies a certain action and creates a sense 
of urgency of an impending crisis predicted by the prophecy. It worth noting that many consider 
Islamic reform a solution of this problem. Hammingsen and Castro (2017:29) warn against 
government involvement in supporting and promoting moderate Islam since it will be ‘construed 
as partisan and discriminatory, contradicting the declared secularism of the state and thereby 
becoming a symptom of double standards, again risking further marginalisation and 
polarisation.’ Abdel-Samad (2016) points out that there are some Western universities who are 
teaching moderate Islam, like Mohanad Khorshid in Germany, but the main challenge is 
sustaining this moderate version Islam, even in the West, considering the current structure and 
the influence of political Islam. For example, an inclusive mosque was opened in Germany for 
all faith to pray in but since it has a woman for an Imam there was an immediate statement to 
delegitimise it from mainstream Turkish institutions and el-Azhar (Box of Islam 2017a).  
However, as discussed earlier it is the political element inherent in Islam that needs to be 
addressed. Political Islamic parties, even militant ones like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, have a theological 
and jurisprudence foundation in the early books of Islam and the Quran, and these values and 
ideas are taught in schools and are anchored in popular culture. With failing states, they posit 
Islam as the solution blaming the current situation on a bad religion, and they harbour a hostility 
towards the West due to its immoral values. The political discourse of Islamist parties promotes 
social justice; regardless of the terminology they use, they model the vision of the state on early 
Islam ‘confederate’s’ arrangement (el-Qemani September 8, 2018) and cite the terms of first 
four Caliphs as the foundation of good governance. The existence of these four Caliphs is put to 
question due to lack of historical evidence (Box of Islam 2019h).  
The mainstream Islamic narrative advocates an illiterate virtuous man who was dictated a code 
directly from God. Upon his Hijra to Medina he established a state, freed the slaves and gave 
women their rights. The textual review of YouTube channels showed that poking holes in the 
accuracy of the mainstream narrative is a common tactic. However, the delivery mode is lecture 
based. This approach has its merit. The authority of the messenger is recognised. However, it 
can also be  a hindrance since the identity of the messenger might deter audience from watching 
and engaging with the ideas. What follows is a brief overview of the historical discussion in the 
media discourse; it includes historicity and historical Mohamed, the Quran creation or evolution 
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and the Language of the Quran.  
 
Historicity and historical Mohamed 
El-Qemani (September 8, 2018) claims that Islam has presented the Arabs [meaning the tribes 
living in the Arabian Peninsula and not the East-Mediterraneans and north-Africans colonised 
by the Islamic conquests] with their tribal norms and rulings. He argues that for Mohamed to 
create his confederation it was impossible to unite the different tribes under Hobal [Arabian 
pagan God]. Therefore he concocted the idea of moulding the different tribes into the one tribe 
of God, regressing them from the second Jahilia [the open society made possible by commerce] 
to the first Jahilia [waging wars for money] (ibid). Islam clashes with modernity (Daring Question, 
2015a). This is aggravated by political Islam presenting the tribal confederation of the 7th century 
as an alternative way of life (El-Qemani September 8, 2018) supported by a popular belief that 
the best century is that of the Prophet, followed by the Sahaba (the companions of the Prophet). 
This belief is based on a Hadith (Mohamed’s speech) mentioned in the two books considered 
the cornerstone of this discipline [Bokhari 2652 and Muslim 2533]. 
 
Mohamed (570, 632) is the role model for Muslims. He recited the Quran inspired directly by 
God via the archangel Gabriel. Muslim scholars pride themselves with the meticulous 
methodology followed to select and authenticate the Hadith (Mohamed’s speeches). The most 
reliable sources are Sahih Bukhari (810, 870) and Sahih Muslim (821, 875). The Syra is 
Mohamed’s biography written by Ibn Ishac (704, 770) on the Caliph’s command; his version is 
lost. The one available today is the edited version of Ibn Hisham (died 833) who states in its 
introduction that he omitted some stories he judged harmful to the Prophet. The disparity 
between the events’ occurrence and the earliest written Islamic accounts, in addition to a near 
absence of archaeological and independent sources, are highly problematic for academic 
historians. Mohamed’s name appeared for the first time inscribed in the dome of the rock, the 
mosque built by Abdel Malik ben Marwan in the 7th century. The inscription ‘Mohamed rassoul 
el-Allah’, from the lens of a Syro-Aramiac literate translates to: ‘Praised be God’s messenger’ 
and is interpreted by some as a direct reference to Christ especially since some unorthodox 
schools in early Christendom rejected the deity of Christ (Box of Islam 2015a; Box of Islam 
2015b).  
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Did Mohamed really exist, and if he did what was his real name? Messelmani (Daring Question 
2016b; Box of Islam 2015v) stresses the abundance of contradictory stories. Qotham Bin Abdel-
Lat seems to be the most likely name; making Mohamed a title inspired from the Bible [John’s 
bible, and Song of songs] (Daring Question 2010q; Box of Islam 2015b). However, while there is 
an abundance of contradicting stories, there are details of important people who are totally 
eclipsed from Mohamed’s life. For example Waraqa Ben nawfal is his wife’s cousin and the priest 
who conducted his wedding ceremony; the Ebonite (a Christian heresy [sic]) priest was 
preparing Mohamed to be his successor according to Hariri (Daring Question 2010e; 1979) and 
he continues to claim that the first revelations of the Quran (The Mecca Part) is an Arabic 
translation of the Ebonite bible. 
Islamic tradition described symptoms that coincide with inspiration; it led some medical experts 
(Sadeghian 2006; Korkut 2001; Box of Islam 2015b, Daring Question 2011b; 2011c) to argue that 
Mohamed suffered from frontal lobe epilepsy. This diagnosis, similar to the case of Dostoevsky, 
explains the repetitive seizures that incite Mohamed’s recitation in an eloquent language in 
Mecca, and the deterioration of his language (as per the deterioration of his mental health) in 
Medina coinciding with his increased inclination to violence. This is in addition to side-effects 
accounted for in numerous texts like: hearing voices, oversensitivity to smells, favouring sweet 
tastes etc. (ibid).  
 
The Quran: creation or evolution  
The Quran is believed to be the word of God preserved on a tablet in Arabic, and in this realm, 
it is preserved to the letter by early Muslim generations as recited by Mohamed (IslamQ&A 
2010). Schools across the Middle East teach the story of Othman Bin Affan who re-gathered the 
Quran and burned all earlier copies. Four copies were made, and he sent them to the provinces. 
None of these copies are found (Box of Islam 2015ac).  
The oldest manuscript, found in Sanaa, is a Palimpsest dating to mid-late 7th century; the 
manuscripts preserved in the Paris Library, Birmingham University, Sanaa, the British Library and 
Samarkand date between late 7th to 8th century. None of these copies are complete versions of 
the Quran. Near complete copies are available in Cairo and Topkapi but they date to the 9th 
century. These are all the surviving copies. (Daring Question 2015u, 2015v; 2017b, Box of Islam 
2015c; 2015d; 2015u, 2015t, 2015ae; 2018a). 
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The Sanaa Palimpsest, according to Dr Puin (Daring Question 2015v), proves that there is a 
change in the text and a difference in the order of Suras from today’s Quran. Since this 
manuscript dates back to the era of Abdel Malik ben Marwan, it reasserts the belief that he 
shaped Islam as we know it today (Box of Islam 2016s) or fuels the argument that Mohamed had 
nothing to do with the Quran (Holland 2012).   
Once subjected to narrative analysis, scholars argue that the Quran retells non-canonical early 
Christian texts (per example the Infancy bible), Jewish stories (from Midrash Rabbah in 
particular), stories adopted from Alexandre Romance and some adaptations from St Jacob and 
St Augustin (Box of Islam 2015e; 2015f; 2016y; 2016ab, 2016a) 
 
The language of the Quran  
There are two periods for the Quran: Medina is the last revelation period that abrogated the 
first period of Mecca. However, Theodor Nöldeke (Daring Question 2012b) argues Mecca period 
should be divided to three distinct periods. 
Patricia Crone aimed to reconstruct Islamic history from outside the Islamic sources. According 
to her, Mecca cannot be a centre of trade, which questions if the Quran was born in Arabia. She 
advocates Petra as a likely candidate of the Quran’s origin, due to the Quran’s mention of olive 
trees in the Prophet’s city and a proximity to a salt statue, as a direct allusion to Lot’s wife 
(Holland 2012). Moreover, the themes discussed (per example nature of Christ) do not concern 
polytheist Meccans but are topics of debate for Levantine Christians (Box of Islam 2015e).  
Christopher Luxenberg (Box of Islam 2015ad, 2015af) advocates the Syro-Aramaic language as 
key to decode the Quranic texts, given that it was the lingua franca of the time. Arabic at this 
time was a primitive language containing just 15 letters and therefore, could not sustain such a 
complex text (ibid). The Quran today uses 28 letters and 14 characters that were developed 
under the Abbasside Empire. Gabriel Sawma (Daring Question 2012k, 2012o) states that early 
manuscripts were written with 22 non-dotted letters, and that a Syro-Aramaic literate could 
read them easily. His angle puts some words, especially those disagreed upon by early Muslim 
scholars, into context (examples include Quran, forqan, ALM etc). 
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Notes for practitioners 
Counter-narrative: deconstruct the foundation myth of the Islamic state by challenging 
inaccurate historical narratives based on academic research and historical evidence 
 
The desired outcome of this angle is to promote critical thinking and educate about factual 
historical events. This can be achieved by representing the ideas summarised above in a more 
engaging style than lecture-based and can produce content that fills the gap in the discourse.  
 
Presenting these ideas under different form:  The different programmes, particularly Box of Islam 
and Early history of Islam, had done a tremendous job in creating the first go-to depository for 
information on early Islam for Arabic speakers. Mohamed Lmasiah, the host of Early History of 
Islam and an expert on Quran manuscripts, announced an online course in collaboration with 
the German research group Inara. Abdel-Samad in the early episodes of his show (2015) invites 
his audience to be critical and do their own research, which should be the point of this angle. 
Engaging with this material and repackaging its message, whether as documentaries for 
mainstream media channels, video-essays for online distribution or fiction, will increase the 
impact of this angle.  
 
The gap in the discourse: While early Islam dominates the discourse, the era when Hadith and 
Syra were collected is not in the spotlight. Hadith and Syra are singled out herein as per el-
Behiri’s argument that they justify terrorist actions. Also, they feature in the hate speech 
directed towards Muslims and the Islamic extremists’ speeches aiming to recruit Muslims to 
fight the Holy War. Questioning if these texts reflect early Islam or the Abasside empire is nearly 
inexistent in the public debate.  Abdel-Samad (Box of Islam 2017) pinpoints that Ibn Taymyah is 
the favourite scholar for extremists and considered a reformist for moderate institutions. 
However, he was deemed too radical for the Abbasside empire, a time where a slave woman 
led the prayer drunk. It is worth remembering that El-Behiri refutes some Hadith if they 
contradict the goodness and the high morals of the Prophet. This is a belief shared by millions 
of Muslims; even Mohamed X, the counter-narrative video, directs the youth to follow the good 
example of the Prophet in their daily life. Since Hadith and Syra are crucial in documenting his 
behaviour, it is important to question if they are political documents truthful to the Abbassid 
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era instead of historical documents recounting early Islam. More importantly, is the image of 
the Prophet, drawn from these texts, a reflection of the historical Mohamed or of that era’s 
ruling elite? Questioning the accuracy of these chains of narration in the public psyche can 
facilitate the task of counter-narratives and reformists. Raising these questions is the important 
task, although it may instigate a furious backlash. It should not be expected from this 
investigation, or the cultural product, to pinpoint to a Caliph that stained the image of the 
Prophet. Ideally, this can be approached as the stress that creates systematic evolution (Taleb 
2018), and pressures mainstream institution into presenting new evidence if they have it or 
justify their lack of interest in conducting the inquiry. The aim from all this is to engage in a 
constructive debate where Hadith and Syra can be discussed as historical or socio-political 
documents instead of basis for law in modern times.  
 
Alternative narrative: aim to tell the history from a local perspective. In the case of early Arabia, 
it should reflect the diversity and the tolerance attributed to its polytheists  
 
The Islamic historical narrative is uniform globally. It stands out as a uniform narrative that 
crosses borders and is the basis of defining Muslims by their Muslim-ness. The story of early 
Islam can be retold from a local perspective. Needless to say, it should be factual, celebrating 
the local and Arabian heritage without playing to a supremacy angle. The desired outcome of 
this alternative narrative is to enable a multiplicity in identity. Identity politics tends to 
homogenise populations and to dilute national, cultural or economical structures by favouring 
a single identity (Islamic, Arabic, Aramaic). Challenging this single identity definition and 
highlighting differences without defacing or denying regional shared history is essential. Identity 
is a theoretical construct of sameness within a nation and difference with others (Bhabha 2013). 
The national unique singularity can be easily fulfilled if indigenous minorities are represented in 
the national narrative. National theories are selected here as they have a better chance of 
limiting cognitive resistance to cultural change. The content derived from this angle needs to 
highlight the local histories and focus the framework on the people living within a national 
border.  
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ii. Second theme: Women status   
The aim here is to promote human rights, especially those of women, as equal in society, by 
normalising the representation of empowered women from all factions of society.  
 
Schmid’s list notes the necessity to develop human rights. Women’s rights in Islam are a topic 
of constant debate. Nation-states offered new possibilities to define ‘sameness and difference’ 
that replaced the religious imagining (Bahabha 1990) and enabled a self-identification as other 
from an underprivileged political position within the national borders. This enabled the feminist 
activists’ quest to acquire their full rights as citizens and explains the movement flexibility in 
embracing ethno-racial and queer discourses (Kaplan 2000). In the West, it took three waves of 
feminist activism to translate these rights into laws.  
It is observable that extremist fundamentalist groups tend to oppress women’s rights upon 
gaining power. Once the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan, they imposed veil on women 
and burned cinemas. Once ISIS succeeded in their coup and declared the Caliphate, they 
articulated their specific expectation of their jihadi wives and reinstated the cult of domesticity 
for women (Saul 2015). Controlling women and imposing a certain demeanour seems consistent 
with Islamists’ interpretation of morality (El-Qemani September 8, 2018).  
Certainly, there are lessons to be learned from western experiences in countering an oppressive 
patriarchal ideology. Per example Johnston (2000) called for a strategy for women’s cinema. Her 
idea remains relevant nowadays. Zanaz (2015: 1) states that a ‘Muslim woman is not born, she 
is constructed’; his depiction of women’s reality in the Islamic world mirrors Kaplan’s (1988:7) 
criticism of Hollywood’s patriarchal films where ‘women are refused a voice’ and ‘their desire is 
subjected to men’s desire leaving them with the choice of living in frustration or risking their 
lives in the daring.’ Les Fonds Suds has financed several movies that addressed women's issues 
in Francophone countries; such initiative, although welcome as it made such movies possible, 
corresponds more to the politics of the French funds and the reception of French audiences 
rather than the impact these movies have on the community portrayed in these movies. For 
example, the war is the dominant topic of Lebanese films while women’s issues feature heavily 
in Tunisian cinema.  
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Storytelling and art projects can have a very important and powerful role to play in aggregating 
change. In the Egyptian context, there are three examples where films had a positive impact to 
the point of changing the state’s laws (Abdel-Rahman 2016; Iraqi 2014). Relevant to our case is 
the movie Orid hallan (Marzouk 1975). Fatin Hamama portrays a lady who goes to Shariah court 
to divorce her husband. The film showcased the nearly impossible task and the humiliation that 
women go through in these courts. In this film, the witnesses provided by the husband 
committed perjury, hence she lost her case after four years of struggle. As a consequence of this 
movie, the Egyptian state introduced a new law – el-Khale3 – where a woman can divorce easily 
if she forfeits the husband’s due alimony (Abdel-Rahman 2016; Iraqi 2014).  
 
The mainstream Islamic narrative claims that Islam championed women’s rights in the Arabian 
Peninsula, saving them from infanticide and giving them inheritance (Ahmed 2011). This claim 
needs to be fact checked in the media discourse. In Pre-Islamic Arabia, el-Lat, el-Uza, and Manaf 
were the Goddesses Triad worshiped in Mecca. Like older Abrahamic religions, the sacred 
feminine was overlooked by Islam to worship one masculine entity. Each tribe considered an 
ancestor as a protector; these Gods and Goddesses were messengers to lift their needs and 
wishes to the almighty God (el-Qemani September 8, 2018). In the case of inheritance, the 
Islamic narrative recounts that Khadija, Mohamed’s first wife, was divorced once and also 
previously widowed. Therefore, she inherited her husband’s business, employed Mohamed and 
initiated their marriage proposal (Ahmed 1986). Polygyny as well as polyandry was practiced in 
Mecca and Medina but Islamic ‘polygyny [as in one man marries and maintains a number of 
women in one or more establishments] seems to have been an innovation of Mohamed’. If it 
was practiced beforehand it was not very widespread; it was easy for a woman to divorce her 
husband by simply turning her tent around, a tradition that Islam abolished and introduced idda 
[a waiting period for women to wait before remarrying] (ibid: 69).  
Women in Jahilia [Age of ignorance as referred to by Islamic scholars] were ‘priests, soothsayers, 
prophets, participants in warfare, and nurses in the battlefield… They were fearlessly outspoken, 
defiant critics of men’ (Ahmed 1992 :62). For-example Assma bint Marwan was a poet who 
criticised Mohamed, therefore he ordered her death (Daring Question 2008d). Islam terminated 
the freedom of women and imposed segregation (Ahmed 1992). Zaki (2016) claims that 
infanticide was eradicated for both boys and girls, arguing that Mohamed’s father was meant to 
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be sacrificed however, a female soothsayer saved his life. The story is recounted in Ibn Ishac’s 
Syra.  
Briefly, in Arabia depending on the tribe in question, women’s status may have worsened or 
gotten better after Islam (Ahmed 1992). The narrative completely overlooks the status of 
women in the countries that were colonised by Arabians. For instance, the Amazigh queen 
Queen Dihya (al-Kahina means priestess) led her army to fight the Arabs’ colonising armies and 
died in battle, leading to many women and children captured as slaves (Daring Question 2018f).  
Most importantly, these changes introduced by Islam still affect women’s status today. Islamic 
Sharia defines a woman as half of a man in inheritance and testimony in court. The Iranian penal 
code Article 297 sets the Diya [blood money paid when someone is murdered] for a man at 100 
camels and in the case of injuring his left testicular at 66 camels, his right at 33 (Abdel-Samad 
2016: 112).  The higher figure is due to the belief that the left testicular are where the boys are 
made. A woman’s Diya is 50 camels. In case of rape, Article 441 entitles a woman to claim the 
‘dowry she might have commanded on marriage’ which may be worth more than her life (ibid).  
A ‘woman is above all a mother’ according to president Erdogan (Agence France Press 2016; 
Abdel-Rahman 2016). The Muslim Brotherhood stresses that a woman’s priority is her husband 
and children (Ahmed 2011) but does not forbid her from pursuing a career with the exception 
of becoming president or Imam. To be fair to the Brethren, Zeinab el-Ghazali is considered their 
unsung mother (Ahmed 2011). When members of the Muslim Brotherhood were jailed, the 
sisters (their female members) smuggled their letters out of prison (ibid The sisters also helped 
recruit other women, promoting the wear hijab and enabling the Islamic Sahewa in the 1980s 
(ibid). As aforementioned, ISIS in a communiqué limits women’s role to mothers, wives and 
housewives. Women can be wed at nine years of age; a girl is allowed to go to school since the 
age of seven as long as she stops at her 15th birthday. She can learn about ‘Islam, Arabic 
language, sewing, cooking and any craft’ that can prepare her to her appointed role. It is 
absolutely not needed ‘for a woman to travel to pursue further education in order to prove 
herself more intelligent than a man.’ (Saul 2015).  
Countering the cult of domesticity is not specific to Islam. The three waves of western feminism, 
from the suffragettes to lipstick feminists countered similar issues and succeeded to secure their 
rights (Kaplan 1988). Islamists brand feminism as a Western imposition of culture (Kroløkke, 
Sørensen 2006). They accuse feminists of promiscuity, while championing the veil as a sign of 
modesty, and some advocate female genital mutilation.  Hence, feminists may be easily 
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dismissed by Islamists and Arabic-speaking media. Moghissi (1999 cited Ftouni 2011: 167) 
defines the ‘daunting task’ that faces Islamic feminists by the necessity to establish a counter-
discourse method against anti-Islamic prejudice without getting caught up in an ‘apologetic or 
self-denying defence of Islamic gender practices or a justification of the oppressive discourses 
of Islamist ideologues and rulers’. A central argument is that men created Islam without 
women’s involvement, and some feminists are trying to take back the narrative (Box of Islam 
2017u)  
Leila Ahmed (1992:238) characterises ‘establishment Islam’ as the language of the politically 
powerful that is ‘legalistic and culturally authoritarian version of Islam that is hostile to women’; 
whereas ‘lay Islam’ has an ethical and egalitarian voice that ‘marginalised groups speak and 
Muslim women hear therefore they declare that Islam is non-sexist.’ An Islamic feminist 
hermeneutic affirms the egalitarian nature of True Islamic ideals. Although frequently referred 
to, the concept of True Islamic ideals is an elusive one, and religious institutions still yield a lot 
of influence.  
 Ftouni (2011: 163) expresses an urgent need for an Arab feminist epistemology, one that 
regards 
the existential reality of ‘being a woman’ as a priori to becoming Arab 
(Muslim, Jew, Christian, Secular, heterosexual, homosexual). An objective of 
such epistemology is to retrieve the agency of Arab women, who are 
excluded from, or misrepresented within the narratives of History, culture, 
politics and knowledge but ‘starts again with ‘different re-departures, 
different pauses, different arrivals. An Arab feminist epistemology requires a 
strategic double move, to both empiricise the lived experiences of women in 
Arab societies, and to theorise new ways of knowing and representing. 
 
While the epistemology is needed, the term Arab is problematic on account of both identity and 
language. According to Raymond (cited Salameh 2011), Arabic is ‘the language of 300 million 
“non-native speakers...”’ and ‘nobody's first language [...] used only for education, official 
purposes, written materials, and formal speeches [...] In most Arab countries only the well-
educated have adequate proficiency in Arabic while 200 million have not.’ Most importantly, 
social media showcase a tendency to reject the Arabic language, promoting the use of the 
spoken languages instead. On Twitter @Bellebnene is an example of this tendency, the account 
handlers hope to standardise the writing of the local language. At this point, some accounts use 
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the alphabet of Said Akl and others use Latin letters mixed with numbers that emerged as a by-
product of using the internet. The latter is used in this thesis. 
As an identity, the term Arab depicts a large geographical area stretched over two continents. 
The constitutions of these countries define them as Arab, yet they house a diversity of ethnic 
groups (Rabinovich March 31, 2019). Many indigenous minorities in the region reject an Arabic 
identity. Furthermore, the status of women’s rights is country-dependent. Despite major 
objections, Tunisia abolished a Shariah law granting women equal inheritance laws (MEMO 
2018) while the major recent gain in Saudi Arabia was the right to drive a car (Hubbard 2017).  
 Saudi women are being held hostage by mobile apps that share their location with their male 
guardian (Bennet 2019). These states are not monoliths; each one derived its country’s laws 
from Shariah and the French constitution (el-Qemani September 8, 2018). Can women’s rights 
activists achieve more progress in their local circumstances relying on citizenship rights 
protected by the nation-state, or by being part of a regional plan? Since the infringement on 
their rights is not consistent across borders, a regional plan can certainly offer support and share 
experience, but the chances of success of a coordinated goal-oriented strategy needs to be 
examined.  
 
On top of the common themes of feminism, Islamic feminism has two additional topics to deal 
with: the veil and female genital mutilation, discussed below. Where these topics are concerned, 
Eltahawy’s (2011) warns that feminist tools are used to void feminism out of its meaning and 
use it against women’s freedom and wellbeing.  
  
Female genital mutilation 
Female genital mutilation became illegal in the UK in 2015. However according to an NHS report 
(NHS 2017) ‘between April 2016 and March 2017 there were 9179 cases identified as FGM with 
87% of women were born and had the procedure done in an African country and 95% of these 
girls were under 18 years old, data shows 44% between the age of 5-9’ (NHS 2017: 6-7). 
Medically this practice has absolutely no benefits; actually, it puts women’s lives at risk by 
creating complication at birth without mentioning the negative effect on their sexual health. 
Furthermore, the Quran does not mention the practice, only Hadith do. A video-essay and a 
discussion of the media discourse around the topic is conducted in chapter 4. 
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The veil: women’s choice or a sign for political Islam  
A statement often heard from Muslim Brothers is that the veil is the first sign of an Islamic 
nation. Once Khomeini won the 1979 Iranian elections and established Sharia law, he enforced 
the veil and segregation. Whether imposed by a fundamentalist group or a theocracy, veiling is 
the sign of Islamic rule and challenging it may have dire consequences. Sheikh el-Qardawi 
(Daring Question 2008r) states that wearing hijab is a farida [obligation] by the unanimous 
agreement of Muslim scholars. This statement is based on Quranic texts (Quran, Sura 24, verses 
30-31 and Sura 33, verses 59).  It is worth noting that Islamic (tafsir) books suggest that 
distinguishing and protecting free married women from sexual harassment was the reason 
behind imposing the veil; and that Awra (private parts) of a free woman is her full body but for 
a slave woman and a man is between the ‘bellybutton and the knee’ (Daring Question 2008r) . 
Mona el-Tahawi (2011) rejects the face veil completely, claiming it erases the identity of the 
women who wear it and argues that the veil - the sign of modesty – signifies the hymen, or the 
sign for virginity. It is worth noting that the veil in general and the face veil in particular is a 
subject of dispute in Islamic circles. Abdel Samad (Box of Islam 2019a) claims that the discourse 
around it has shifted from morality towards defining it as a tool of empowerment.  
In recent history, a rise in numbers of veiled women in public space coincided with Islamic 
resurgence – Sahewa- in Egypt and the revolution in Iran (Ahmed 2011; Daring Question 2016j). 
Women were in the middle of the political movement of the Iranian revolution and the Arab 
spring. Egyptian women were part of the revolution against Mubarak, and the government 
subjected the women arrested to virginity tests in order to humiliate them (Rice 2011). Norma 
Claire Moruzi (1994 Cited Dempsey 2013:122) summarises the feelings of Iranian revolutionary 
participants who:  
… have donned the hijab as a revolutionary symbol and then were surprised 
by a government that forgot their revolutionary fervour and contribution to 
the Islamic state. Collectively, they felt betrayed by a national shift that had 
cut them off from the future they had expected and stranded them in a 
landscape of changed gender relations that proscribed the conditions of their 
individual fulfilment 
 
Rabboudi (Box of Islam 2019h, Box of Islam 2019b, Box of Islam 2019e) argues that Islamism 
pitches practices that are Islamawiya [political in nature] and passes it as Islamiya [Islamic as in 
religious or cultural]. This seems to be support Abdel-Samad’s (Box of Islam 2017l) claim that 
the veil is a sign of Islamisation of the public space. Mahmoud Rasmi (2018) argues that the 
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European left shows a very apparent double standard around this topic, citing a court case 
where a veiled woman won the case after refusing to shake hands with men following a job 
interview. Rasmi (2018) claims this lady has a gendered worldview that is inconsistent with 
liberals’ value system, and that this value system is trumpeted by cultural sensitivity; however, 
if one of the men she refused to shake hands with was transgender then the left will have no 
comment on the matter. The author (ibid) attributes this double standard to the left appointing 
itself a defender of a minority they deem vulnerable, but when two minorities clashes, the left 
keeps silent.  
The #MeToo movement, where women spoke against sexual violence, shows the influence of 
initiatives started in the West. Women from Egypt, Lebanon and India shared their experiences 
on social media (Eltahawy 2017); however, when specific accusations targeted Tariq Ramadan, 
malaise and polarisation crept in. Once the story broke, a colleague in Oxford university 
immediately defended him as being attacked for being a prominent Muslim (Yorke, Lawford 
2017). El-Tahawi (2017) claims that Muslim women’s bodies are used as proxy; she claims that 
Muslim women are caught between a rock – a right wing that demonises Muslim men and 
‘connects every single misconduct to Muslimness and Islam’ – and a hard place that is a 
community ‘too eager to defend men against all accusations.’  As mentioned earlier, the 
discourse became so polarised that it is becoming increasingly difficult to discuss the issues 
specific to the Muslim communities. El-Tahawi (ibid) cited Aziz who reports that many women 
were reluctant to discuss the cases ‘to not feed into the elements of the media’s Islamophobic 
and racist framing of these allegations’, adding this does ‘nothing to encourage reporting sexual 
violence’.   
This reflects the feeling of otherness among the Muslim community. Pandith (Women in the 
world 2016) points out that Muslims have been on the cover of magazines since 9/11, mostly in 
a negative sense, hence it is no surprise the discourse got to this point. Storytelling in general 
and films in particular, whether feminist or not, can refocus the debate on the woman/women 
affected by these rights’ infringement.  
Notes for practitioners 
Counter-narratives: deconstruct Islamic narration regarding women in Pre-Islamic Arabia 
It is important to draw a picture of Pre-Islamic Arabia that is accurate from a human-centric 
perspective. This means focusing on historical personalities that embody the degradation of 
women’s status present in Ahmed's studies. Hate speech in far-right discourse relies on 
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women’s depiction in Islamic scholarship to offend Muslims. They are not alone. Wafa Sultan 
rejects Mohamed as a moral figure quoting how he treated women, particularly Aisha whom he 
married at nine and Safia the Jewish woman whom he married the night he conquered and killed 
her father, brother and husband. These stories are based on Hadith and Syra, hence the same 
suggestions from the first theme apply here too. It is important to draw an accurate depiction 
of women in the Abbasside empire and question if these texts are a reaction to the status quo. 
After all, since there is no historical artefact to prove any of the pre-Omayyad narrative, it is 
worth asking if the marriages of the Prophet justified the Harem or is it the other way around? 
The target here is to dissociate the systematic rape and enslaving of women from following the 
Prophet model. If public opinions moved enough, this might put enough pressure on 
establishment Islam to ban under-age marriages and purge the Hadith describing sexual 
encounters with infants described by el-Qemani (September 8, 2018).  
 
Alternative narrative: present historical stories from local and national borders, normalise the 
representation of strong successful women Muslim and non-Muslim. 
Islamism is not only the responsible for women’s issues. Whether the veil is a sign of faith, 
political signifier or an assault campaign from the far-right (the Punish a Muslim Campaign), 
cultural productions need to put the sophisticated diversity in Muslim women as a core principal 
of its representation, particularly in the West. In the Middle East, representation of successful 
women needs to be dissociated from traumatic events as pointed out by Azzi. She (Azzi, Tannous 
2021) added that these women are depicted as if their success is a quest for revenge on a society 
that traumatised them. Representations need to normalise the success and achievement of 
women. That is by no means a call for undermining the struggle they go through or the sexism 
they may face. Ideally, the success of Orid Hallan need to be replicated. The film avoided 
hyperbole and presented its case simply and genuinely without militarism. Audience were 
sympathetic to the main character and her struggle to break free. Across the national borders, 
many issues can be challenged in both narrative and documentary. Activist filmmaking is by no 
means the only one promoted here; feel-good movies with positive outcomes can set a good 





iii.  Third theme: Minorities’ rights 
 
Most material consumed by extremists contained no direct reference to violence but ‘instead 
promoted an identified group of people above others and used derogatory language and 
references to undermine outsiders in distinctly malign ways, without explicitly suggesting they 
should be targeted or harmed’ (Holbrook 2017:14). Material within this category included some 
of the output from radical preachers and scholars such as Anwar al-Awlaki, Sayyid Qutb [founder 
of Muslim Brotherhood], the Australian cleric Feiz Mohammed, and Jamaican-born convert 
Abdullah Faisal, who authored extremist content too (ibid). 
Extremists target minorities in their violent attacks. ISIS drove the Yazidi Iraqi community to near 
extinction. The community has a reputation of devil worshippers which makes them an easier 
target to justify for extremists (Jalabi 2014). It is worth noting that targeted minorities also 
include Muslims such as Shia, Ahmadi, Alawi etc. Since Sufis are accused of worshipping idols, 
this community is particularly targeted (a deadly attack of 235 worshipers in Sinai [BBC 2017]). 
Upon the rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, Sufi’s worship places were destroyed among all 
the other Kaabas leaving only the one holy place known today (Daring Question 2007e; 2017n). 
It is worth noting that establishment Islam claims the right to identify who is Muslim and who is 
not (Ahmed 2011). For example, according to Fatwa 5419 (2000) it is a crime for an Ahmadi to 
“call himself Muslim, to call his religion Islam, to call for a prayer by using the Azan or to refer to 
his place of worship as mosque.” Dar el-Fatwa in goes further by threatening Muslims who joins 
Ahmadis by apostasy (Fatwa13503 2017). 
 
Abdel-Samad (2016) claims that Islam posits itself as a single identity source. This is not an 
attribute to Islam alone in the political discourse, as Arabism did the same. However, little to no 
distinction was drawn between ‘Arabness, Islam, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism’ as Salameh 
(Twitter 28 June 2019) points out while commenting on the 1937 speech of Druze Prince Chakib 
Erselen in the Great Mosque of Aleppo.  
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In this context, it is worth noting the map 
to the right.   Jihadoscope (Twitter 5 April 
2019) shared the new magazine of Al-
Qaeda Ummah Wa7ida [One Ummah]. The 
editorial states their belief that ‘our 
Islamic nation is one nation despite the 
difference in regions, languages and 
colours’ and succeeding in this unification 
is a jurisprudence obligation. They 
advocate for the brotherhood 
underpinning this union due to the 
Quranic scriptures and Hadith, and 
politically they claim it is beneficial to unite 
under one Imam and one political system.                                                              
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
In this highlighted area in the map, various ethnic, religious or ethno-religious minorities 
live who either do not identify as Arabs (Yazidis, Kurds, Maronites, Copts, Amazighs etc) 
or are not Muslim (Christians: Maronites, Orthodox -Greek, Coptic, Syriac, Armenian, 
Caledonian etc and Catholic; Jews, Yazidis, Mandaean etc).  
This issue is considered to benefit Israel who wants to seek discord and fragment the 
Arabo-Muslim world; most countries, with the exception of Lebanon, dealt with 
minorities as inexistent (Rabinovich March 31, 2019). Hazran (March 31, 2019) argues 
that it was an actual policy and strategic vision for Israel to ally itself with the league of 
minorities against Arabism, from attempting to establish a buffer Druze state on its 
borders with Syria to forming an alliance with the Maronites in Lebanon, and it was in 
that line of thought that they invaded the Golan and Lebanon in 1982; however, these 
policies have failed. This adds complication to an already complex issue. The Jewish 
communities paid a heavy price for the creation of Israel since they were kicked out of 
their homes in Iraq, Egypt and Algeria (Box of Islam 2016g). They also feature in most 
conspiracy theories and fighting them is an eschatological requirement for the end of 
days. MEMRI has an anti-Semitic project that documents all the negative discourse 
around the Jews in Arabic-speaking media. The efficiency of this method is questionable. 
Picture  Al-Qaeda new magazine cover featuring a 
map of the one nation 
Picture  10 Al-Qaeda new magazine cover featuring 
a map of the one nation 
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RAN advises that portraying voices from the community will stop the dehumanisation 
(Radicalisation Awareness Network 2018). MEMRI’s angle up to now has been to 
pinpoint racism in the Arabic media discourse, without any representation of the 
community.  
 
It is worth noting that some voices in communities reject the status of minorities, like the 
Amazigh in Morocco and Algeria and the Copts in Egypt, deeming themselves the 
indigenous people of Land before the Arabic colonisation. The colonial aspect of Islamo-
Arabic narrative is taught in school curriculums.  Frank Salameh (March 31, 2019: 3’00) 
comments on the ‘fin de race’ as defined lamentably by Arabism scholar Kamal Salibi as 
the  
destruction of near Eastern Christendom […] the deliberate methodical 
dispossession and the outright erasure of the histories, languages, cultures 
and memories of the indigenous non-Muslim Middle Easterners is a saga 14 
century in the making yet normative Middle East studies, Middle East 
scholarship, and legacy Middle Eastern punditry praised themselves often for 
identifying the same usual suspects namely economic hardship and a vexing 
Arab-Israeli conflict that rankles even the weary…  
 
Furthermore, non-Sunni Muslims complained about being excluded from this Arabism that 
seemed like a Sunni movement (Rabinovich 2019). Michel Aflak of the Baath party helped to 
create a secular version of Arabist ideology (ibid). Saghiyeh (2014) states that minority identities 
were mocked in Arabists’ circles of the 1960s and claims that the creation of ISIS is a humbling 
symptom of a region in crisis with modernity. The next day Khoury (2014 cited Salameh 2015 
:21) responded saying  
Concerning the ‘other’s’ affront to Arabism, it is perhaps worth remembering 
that that the onus here is not the Phoenician, Pharaonic, Mesopotamian, or 
even Kurdish and Berber civilisations, as my esteemed colleague suggests; 
they, after all, are not the one who trespassed on the Arabs. It is in fact the 
Arabs, themselves and Arabism in particular, that affronted and abused all 
those who were not Arab. No need to remind anyone here of the ethics and 
(less than becoming) conduct of Arabists in the heyday of Arab nationalism. 
Indeed, Arabism was to a large extent the ISIS of its day. Arabism and its 
hollow strident acoustics was the only acceptable benchmark of selfhood in 
those times; if one dared disclaim his imputed Arabness, he was deemed a 
traitor (instead of, say, an infidel today), and his reward would have been the 
gallows (instead of, say, meeting the sword today). 
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Each indigenous community has specific aspirations; however, their respective histories 
showcase the process of Arabisation. ‘A Berber is someone who did not attend school’ (Maddy-
Weitzman March 31, 2019) means that a person was not subjected to the Arabisation process 
of education. Hence it should be an immense win to have the Moroccan state recognise 
Tamazigh as an official language and have it taught in schools; however, the state still refuses to 
register children with Amazigh names (ibid). The Kurdish community is an example of a 
community that rejects Arabism; they were targeted by Saddam Hussein’s Baathi regime who 
bombed the city of Kirkuk with gas, killing thousands and forcing the survivors out of their 
villages (Daring Question 2016c; Box of Islam 2018g). The Kurdish case is special since the Iraqi 
Kurds aim to establish an independent state. However, the Syrian Kurds did not communicate 
separatist tendencies, but instead established a local pluralistic government in Rojava, North 
Syria.  
Perhaps the most outrageous crime against humanity in modern times is the Yazidis’ 
enslavement. Working with them, Miara (March 31, 2019) describes a loss of identity and a 
complete confusion of how to identify. Despite being living in Iraq for centuries, the Yazidis are 
still not present in the educational curriculum according to al-Tamimi (The Muslim Woman 
2017) and it is the Iraqi government, and not them, who holds the deeds to their land (Miara 
March 31, 2019). 
Salameh (March 31, 2019) argues that Near-Eastern communities acted ‘as cultural 
intermediaries – a hyphen’ to preserve the philosophy and to translate it between East and West 
– and prompted the scientific progress in the Abbasid era. Abdel-Samad (Box of Islam 2016e) 
attributes the progress in Baghdad and Cordoba to the diverse environment and the cultural 
investment of different communities. However, the mainstream narrative claims that progress is 
due to Islam (ibid). However, Islamic and Arabist myth is not based on historical evidence. 
According to O’Shaughnessy (2004) effective propaganda is the synthesis and manipulation of 
symbolism, rhetoric and myth. He argues that  
propaganda rejects intellectual challenge, and it seeks refuge in the structure 
of myths. Old myths can be re-created, but new myths can also be invented 
[…]. Myths are a culture’s self- explanation, and they are a key part of 
propaganda (stereotype, for example, is a kind of myth) (O’Shaughness, 
2004: 4 &65 cited Schmid 2014:2).  
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Islamism and Arabism are not the only ones creating the myths. Minorities may have weaved 
victimhood (Copts) or resistance (Maronites, Kurds) in their own myths. This section reproduced 
scholarships and discourse from the minorities’ standing point. The aim from that is to sense the 
disgruntled feelings underpinning it. If multiplicity in personal identity construct has shielded 
youth from extremist recruitment (Nafees 2018) then pluralism is a value to promote as an 
antidote for the single identity construct, especially since it has an inherent value as part of the 
history and the myth of the area. From this perspective Islamists’ and Arabists’ myths can be 
countered by the historical myths of the indigenous communities. However, Andrius (Box of 
Islam 2019f) asserts that Orientalism is mainstream in academic circles. Needless to say, the 
study of the inner clash of civilisation in the East Mediterranean and North Africa cannot be 
understood in its full scope from an Orientalist angle that promotes homogeneity of an Arab 
identity, especially if voices from the communities reject it as an oppressive colonialist identity.  
 Notes for practitioners 
The aim here is to promote human rights and assert diversity as an inherent cultural value by 
enabling minorities to tell their own version of historical events and put forward their eclipsed 
cultures as alternative narrative. 
Counter-narratives: deconstruct the invasion and subjugation narrative, address grievances.  
In its current format, the theoretical discussion attempted to hint at the fundamentalism 
present in the discourse of minorities. Instead of challenging it, this research advocates 
understanding the underlying frustrations and putting their grievances central to the discussion 
and representation. Abdel-Samad (Box of Islam 2017) touched upon the grievances of Byzantine 
Christians with the Roman Churches; this is an angle and perspective to historical narrative that 
requires some attention, particularly around the fall of Constantinople and the Crusades. 
Furthermore, the current narrative of establishment Islam and the one taught in schools claim 
that there was a foreign Arab-Muslim army that invaded the Levant and North Africa subjugated 
and enslaved its indigenous population. This is a similar to the ethnic replacement if not 
cleansing of the Native Americans or the Maori in New Zealand. However, while the sentiment 
of resentment may be similar, Middle Eastern history may have been viewed with a 
retrospective distortion (Taleb 2014). Holland (2015) suggests a peaceful transfer of power to 
the Umayyads, and the emerging DNA studies suggest a story of conversion instead of 
replacement. If proven true, feasibility studies can determine if an online mapping project 
instead of video-essay or documentaries can have a positive effect on establishing family ties 
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from different regions, denominations and religions. This can challenge if not refute the single 
identity or replacement narrative. While there might be hope for a more peaceful historical 
narrative, it is by no means an invitation to neglect hardships or even massacres that are 
forgotten in the collective memory.  
Moreover, the Islamic narrative attributes progress to Islam in Andalusia and Baghdad, while in 
truth the responsibility lies with pluralism and the cultural exchange caused by migration (Box 
of Islam 2016e). The contributors to the progress were from mixed religious and ethnic 
backgrounds: Christians (translations by Syriac monks), Jews, Persians etc. Recognising 
minorities’ contributions to this historical progress is one of many necessary steps to address 
the sentiment of erasure very present in the quoted literature. Reversing their marginalisation 
in the narrative may be a long and complicated process; however, placing diversity central to 
the narrative is starting point.  
 
Alternative narrative: normalise diversity representation; celebrate the contributions of 
minorities to cultural of national heritage,  
Political Islamist parties succeeded in clouding correct definitions in the public discourse (el-
Qemani Septermber 8, 2018). Assid (Box of Islam 2018b) pinpoints that secularity is organically 
achieved in communities before Islam. This is an example where local histories and narratives 
can be an asset in redefining national identity. As already discussed, many minorities reject this 
hegemony in identity definition as Arabic post-colonial. Hence, Orientalism as a theoretical lens 
for representation needs further attention.  
National identity is defined as the product of sameness within the national borders and 
differences with others. Across the Middle East, closer attention needs to be given to the myths 
produced by minorities as an asset for national identity construct. This is an example of a Coptic 
myth: During the Fatimid era, a Coptic priest won a debate over a Rabbi. Offended, the Rabbi 
manipulated the Caliph to ask Christians to assert their beliefs by moving a mountain as 
indicated in the Bible. The Virgin Mary guided the priest in a dream to a devout man who 
performed the miracle in question and saved the Christians. The religious aspect of the narrative 
may divert from the victimhood woven into this community’s narrative to the point tht it 
attributes its survival in their homeland to a divine intervention. Yet it does not mask the 
problematic relationships between minorities, particularly the Jewish community that is cast as 
a provocateur.  
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This research cannot give recommendations relevant to communities in each country. What it 
can assert is targets and values for minorities’ representation that practitioners need to adopt 
for their local community and production infrastructure. Future representation needs to 
normalise minorities’ representation in a way that avoids the stereotypical images already 
produced in the national sphere.    
 
Content creators: cultural practitioners and academics 
The cultural practitioners meant herein are directors, writers and producers who are in a better 
position to produce the alternative narrative. Sanaa Azzi (Azzi, Tannous 2021) suggested that 
producers can be lobbied to adopt the recommendations of this framework in their 
commissioned content for mainstream media organisations. Since the reliance on their role in 
producing content for media consumption is self-explanatory, this section will focus on 
discussing the role of engaged scholarship and impact of academia.  
Engaged scholarship and the role of academia 
 
 An increasing number of academic literatures are reflecting on academia’s crisis of relevance. 
This crisis is reflected in the study conducted by the Pew Research Centre published in 2015. It 
noted an alarming difference between the views held by scientists and those of the public 
(Hoffman 2016b). Furthermore, the economist (2010) wondered if America’s universities would 
face the same fate as the Big three American automaker companies in ‘facing the cataclysmic 
change around them and failing to react.’ One of the problems may simply be that academics 
might not see the benefits of allowing participants from the public to influence their decision-
making in deliberative meetings (Hoffman 2016a).  
However, the causes of this crisis go beyond the academics’ refusal to engage in public and 
political debate to the academic culture of ‘brick-making’, meaning ‘producing specialised pieces 
of knowledge without integrating them into a cohesive whole that could fully explain the corpus 
of their inquiry’ (Hoffman 2016a:77).  
However, the engaged scholar (Van de Ven 2007) lacks training in engaging the public and 
political discourse. Hoffman (2016a) structures the pressure on academics around three 
domains: pressures for change, signals of change and the urgency of change.  
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The first pressure force is the state of public debate, where there is a disconnect between 
scientists’ stance and the public (ibid). This disconnect is explained by motivated reasoning 
(Kahan 2010) and political partisanship (Mcright, Dunlap 2011). It threatens the efficiency of 
academics and scientific communities in explaining the state and the gravity of scientific findings 
(Hoffman 2016a). The second pressure force is the new context of the academic environment 
in which social media is democratising knowledge, and where universities must learn to engage 
in the new realities of the information age. Scholars writes in academic journals and consider it 
a contribution to the public debate without knowing that no one reads them (Hoffman 2016a). 
Moreover, pseudo-scientific journals are changing the landscape (Kolata 2013). Hence, insisting 
on writing solely in journals means relegating academic publications ‘further to the obscurity of 
the side-lines’ (Hoffman 2016a: 81). Strauss (2013) professed lack of appreciation for the value 
that the academy provides to society within state legislatures. Hofstader  (1962: 33) noted that 
academics are viewed as an elite class of people who are studying issues that are ‘beyond the 
reach of the ordinary man’s scrutiny, but who can, and often do, determine his fate; through a 
disproportionate influence on the political process, often at the expense of the taxpaying public.’ 
Nevertheless, Konkel (2015) notes that scholars are beginning to engage in public and political 
discourse despite the fact that they are often not trained or given the proper incentives to do 
so. This engagement depends on school or department and career stage, with younger faculty 
expressing more interest in engagement and in using social media to do it (Hoffman 2016a). 
Calling for academics’ public engagement is an urgent return to the core purpose of higher 
education (Checkoway 2013) or the scientific social contract as advocated by Jane Lubchenco 
(2015). Hoffman (2016a: 82) argues that academics are obliged to provide ‘a service for the 
community, to give value for money they provide in public funding, government grants or 
general tuition and an account of what that money is being used for’  
Notes for practitioners 
This research embraces more involvement from academia in public and political discourse as 
theorised above. Academics can fill the gap in promoting the critical thinking necessary for 
counter-narratives. Needless to say, they can conduct theoretical research looking into the 
theoretical gaps identified earlier. Furthermore, this involvement can solve some of the 
problems identified in the discussion with the practitioners. For example, Asmar (2021) touched 
on the errors on the misrepresentation in costume dramas, while Azzi (Azzi, Tannous 2021) 
stated that instead of spending on five documentaries consumed only by elite, the focus should 
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be on producing engaging dramas. Representation studies is already present in film scholarship; 
a closer attention can be given to practice experimentation.  
Video-essays are one of many possibilities of publications that can democratise or increase the 
reach of academic publications to a wider audience. As stated earlier, this framework entrusts 
academic research and engaged scholars in producing the counter-narratives and 
communicating them to a wider audience. El-Messayeh (Box of Islam 2017n) notes the 
audience’s thirst for academic knowledge on Islamic history and attributes the wide acceptance 
of Box of Islam episodes to discussing data without disrespecting Islamic heritage. It is worth 
noting that researching Islamic history faces limitations. Sawma (Daring Question 2012c) calls 
on Dr Piun to release the earliest Quranic parchments retrieved from Yemen so other scholars 
can study them. However, these parchments contradicted the Islamic narrative and were 
retracted by the Yemeni government according to Abdel-Samad (Box of Islam 2015v).  
To highlight the importance and the necessity of academic research that challenges the 
monopoly of establishment Islam over scriptures, this is an example from a research conducted 
by Younes (Daring Question 2013y).  
 
Picture  11 On the Left, the current version interpreted as the horses going to war. On the right, Younes’ research 
where the poem speaks of [possibly] nuns lighting fire and bringing it to the congregation. 
 
Younes acknowledges that the Quran was written with undotted letters; he redistributes the 
dots on letters from a Meccan Sura. Commonly the meaning describes a war scene however his 
reading describes women (possibly nuns) bringing light to a gathered congregation (Daring 
Question 2013y).  
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The output of this angle can include video-essays exploring representation or sharing academic 
research as well as documentaries or feature films. These suggestions are not an alien concept 
to academia. Lamma Hekyet Mariam (Fouladkar 2001) is a commercially-released feature film 
which relied on the infrastructures and personnel of a film school. Academic institutions possess 
production infrastructure and professional personnel to enable individual practice research or 
creative partnerships. Film schools aggregate the right environment for the creative risk-taking 
necessary for bold initiatives, like developing critical cinema such as women’s cinema as 
proposed by Johnson (2000) or treating social complex issues absent from mainstream 
cinematic representation like minorities and the other themes as proposed in this research’s 
framework. Academic institutions are in a privileged position to produce documentaries for 
general audience consumption – like Fronteira da Grandeza produced by Combat films and 
research of the David M. Kennedy Center for international Studies – or to negotiate 
collaboration with mainstream media outlets – like the Open University productions with BBC.  
However, there is an added problem to those listed above relating to Orientalism. Given his 
research interests, Antonius (Box of Islam 2019f) recounts a friendly warning to beware of 
Orientalists, as it is the mainstream theoretical framework that is aggressive towards 
challengers. Orientalism seems to play into the victimhood discourse of Islamism; however, their 
discourse marries victimhood with supremacy (Abdel-Saamad 2016f).  
Khatib (2007:65) claims that studies of Islam in Western cinema often relied on Orientalism as a 
theoretical basis where the undeveloped/inferior Orient is opposite to the developed/superior 
West. She points to problems in these studies such as the preference to an abstraction of the 
Orient rather than a depiction based on evidence. Furthermore, since the Orient cannot define 
itself the Western vocabulary is scientifically objective, and lastly the Orient is depicted as 
something to be feared or controlled (Khatib Halliday (1995 cited Khatib 2007: 214) calls this 
tendency ‘Eastoxification where myths are reproduced uncritically about the region in the name 
of anti-imperialism’. He (ibid) argues that the Orient contributes to the othering and that it is a 
manifestation of the power struggle within the East. Rabboudi (Box of Islam 2019b) disputes 
that there is an Arab World or a Muslim World, yet these are common words that anchors most 




Western involvement in solving world problems 
 
It is worth noting that the research institutions that are studying topics related to all three 
themes are based in the West.  Expatriate academics or those with roots and links to Levantine 
and North African countries have a very important role to play. They can tackle issues more 
directly than home based researchers or academics if they are present in a safer environment. 
This explains the research’s stance in calling for more engagement from the West in solving 
world problems. This section draws on the necessity of public policy, and while engaged 
scholarship can fill a certain gap it is not a substitute for a culture policy. However, academics 
can influence policy makers; hence what follows draws on the necessity to take this influence 
into consideration in future research and publications. 
Abdel-Samad (2016) draws an analogy between Islamism, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and the Nazi party; the analogy includes their role as the single provider of identity, the feelings 
of defeat at the root of their beginnings and the attempted balance between the victimhood 
and supremacy. This analogy is one of the reasons to draw lessons from the German anti-Nazi 
purge. Recognising the danger of the philosophy in Germany, Japan and Italy, President 
Roosevelt requested their total surrender to the Allied Forces in World War II (Taylor 2011). To 
purge Nazi Germany, the Allies dismantled the governmental institutions in Germany and forced 
an election, which is also what the American-led coalition implemented after defeating the 
Baathist regime in Iraq (ibid). However, after the US army withdrawal, ISIS was born; they 
established their state in Syria and erased borders separating Syria and Iraq. Abdel-Samad 
(2016) argues that Germany was reborn by owning up to an ideology that is no longer acceptable 
and rising above its past, while the Muslim world still holds dear a worldview that cannot be 
compatible with the modern world.  After its defeat in World War II, Germany purged hate 
speech from its curriculum (Rodden 2001) and invested in culture initiatives like the Jewish 
Museum. This museum stands witness to the genocide committed against the Jewish 
community but at the same time it educates about certain aspect unique to Jewish culture.  
Despite that the German experience might be a guideline to follow in countries struggling with 
extremism, it is highly unlikely that such steps can be forced on a sovereign state.  Al-Tamimi 
(The Muslim Woman 2017) claims despite surviving ISIS, there is still ‘not one page on the Yazidis 
(Êzîdis) in the Iraqi curricula. Furthermore, most schools’ curricula praise Arabo-Islamic 
colonisation over the history of the indigenous communities (el-Qemani September 8, 2019). 
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This research seems to espouse Levy’s (2019) call for more involvement from the West in solving 
global problems, even on a cultural level. Even if the philosophical underpinnings add to the 
gravitas of the argument, the call for more involvement of Western academic institutions is 
purely practical, since the willingness of Middle Eastern states to target this issue with cultural 
or educational policies seems unlikely in the short term. While these states are forthcoming in 
establishing secularity (Box of Islam 2019a; 2019h), Assid (Daring Question 2015ah) attributes 
the struggle to modernise Middle Eastern states to four reasons dictatorships, petrodollars and 
the Wahhabi influence, political Islam and Palestine.   
 
(1) Dictatorships - army coups:  
Can Dünbar (2016) describes power relations in Turkey as ‘a pendulum from barracks to 
Mosques’. This description is applicable across the Middle East. Assid (Daring Question 2015ah) 
argues that in order to compensate for the lack of democratic elections, rising dictatorship 
always allied themselves with religious institutions to gain legitimacy.  
In Egypt, the Socialist coup of Abdel Nasser advocated a Pan-Arab national identity. Political 
Islam, although popular, was pushed out and members of Muslim Brotherhood were 
persecuted, arrested and tortured in jails; some of them were exiled to Saudi Arabia. This is not 
specific to Egypt. The political activist Albert Kilo (Elsharq 2017) recounts that a guard in a Syrian 
prison ordered him to tell a very young child a story. When he attempted to narrate a story 
about a bird, he was interrupted by the child who had never seen one. Kilo explains that the 
child was probably was born in the cell to a mother who is ‘probably the daughter of a Muslim 
Brother’ and that she was held there without a trial to lure her family back to Syria. 
Although Sadat is the one associated with the rise of Islamism in Egypt, Radwan (Daring Question 
2017k) claims that Abdel Nasser played a massive role in empowering Islamist agenda by making 
el-Azhar a university and a partner of the Egyptian judiciary system. El-Qemani (September 8, 
2018) supported President Sisi’s coup to oust the Muslim Brotherhood rule, but he later 
expressed his disappointment in the era. 
The Syrian Baath regime, allegedly secular, is viewed as an Alawi dictatorship (Rabinovich 2019). 
It reinforced the grip of religious preachers on Syrian society (Daring Question 2013aa) as did 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Annahar 2014 cited Ibrahim 2015). Jean Pierre Filiu argues that security 
 122 
agencies preserved the ‘Arab deep state’ at a price of helping to create a ‘monster […] in its most 
extreme form the jihadist of the Islamic State (ISIS)’ (Black 2015)  
Coptic Nationalism, a blog founded in 2011, aims to ‘revive the culture of our [Coptic] nation’. 
The stated aim for the blog or the movement is to work for a civilian, secular and a democratic 
Egypt for all its citizens. That entails casting out political Islam from the politics in Egypt, as 
‘Islamism cannot coexist with democracy, fraternity, equality and liberty in any country’ (Boles 
2014).  Eventually, though not immediately, it also means the replacement of the military rule 
by a purely civilian one. ‘This will have to wait until the Islamists are sufficiently weakened’ (ibid). 
That political voice from a minority prefers a dictatorship than Islamism after hopes faded for a 
democracy in 2011 since ‘Islamism and the military are the only two competing powers’ (ibid). 
Naturally, the statement also required guaranteeing the individual (civil and political) rights of 
the Copts.  
 
(2) Petro-dollar and the Wahhabi influence   
The discovery of oil in Arabia was one of the biggest factors in spreading the Islamic resurgence. 
Assid (Daring Question 2015ah) claims that the absence of a civilisation plan led the newly rich 
state to export backwardness. This controversial statement is due to the massive Saudi 
investments in opening Islamic schools worldwide that teach the Wahhabi interpretation of 
Islam abided by in the Kingdom. Leila Ahmed (2011) noted the role of the Saudi money in 
building new mosques and schools in Egypt after the return of the exiled Brothers from Saudi 
Arabia under Anwar el Sadat.  
Hamid Toufic (Daring Question 2011; 2011i) stresses that the Islamic resurgence worldwide 
success was only made possible after the organisational skills of the Muslim Brotherhood united 
with the unlimited Wahhabi funds during their exile in Saudi Arabia. Khalil (Daring Question 
2016j) claims that the consequences are seen in the Netherlands and Germany without 
forgetting North Africa and the Middle East. In America, CAIR (Council for American Islamic 
Relations) oversees these schools. After the attacks on the Twin Towers, the curriculum of these 
schools was put under scrutiny and they were required to remove hate speeches. After 
complying with the government’s recommendation, a review published in the New York Times 
stated that they still advocated a world divided into two groups: believers and non-believers. 
Believers referred to those of the Muslim faith and the unbelievers are all other people; this 
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would mean that non-believers would not have same rights in a Muslim country or the love of 
Allah in the afterlife (Abdel-Samad 2016h).  
(3) Political Islam:  
It is worth noting that many of the interpretations present in the counter narratives belong to 
Islamic Renaissance scholars like Mohamed Abdo, el-Afghani and el-Kawakebi, Assid (Daring 
Question 2015ah) points out that they acknowledged the Western leadership in the fields of 
science, logic, freedom, architecture and the organisation of a state. However political Islam, 
and mainly the Muslim Brotherhood and its influence in el-Azhar sabotaged these efforts (ibid).   
In 1928, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim Brotherhood was formed with the 
goal of re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate (Daring Question 2011; 2011i; Box of Islam 2016c). 
The founder of the Brotherhood, Mohamed el-Banna, is an el-Azhar graduate and scholar; he 
based his ideas on the teachings of Ibn Taymiya, a scholar who lived in 13th century Baghdad 
(Abdel Samad 2016c). It is the main ideological school from which all the Jihadi groups were 
derived, including Jama’a Islam-I, al-Qaeda leading to the birth of ISIS (Trager 2017; Abdel-
Samad 2016; Box of Islam 2016c; El-Hadad 2017; Daring Question 2015a). The Muslim 
Brotherhood contrasted the good East vs. evil West, advocating their moral superiority over the 
promiscuous West, and the necessity to fight till the good – Islam – wins.  
  
(4) Palestine  
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is in the heart of most political debates in the area. The suffering 
of the Palestinians is featured in the first speech given by bin Laden (Glazzard 2017). Most 
Islamist groups claim a victim’s status. They complain about the West’s hostility towards the 
Muslim World, particularly America with its support of Israel. Zionism is in the heart of most 
conspiracy theories and the de-facto go to reason for all the problems of the Middle East. 
Comparing the outrage expressed for the sufferings of Palestinians v. Kurds, Abdel-Samad (2016) 
points out a double standard in the reactions of the public, stating that the victim is not the one 
who rallies sympathy but a tailored anger towards the criminal. El-Qemani (September 8, 2018) 
states on the Palestinian cause ‘we are fighting for the mosque, if we were fighting for the land 
people would have understood us.’  
It is worth mentioning that the defeat in the wars with Israel has created a mass-disillusion that 
was harnessed by Islamists and particularly the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. El-Qemani 
picture  The logo of Muslim Brotherhood 
retrieved from their Arabic website. It features 
the Quran highlighted by 2 swords and the 
word wa-a’idu in reference to a Quranic verse  
(8:60) ordering to be ready to battle God’s 
enemy 
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(September 8, 2018) recounts that upon Egypt declaring defeat in el-Nakssa, the war lead by 
Abdel-Nasser, the head of Muslim Brotherhood performed an Islamic prayer thanking God for 
the victory of the believers/Jews over the non-believers/communists. This enabled the Brethren 
to advance their slogan: Islam is the solution, which gained momentum following the masses’ 
disillusion with socialist ideals (Ahmed 2011).  
 
Marriage of convenience: The role of moderate religious institutions  
 
El-Azhar is an embodiment of Ahmed’s definition of ‘establishment Islam’ that judges other 
readings of Islam – or sects – as ‘heretical’. For example, Ahmadis are infidels according to Fatwa 
5419 (2000) but the institution refuses to extend the courtesy to ISIS (Kol Yom 2017b, 2016b). It 
interprets the Hadith and the Quran as ‘ascertainable in a precise and absolute sense’ (Ahmed 
1992: 238). The institution has a great impact on Egyptians’ lives: it issued 520,000 fatwas in 
2014, educates 400,000 students in its university and three to four million students in its schools 
(without counting its schools outside the Egyptian borders) (Daring Question 2015g; 2017k). 
Although it is a moderate institution, the list of its graduates includes Ayman el-Zawahiri, Sayyid 
Qutb and Abdallah Azzam (founder of modern concept Jihad) (ibid). El-Qemani (September 8, 
2018) accused el-Azhar of be being a terrorist organisation. This is mainly due to the thesis 
presented by Abdallah Azzam that is argued to be the blueprint for al-Qaeda (Daring Question 
2017h)  
One of the main problems is that governments rely on religious institutions to give them 
legitimacy as they are not relying on a mandate given by a democratic vote (Daring Question 
2015ah). In the case of el-Azhar, a fatwa calling someone a Kaffir (or infidel), is a Hokem or 
juridical verdict (Daring Question 2013a) upon which the life of the person becomes less than 
the life of a Muslim. Therefore, assassinating one does not solicit capital punishment. In recent 
history, the el-Azhar apostasy fatwa led to an attack on Taha Hussein, following his book Fil Che’r 
el Jahili (1926). The book questioned the reliability of Arabic poems’ sources and by extension 
the Quran; Hussein had to retract his book. The fatwa against Faraje Foda led to his assassination 
and his killer was even defended by El-Ghazali, a sheikh from el-Azhar and a Muslim Brother 
(Ahmed 2011). Egypt recognises Islam as the religion of the state, and still has clause in its laws 
that prevents disrespecting religions. Under this clause, el-Azhar recently managed to prosecute 
and jail Islam el-Bihiri, a TV host who calls to address the violence in the Hadith that is taught by 
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el-Azhar as well as fine Fatma Naout for her tweet on Adha (Daring Question 2016f). Moderate 
religious institutions are responsible for teaching curriculums not just in Muslim countries but 
also in the West. The curriculum of Islamic schools came under fire in the UK and the US (Bennet, 
Sylvester 2017) for teaching wife beating. In Egypt el-Azhar’s curriculum came under fire in the 
Egyptian media and the purge they conducted was deemed inefficient by their critics (Kol Yom 
2017a; 2017b).  
El-Qemani (September 8, 2018) claims that it is futile to count on the Muslim majority 
governments to solve the extremism problem as they are benefiting from it. Rabboudi (Box of 
Islam 2019b) claims that in the Middle East states are still under construction, suffering from an 
identity crisis, and that the population are showcasing an unwillingness to live together. Political 
Islam is thriving under these conditions since they present themselves as the solution without 
having to put forward real solutions to the problems. The states are using political Islam to justify 
their dictatorships. Even in the case of Syria, the ISIS stronghold, the protests started to demand 
basic rights of freedom and dignity (Sinjab 2013). To silence them, Assad had to mobilise the 
Alawi community as under threat from Islamists (Rabinovich 2019).  
This framework is developed to fill some of the void created by the lack of governmental policies 
that tackle extremism on the cultural level. The policy followed in Egypt is to silence them 
completely and control the media discourse (Azzi, Tannous 2021).  
 
Section 2: Distribution  
This section discusses the people this framework hopes to reach and how to reach them:  the 
target audience and the medium. 
 
Target audience 
The target for this framework is a general audience. If desired, defining the age group for each 
project is consistent with the standard practice adopted by producers for film productions. 
Cultural productions are not just mere responses to propaganda; they espouse ideals of activist 
filmmaking. However, they can still benefit from governmental strategies determining targets 
for counter-narratives. The Danish government drafted a national plan to counter and prevent 
violent extremism in 2016; it is increasingly framed in the Prevention Pyramid, pictured below. 
It lists target groups and corresponding efforts (Hemmingsen, Castro 2017: 13). 
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                   Figure 4. Danish Pyramid of target groups and intervention level 
 
This research targets the category in bottom of the pyramid in Figure 5 branded “Everybody.” 
Strengthening the resilience of the general public can be successful by combining elements from 
counter [as in aggressive attacks or deconstruction] and alternative [as in promoting values] 
narratives in order to challenge the extremist worldview that aims to alienate Muslim 
communities from others. Using popular culture and storytelling allows us to discuss difficult 
issues such as extremism without alienating moderate Muslims. In this way we can ‘avert the 
risks of making the problem appear bigger than it actually is’, and the subtlety of content can 
also avert ‘raising the curiosity of the recipients and pushing them to seek extremist material’ 
(Hemmingsen, Castro 2017: 28).  
 
Platform: Mainstream and Online media 
The three counter-narratives’ frameworks reviewed earlier claim that the space of 
deradicalization in online (Ashour 2010) and limits the role of media to accurately report the 
news (Van Ginkel 2015). The framework for cultural productions as counter-narratives 
developed in this thesis contradicts that completely. The model built for practitioners regards 
mainstream media and online distribution as equally important. It is certainly preferable to have 
a distribution strategy that targets both. Mainstream media will increase the products’ audience 
share and might increase any project’s visibility on online platforms. However, access to 
broadcasters might not be available to many producers or director (Asmar 2021).  
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Each project stemming from this framework is a unique case. Practitioners will develop their 
own distribution strategy according to their budget. However, when choosing an online platform 
for their products, practitioners are advised to heed Tannous’ (Azzi, Tannous 2021) advice to 
carefully consider the user experience on that platform and avoid the ones that will overwhelm 
their viewers with ad content. He also advised to devise online ad campaigns engaging 
influencers to promote the product or to highlight a specific character. While there is more 
online distribution platforms, Azzi and Tannous (2021) pointed out to the importance of Netflix 
and its impact on the mainstream Arabic speaking media.  
 
Sustainability of the proposed framework: managing risks 
 
One of the advices to counter-narratives’ practitioners is to go for measurable results while 
building a sustainable campaign (RAN 2018; Counter-narratives.org). This research argued for a 
cultural change aggregated by cultural goods. This change is difficult to measure and prove. 
However, audience responses to individual projects can be assessed and can inform future 
content creation.  
Risk management: Deflecting investment and consumption risk 
The possibilities of cultural productions stemming from this framework are endless and range 
from fiction films and documentaries to art installation or theatre etc. However, it is essential to 
make creatives’ involvement in these issues attractive and enabling creative risk. For that the 
funding bodies can adopt selection criteria that prioritise issues identified by this research and 
support producers in shouldering investment risks. 
Since the Second World War, American movies dominated the market. In 1918 Charles Pathé 
(cited Sojcher 2011) came to the conclusion that whoever dominates the American market for 
film production and distribution will dominate the global cinema market because the USA 
offered a viewers’ market bigger than all industrialised countries. In the light of lessons learned 
from the Nazi experience, relying of Hollywood productions alone is problematic considering 
the simplification of the representation (Mann 2003; Khatib 2006b) and the necessity of treating 
extremism as a problem within Muslim communities (Khatib 2006b).  
This can be problematic due to the monopoly of the Hollywood distribution and the challenge it 
poses to local cinema. Tannous (Azzi, Tannous 2021) highlighted the importance of giant media 
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organisations and the impact they might have on addressing the issue. Hence it is important to 
understand their business model. Hollywood’s profit model is similar to book publishing, music 
recording and pharmaceutical manufacturing, meaning only a handful of product generates 
significant profit and half of the productions are moderately profitable (Pokorny, Sedgewick 
2012). The blockbuster was essential to Hollywood’s survival after the World War II as to 
differentiate its outputs from television. Despite the increasing level of risk with higher budgets, 
their obvious attraction is the possibility of a single film generating very high profits (ibid). Since 
the 1960s, suburban multiplex cinemas were developed to sustain the movie-going culture, and 
Hollywood’s survival increasingly requires developing sophisticated strategies for maximising 
film revenues (ibid). This allowed more movies to be released simultaneously; to benefit lower-
budget movies, blockbusters were released on several screens simultaneously, making the bulk 
of their turnover in the first weeks (Wall Street Journal 1998 cited Stoller 2019). Online 
streaming offered possibilities for producers to reach audiences worldwide. Azzi (Azzi, Tannous 
2021) asserts that commissioners require their content to be ‘Netflixable’. Stroller (2019) argues 
that Netflix is centralising distribution and production; their strategy now is to cancel shows that 
subscribers like in order to avoid paying its creators and subtly raising the prices of their 
subscription knowing it will be tolerated. Stroller (2019) adds that ‘Netflix is a money loser […due 
to] taking inputs and combining them into something of less value […] the company doesn’t sell 
content. The company is selling a story to Wall Street, that, like Amazon, it will achieve dominant 
market power.’ Even if this the case Stroller (ibid) argues that legislative power can restore open 
market.  
However, the products stemming from this framework would be more likely products of 
independent cinema. This section discusses the risks that practitioners need to be aware of 
while developing their content. Mann’s (2003) critique of the easily dismissed Hollywood movies 
is due mainly to the formulaic Hollywood narrative. Bordwell and Thompson (2007) claims there 
are five principles crucial to Hollywood’s narrative: (1) a goal-oriented story means it is ‘driven 
by the character’s effort to attain goals’; (2) a double plotline has to have one of them at least 
as a heterosexual romantic love; (3) a discrete part structure that is built around four parts: the 
setup, the complication, the development and finally the climax; (4) planting causes for future 
effect where ‘every scene has unresolved issues that demand settling further along’ and (5) 
deadlines referred to by screenwriters as “ the ticking clock” or the time pressure which can be 
present at any point but is ‘mandatory at the climax.’ Independent producers are freer in their 
stories, but that makes them more popular in aficionados’ circles (UK Film Council 2007). 
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However, independent producers rely on different set of strategies to lower risks, like 
adaptation or securing content from other media to provide an acceptable familiarity with the 
story as a risk-reducing technique (von Rimscha 2009). Common practices among independent 
producers to raise funds can be summarised in four points. First, securing a letter of intent from 
bankable stars is not legally binding, however, it is more appealing for investors. Employing a 
star is a risk-reducing technique since a star acts as a control agent of quality, but it means a 
higher budget which raises the amount of potential loss (ibid). Second, profit sharing contracts 
are utilised, in which the risk is transferred to the personnel where they accept deferring their 
fees till profit is being generated. Third, contracting a sales agency is an ideal scenario to secure 
a pre-buy exploitation right at the development stage (ibid). Besides the cash flow, it secures a 
powerful adviser against marketing faux pas since consumption risks are usually managed down 
the line. Vertically integrated corporations (production-distribution) are usually the ones who 
benefit from addressing consumption risk at the development stage (ibid) Finally, a completion 
bond is meant to reduce production risks and ensure that project is complete in time and to 
budget. It ensures solely the investor or funding body’s interest since if cashed, the producer 
loses all rights to the project and his/her reputation (ibid).  
 
It is worth noting that consumption risks are higher when targeting Islamic subjects. For 
example, when Islam the Untold Story was aired on Channel 4 in the UK, Ofcom received more 
than a thousand complaints huge number of complaints (O’Carroll 2012; Sweeney 2012). 
Besides the threats to Tom Holland’s safety, Channel 4 cancelled the scheduled repeat (ibid). 
This example shows the high risk of consumption hence producers have to rely on public funds. 
Receiving them is a risk-transferring technique, given that the producer is aligned with the public 
body’s selection and funding politics (Sojcher 2011), but that usually means abdicating economic 
objectives. Nevertheless, producers are expected to point out why ‘the proposed movie package 
is likely to result in a successful movie’ (von Rimscha, 2009: 83). This is why it is important that 
these different funds support shouldering the various risks undertaken by practitioners when 
their cultural products are aimed to challenge cognitive extremism.  Needless to say, 
governmental funds are a European peculiarity. This explains why this research nods at the 
important role that expatriates can play in conducting their own productions or forming co-
productions with practitioners in their homeland. There are lessons to be learned from small 
nation cinema, particularly Danish cinema, when it comes to developing cultural policies that 
support the production of cultural goods while enabling the creative risks.  
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Lessons from small nation cinema 
A small nation obtains this title if the size of its population is too small to sustain a commercial 
film production, if the language spoken makes it difficult to expand the market through export 
and international distribution, and finally if its productions struggle due to the influx and 
dominant presence of American films (Hjort 2005a, Hjort 2005b). Denmark outgrew its small 
nation status and got the attribute of a medium size. This growth is due to a specific condition 
that created the right environment and to the major influence of Lars von Trier (Hjort, Petrie 
2007). His Dogme 95 manifesto validated the idea that a low budget movie is not something to 
fear.  
The Danish government played a major role in supporting this environment. It implemented a 
plan to finance a one-hour film for emerging talents and succeeded in limiting the risk of a first 
film. It then increased support from ‘50/50 to 60/40’ making it easier for producers to finance 
the rest of their films (Hjort 2007: 31). The New Danish Cinema was created to support the artists 
in their creative process as a ‘strategic countermove to the inherent risk of inertia quickly setting 
in [in] any form of government’ (Redvall 2012: 213) in order to ensure future success for Danish 
films. With their involvement in the creative process, a commissioner is no longer a gatekeeper 
but an ‘organisational representative who conducts an initiative to enhance creativity’ (Stradvad 
cited Redval 2012: 216).  
However, in this context, funds that support international productions like Fonds Sud Cinéma 
and Europe’s Neighbours are of great importance. Les Fonds Sud Cinéma, one of the funds of 
the French Centre National du cinema (CNC), supported more than ‘500 films from Asia, Africa, 
Latin America, Near and Middle East since 1997’ (CNC Website). Most importantly as mentioned 
earlier, it supported artistic initiatives otherwise overlooked in the national cinema, like topics 
of war in Lebanon and FGM and fundamentalism in Egypt (Dunia and Al-Massir). Their 
assessment technique to justify their funding is interesting. It is not centred around the 
commercial success of their movies but assesses the economic and social impact of the monies 
spent by the CNC (Bout, Salles 2013:9). It is worth noting that media professionals in the Middle 
East criticise the CNC selection policy as Orientalist (Azzi, Tannous 2021). This selection can be 
updated to take into consideration the positive impact it may have on the audience in recipient 
countries of these funds.   
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Access to European funds or any governmental funds may not be an option for many filmmakers. 
This underpins the recommendations of this research for engaged scholarship to fill the gap 
already discussed earlier.  
 
The difference from other frameworks 
The counter-narratives frameworks developed by Ashour, Van Ginkle and Tuck and Silverman 
were built to support the creation of ad campaigns centred around messengers delivering direct 
messages to a fringe audience. The difference between them and this framework for cultural 
productions is obvious once their approach to content and target audience are considered. Only 
one of the frameworks reviewed in this thesis addressed the content. The handbook by Tuck 
and Silverman is the foundation for the toolkit available on counter-narratives.org. However, 
their advice on creating engaging content claims it can be 
   a wide-range of different tones. It could be; reflective, antagonistic, 
scholarly, mournful, regretful, cool, exciting, adventurous, provocative, 
humorous, or satirical. It can tell a personal story, seek to directly engage 
an ideology or one component of an ideology. It can feature real-life 
people, such as former extremists and survivors of extremism, in an 
engaging documentary-style. It can involve cartoons and created 
characters; or fictionalised dramas or scenarios (Tuck, Silverman 2016:20).  
 
The framework presented in this thesis is set to define the themes needed in the dramatisation 
of identity related content suggested in Ferguson’s research. In order to take control of the 
narrative, it advises practitioners not to respond to extremists’ narrative but to produce content 
in the identified areas where the debate can be refocused on the human experience. It is not 
concerned with movies who wants to represent the military aspect of fighting extremism. These 
movies may be important in order to resist the tendency for collective amnesia that a society 
might strive for after a trauma. However, these movies need to refrain from committing the 
same mistake of Nazi movies and have to be more than ‘just movies’ (Mann 2003). Also, for 
those who are interested in direct interaction with people vulnerable to extremism narrative, 
theatre work may yield better results and may benefit from referring to work by Odd Arts in the 
UK or Lucien Bou Rejeili, particularly his work with fighters from different camps from Tripoli. 
This is aimed at practitioners who use film aesthetics and production structure to tell their 




This thesis set to define the identity-related content that can have a positive impact on violent 
extremism. It showed how cultural productions can embody the aims of counter and alternative 
narratives as defined in violent extremism literature. Hence, it presented a framework for 
thematic content that can challenge cognitive extremism in the cultural sphere, as well as a 
model for practitioners to support their decision making and define their product in the 
development phase. It is devised with Levantine and North African creators in mind (both 
residents and expatriates) for their future use.  
 
Since cultural productions aim to fulfil the role set for counter-narratives, the research adopted 
their guidelines of combining offensive and defensive techniques where a counter-narrative 
deconstructs, and an alternative narrative promotes (Reed, Ingram et al. 2017). It was 
imperative to identify if specific themes were needed for this content, and most importantly to 
define a language that can articulate it to bypass cognitive resistance. The textual analysis of 
YouTube videos of skin-in-the-game cultural practitioners identified three themes: historical 
narratives, women’s status and minorities rights. Aimed to practitioners, the research was 
designed as practice-led. Hence, a series of seven video-essays studied representation in 
popular culture to inform the development of the framework. This process, aided by the 
discussion with practitioners, enabled the creation of a working model that guides practitioners 
to define their product as counter or alternative narrative based on their research, storytelling 
strength and interest as well as the considerations they have to keep in mind throughout the 
development phase.  
 
European governments believed counter-narratives will counter extremists’ recruitment 
(Glazzard 2017). However, a growing body of literature is claiming they are inefficient (Glazard 
2017; Nafees 2018) and even counterproductive to their target audience (Bélanger, Nisa et. al 
2020). This research built a model based on a growing body of evidence that suggests the 
positive impact of identity related content (Ferguson 2016). The model presented here 
showcased the necessity to look beyond the violence or behavioural extremism and challenge 
the worldview common between violent extremists and non-violent Islamists. Many of those 
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who embraced violence were initially influenced by non-violent extremists (Schmid 2014b). 
Violence may be the modus operandi of extremist Islamic parties, but that does not mean they 
envision a nation’s political construct differently than the confederate established by the 
Prophet (el-Qemani Septermber 8, 2018). With political Islamic parties sharing the same 
worldview, they have the ability to affect the social structure and the nature of relationship 
between Muslims and other communities (Ahmed 2011; Box of Islam 2019f). The Muslim 
Brotherhood is argued to have laid the foundation for Islamism. The Brotherhood was 
‘spectacularly victorious’ in Islamising Egypt due to their non-violent methods favouring the 
route of education (Ahmed 2011). An Islamist journalist summarised the ‘common 
understanding of Islam’s inevitable advance’ in the following words:  
Islam will spread through the neighbourhoods, and then to Egyptian society 
as a whole, and then to the Egyptian state, and then to other Muslim 
countries, and then to countries in which Muslims were formerly the rulers, 
and then to other parts of the world, including Europe and the United States. 
(Ahmed 2011: 154) 
 
To address cognitive extremism, this research’s framework advocates a human-centric approach 
to storytelling and built its recommendation to normalise representations of modern-day values 
of equality, human rights and diversity. In practical terms, the counter-narrative aspect of this 
framework, delivered primarily via video-essays and documentaries, targets the transnational 
narrative of Islamism. This is the offensive approach aforementioned against the transnational 
narrative. It aims to challenge the concept of Islamic Ummah, the Caliphate and the 
misinformation about Pre-Islamic Arabia and early Islam. More importantly it deconstructs the 
single identity component that Islamists promote (Abdel-Samad 2016), making a multiplicity of 
identity construct possible among their targets. The ‘intellectual vanguard have long recognised 
its obligation in the face of a universal emergency’ (Mann 2003: 173). Hence, academics are best 
placed to deliver this angle with the factual deconstruction of historical narratives’ inaccuracies. 
Academics already conduct the foundation research needed for this angle. Engaged scholarship 
advocates an increased involvement of academics in the political and media discourse. Needless 
to say, this research espouses these values and calls on an increased role of academia in 
promoting critical thinking and actively seeking to increase its positive impact on the society at 
large. Furthermore, practice researchers have a huge role to play in communicating their 
research in engaging ways to larger audiences. This research advocates video-essays as a way to 
communicate data and accepts Mann’s (2003:181) assessment that the documentary style 
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‘proves so successful […] may well be compatible with the bold artistic approach.’ If academics 
outputs embrace video-essay and documentaries, it will clear the path for cultural practitioners 
to focus on drama production and produce content that normalise empowered women, the 
LGTBQ community and minorities. Azzi (Azzi, Tannous 2021) suggested the incentive is poor for 
producers to produce documentaries due to a limited audience share of an intellectual elite and 
a low consumption from a general audience. However, these documentaries can play a great 
role in influencing the media discourse. It is worth noting that these suggestions are not meant 
to deter academics from producing dramas or cultural practitioners from producing 
documentaries or videos.  
 
Consequently, the alternative narrative promotes local identity as a component for the personal 
identity construct and places diversity and pluralism as an intrinsic value to the society or 
community in question. This approach is very local. Considering the difference in history, 
minorities and women’s rights, this research cannot extrapolate a uniform production model 
that can work efficiently in different countries of the Middle East. However, it presented cultural 
practitioners with a working model that can support their storytelling development. In a 
nutshell, it advises producers, directors or storytellers to set an aim they like to promote or 
counter. They can then develop the story to embody it indirectly without lecturing the audience. 
A cast of stars can help increase the reception of this approach. Philadelphia and Orid Hallan are 
both examples of letting the story be the message needed to win public opinions.   
 This research’s approach plays directly to the role of media in shaping personal and national 
identity, where they act as distributors of ideology, enabling the imagination of the community 
and the nation (Dzeimidock 2003; Gitlin 1980; Anderson 1991). National theory is selected 
herein to limit cognitive resistance.  
The implications of this research can reach policy makers and film funding bodies. For countries 
struggling with extremism, it lays the foundation work for future development of local cultural 
policies that take into consideration local narratives and cinematic productions’ infrastructures. 
The parallel between Islamism and Nazism (Abdel-Samad 2016) gives a working model for what 
local governments need to implement in terms of cultural and educational policies. Educational 
curricula can become more inclusive of different communities, their culture, histories and 
narratives. This precisely relevant to the indigenous minorities of the Middle East. Similarly to 
educational policies, cultural policies can reflect the diversity of the local history and culture: 
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initiate museums to document the atrocities endured by the victim of extremism as well as 
present their culture, as seen in Germany’s Jewish Museum, and create funds to support 
research and cultural initiatives as in theatre and films that represent marginalised communities.  
Film funding bodies, precisely those who fund international films co-productions, can rethink 
their funding policies to consider the impact of these productions on the community or nation 
represented by the films. Their selection can take into consideration prioritising productions 
stemming from this research’s framework to support its aim and increase its impact. Naturally, 
funds can help producers shoulder the financial risks which may increase the number of 
participants.  
 
The practice model developed for cultural productions as counter-narratives contradicts the 
established model for counter-narratives. The framework of this research takes radical steps 
away from the three different counter-narratives’ frameworks. Ashour, Van Ginkel and Tuck and 
Silverman advised practitioners to create ad campaigns as a product. However, in this model, ad 
campaigns are just a promotional tool for the products of the cultural productions’ framework. 
It is worth noting that Bélanger et.al (2020) pointed to a palpable efficiency to political 
messaging in ad campaigns. However, if this suggestion is aimed to change minds, it is worth 
remembering that election campaigns are based on political messaging and fail to change minds 
on social media (Chan 2020; Hanft 2012). Cultural producers interviewed for this research 
agreed on the inefficiency of campaigns to change minds, with Tannous (Azzi, Tannous 2021) 
highlighting that campaigns driven by influencers can work to promote a cultural product.  
Additionally, this framework laid the foundation to address cognitive extremism. Hence, the 
violence is no longer central to its counter-narratives’ discourse since they bypass the modus 
operandi to address Islamists’ ultimate goal of establishing the Caliphate. Hence the importance 
of a messenger experiencing and contributing to violence is dramatically diminished in this 
approach. This indirect approach to storytelling and focusing the discourse on the lived 
experience of the character can focus the discourse on the issue tackled by the production.  
 
Unfortunately, this research could not take a particular country’s production infrastructure into 
account in its risk assessment section. If some sort of financial support was available, its practice 
could have explored more in-depth the difference in counter and alternative language in each 
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theme. Video-essays would have higher production values and better quality. This lack of funds 
deterred from further researching the Abbasid era contemporary to the writing of the Hadith’s 
books identified as missing from the discourse since a visual exploration in video-essays was 
unaffordable.  
 
While discussing the framework, I identified gap in the discourse. Naturally, further research is 
needed. While my angle is practice-based research to track impact and audience reception, it is 
by no means the only one possible. With regards to the Abbasid era, it is worth exploring what 
impact it had on the depiction of early Islam and the Prophet? Will discussing the socio-political 
environment of the era impact the audience perception of early Islam? How will that impact the 
discourse of establishment Islam? To date, establishment Islam defended the rigour of the 
methodology followed by the Hadith collectors. It is worth noting that the lack of historical 
evidence supporting the narrative of early Islam, precisely the one of the first Islamic Caliphate, 
is not discussed on mainstream media in Muslim majority countries. More importantly, the 
narrative of an Arab-Islamic invasion lacks the historical evidence (Holland 2012). 
Deconstructing this myth can affect discourse of establishment Islam and minorities. Also, it can 
impact the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. These are a few samples of the 
potential research enquiry this framework can instigate. It is worth noting that when there is an 
Islamic historical artefact it should be placed central to the research inquiry. Making the findings 
of the research of the seventh-century Quranic manuscript public can have an impact on the 
discourse and audience as well. Balancing the research outputs between showing historical 
evidence when available and pinpointing lack of evidence when it is the case is preferable. As 
repeatedly said in this framework and the work it inspires should celebrate and respect Islamic 
heritage. 
Unfortunately, the threat of violent extremism is not over yet, so this enquiry might still be 
possible. Despite the fact that ISIS is losing ground, they released three videos of groups from 
Sinai, West and East Africa pledging allegiance to them (Jihadoscope Twitter 23 June 2019). 
Some jihadists joined the Hazimi group which is more extremist than ISIS (NL Times 2020). So 
finally, for practitioners who were wondering what can we do to fight extremism? This is your 




7.1 List of films featured in the video essays 
Films that defined the perception of early Islam in the public psyche 
El-Shayma’ (Mazhar 1972)  
El Shyama’ is the sister of the prophet, she is the daughter of the woman who breastfed him 
which is considered a sibling’s bond in Arabia. She is married to a man who hates him and 
conspire against him with Quraich. Her avid support for her brother puts a strain on her 
marriage. Throughout the movie she challenges him and her tribe to not fight Mohamed and 
protects him against the kill order issued by Mohamed. The film is historically inaccurate.  
El-Rissala (Akkad 1977)  
The film recounts the stories of early Islam from the view point of the prophet. This was el-
Akad’s way to go around the ban of representing the prophet of Islam instead of relying on third 
person narration. It is worth noting that this film has a seal of approval from both Sunni (el-Azhar 
in Egypt) and Shia (Majeliss el Shii el a3la in Lebanon) authorities and despite that it was banned 
from release in Egypt. It was filmed in Arabic starring Abdallah Ghayeth and in English starring 
Anthony MacQueen (Massrawi 21 9 2017). The director claims his film was seen by American 
soldiers Post 9/11 to understand Islam (Al-Mouji 2017).  
Hijerat el-Rassoul (Amara 1964)  
Hijra is the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Yatherib and the start of the Hijri year. The 
film focuses on slave stories who converted despite their masters’ will. Although the characters 
are fictional the film did not roam free from the shackles of the main story (Kassem 2011). 
Commonly, Mohamed is believed to have freed the slaves and established equality. However, 
although some slaves might have been freed as a political statement (Daring Question 2010c; 
2010d), scriptures regulating slavery is reproduced in the Quran (el-Qemani September 8, 2018)  
Films that represented extremists/ fundamentalists 
El-Irahab wal Kabab (Arafa 1992)  
Ahmed is frustrated by bureaucracy in his attempts to change his son’s school. The government 
employees were not helpful or professional, particularly the fundamentalist. In an unlucky twist 
of events, Ahmed got in a fist fight with the fundamentalist and disarmed a security officer to 
find himself an accidental terrorist holding hostages. A call girl and a cleaner joined his cause. 
Not having demands from the government, he ordered lunch for his hostages, kebab and kofta. 
He leaves the building aided by his hostages.     
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Al-Massir (Chahine 2000)  
Abdallah, the Caliph’s son wants to become a dancer, Marwan and his wife grew attached to 
him. Exploiting his differences with his father, radical extremists target Abdallah to recruit him 
in order to assassinate the Caliph. Averroes was made aware of the extremists’ threat. A 
fundamentalist judge is baiting Averroes drawing a wedge between him and the Caliph to thwart 
his efforts to uproot the extremists. While the extremists’ plot against the government failed, 
their plot against Averroes succeeded and he was sent to exile after attending the burning of his 
books. Nevertheless, his allies succeeded to smuggled copies of his books out of the country, 
but only one copy made it to Egypt to be preserved.  
Touyour el-Zalam (Arafa 1995)  
3 old communists friends’ life choices are contrasted in this movie. Mohsen kept true to his 
communist ideals but poor. Fathi, pursued financial gain through enabling political corruption 
and becoming the office of a corrupt minister. Ali’s easy money road led to defend Islamists and 
mixed up in their terrorist activities.  
Hello America (Galal & Zakri 2000)  
In the sequel to Bekhit and Adila, the couple travel to America. The films depict them in a series 
of situations where cultural differences are highlighted.  
 Al-Irhabi (Jalal 1994):  
After failing in his assassination mission, the Salafi terrorist Mostafa got hit by a car. Mistaking 
his identity for a Philosophy lecturer, Sawsan and her left leaning family insisted on hosting him 
till he fully recovers. Mostafa falls in love with Sawsan. He learns that her target is her uncle. 
Once his true identity was discovered, he returns to tell Sawsan and her family that he did not 
kill her uncle. However, an extremist assassinates him and he dies on their doorstep.  
Films that represented minorities 
Janat el Chayatin (Fawzi 2000)  
The film is an adaptation of a Brazilian novel by Georgio Amado. Tabel died of an overdose and 
his body was delivered to his family to receive his final rites. Tabel had walked away from his 
rich life to live with delinquents and marginalised people. His friends stole his body and the film 
follows their last goodbye trip together.  
Amir el Zalam (Imam 2002)  
Saïd is one of the heroes of the October war, he was blinded in the war. Rejecting to accept his 
disability, he walks around pretending he can see and protects the youngsters in the shelter 
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from a cruel director. An assassin infiltrated Egypt to kill a foreign diplomat and choose the 
shelter as a base for his operation. Naturally, Saïd steps in to save the day. It is worth noting that 
the film was a huge commercial success and argued for disability rights 
Bahib Issima (Fawzi 2004)  
Naïm falls in love with cinema. Adli, his fundamentalist Coptic father forbids him from watching 
movies.  
Films that are funded by the French funds. 
The inclusion of these movies was due to their artistic expression and their treatment of difficult 
topics particularly Dunia.   
Dunia (Saab 2004)  
Dunia wants to become a professional dancer. In her admission interview to a dance school, she 
stands still and recite poetry claiming that a woman cannot move her body or evoke an act of 
love if society requires her to hide her femininity. This is one of the rare movies that addressed 
Female genital mutilation.  
Whatever Lola wants (Ayoush 2008)  
An American woman falls in love with an Egyptian man and followed him to Egypt, he rejects 
her since when in Egypt he needs to abide by Egyptian values. She tracks Asmahan, a former 
dancer who retired following a scandal and eventually, convinces her to teach her to belly dance. 
The relationship between the 2 women sparks Asmahan’s healing process.   
Additionally, other films were included in order to illustrate the point that the essay  
Imara’a wahida la takfi (Degheidi 1990)  
A corrupt journalist is involved in a love triangle between a poor woman he is supporting, a 
feminist and a rich lady who is advancing his career. Although irrelevant to the plot, the film 
portrayed an education that is heavily shaped by Islamists.  
Singing in the rain (Gene, Donan 1952) 
The classical Hollywood movie that depicts the shift from the silent era to the talkies. The choice 
of this particular movies is due to its dream ballet in order to illustrate the theories it inspired in 
academic literature.  
Sabah (Nadda 2005) 
The film portrays a conservative Syrian family living in Canada. Sabah falls in love and her 
relationship triggers her family’s road to fully integrate into the the Canadian way of life.   
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7.2 Interviews with practitioners  
Nabil Asmar: In house director MBC  
Greetings and so on 
Nabil: I didn’t quite catch what is required from me 
Nagham: Ok let me tell you why we are discussing political Islam and extremism now. I started 
my PhD in 2015, it is coming to an end this is why I asked you for your contribution. We will be 
discussing my media strategy and thinking together as media practitioners, media outlets and 
what type of content we need to produce 
Nabil: interesting  
Nagham: we are going to have this discussion because you know your audience, you work in one 
of the biggest channels with a considerable if not the biggest regional audience share, you have 
been working long enough (laughs) to know the audience, what they want and you are politically 
aware and active from what I see from your Facebook posts. So, this is why I value your input 
on the topic 
Nabil: Thank you 
Nagham: Before briefing you on the work done, let me ask you what do you think we should do? 
How do you perceive the work? 
Nabil: we should do in the business? 
Nagham: yes. To counter the narrative of extremism like ISIS, like Hezbollah, like political Islam 
or whatever, what do you think we can do? 
Nabil: this is not my field, I used to cover a lot of political gatherings and stuff but for the time 
being I am doing daily shows and bulletins of 30 minutes, but I am not… 
Nagham: Apologies I forgot to say, you don’t have to respond in English by the way, I can do the 
translations later. Whatever language you are comfortable with, it’s fine with me 
Nabil: I prefer English or French 
Nagham: both are fine 
Nabil: I do not interfere in the content; I follow what is going on and of course I have a vision of 
what needs to be done. Already, what’s being done is not a small deal, especially in big stations 
like Al-Arabia and Al-Hadath [News channels] and now Bloomberg, MBC. Foreign news 
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organisation Euro news, CNN. Their role, well there is 2 folds. Certainly, they have their politics, 
their alignments and they have their funders and certainly they have a content that goes parallel 
to their advertisement and the turnover of the station. After all this is what TV does, it is not a 
charity, it will be ruined if it did not bring revenues. For example, Tele Lumiere aims to spread a 
Christian content purely, they are against advertising, they are funded by individuals, if these 
people aged and passed on, their children will not pursue the funding. Their funding does not 
seek commercial gain this is why it is a weak channel. I am not saying that good content is a 
funded content, no, good content is a product of intellect. But to get people to make that 
content with intellect. At first intellect costs money, to get an intellectual to do this content to 
invest in people... to invest in a mixer or a camera is way easier than to invest in a brain. 
Nagham: true 
Nabil: Now, in the Arab world there are loads of Brains [as in intellectuals] I work with them on 
a daily basis; however, these brains are politicised, and they adhere to the stations in their 
political agendas. We cannot compare the Brain power here with those of Europe. The 
difference between news media between the East and the West: The West is pure information, 
here we have loads of langue de bois, meaning receptions and goodbyes, this is an aspect and it 
has an audience. The second aspect of those Brains who do political content, if our conversation 
will look jut into politics and war, these are the best, the best journalists. Unfortunately, in 
Lebanon if we want to separate Lebanese media from Arab media, unfortunately this is media 
that lacks objectivity, unfortunately it is not credible. They are intellectuals beyond belief, 
learned and avid readers, they all graduated from the UL, they are all on the same level, I am 
not going to get into the naming game, unfortunately the well-established are not credible. It is 
impossible as a journalist to have dinner with a politician tonight and tomorrow you have him 
as a guest in your panel. As a journalist it is forbidden to be their friend. If we compare our media 
with European media. Those who make the politics programming or the news in France, Patrick 
Poivre d’Arvor and Clair Chazal, when they host a politician they are objective and transparent, 
they don’t hang out with them, they don’t have dinner with them and they are not their bodies, 
because this will cost their credibility. A journalist without credibility is not a journalist. This is if 
we are addressing the part of the politicised journalist. A politicised journalist can exist if 
committed, meaning if I am a journalist for al-Massira magazine, I am a journalist for the 
Lebanese Forces (LF), I write for the LF, I have my politics but I am clear that this my angle, I 
write from this group’s perspective. I am addressing my local journalism. If we are talking about 
Arab media from the big channels I mentioned, the journalists working in these stations have to 
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respect its politics but believe me it is coming from conviction. Nobody does a report against 
ISIS or any terrorist group or political Islam or Muslim Brotherhood without conviction. It is true 
they are working in politicised stations. In counterparts the journalists of Al-Jazira who are 
starting to tame the discourse with other GCC stations but for a while they were focused on 
criticism Al-Arabia and Al-Hadath and other stations who spoke against Qatar.  
Nagham: yeah  
Nabil: so, what these stations are doing is around the clock coverage of everything that is 
happening in the world, in the Arab world and the terrorism and those… what they are called… 
the extreme groups 
Nagham: yes, got you conservative groups and fundamentalist/ extremists 
Nabil: yes, they are giving 24/7 information. On the other hand and in parallel and this is why I 
am a bit… because we are from the pure TV generation before digital was introduced… on the 
other hand, every station without exception, every station has a segment or a programme  that 
reports on what’s going on social media. Certainly, there are people who studied and planned 
to make this strategy, to integrate the world of digital with the TV, but is this something good or 
dangerous? Every station now has its own digital account, every programme has its own digital 
account, the social media account, ok do you want to attract viewership, or do you want to alert 
them that your content is available in summary on their phones? Certainly, I don’t have the 
answer, it’s with those who devise strategies. The creators of these platforms are intelligent, 
and it is now a paid platform to watch content that has sponsorship, but this is something, if we 
want it or not, is dangerous to TV. Now, if we put good content on a TV station or a radio station 
or on a digital platform, whether it was in a super expensive set or on a cheap chair on a sidewalk 
in Dawra, it is content. Now how it is received by the viewers? Which is more impactful? I haven’t 
conducted studies on it, but it is very possible that the content made on this chair in Dawra’s 
sidewalk will be more viewed that the content made in a setup for 100 of thousands of dollars. 
This is why I always say, the big headline, content, content and then content. Without content, 
we have nothing regardless of technologies, without content we have no TV material.  
Nagham: I think you hit the nail on the head in some issues, especially in information, we have 
a big issue in reporting… [interviews interrupted by a phone call] 
Nabil: where were we? 
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Nagham: We were talking about information, counter-narratives as it is conceived now, they are 
saying that the media role is to give information. There’s a study that claimed dramatization of 
identity related content will have a positive impact on violent extremism. So in these years, I 
scouted the Arab speaking media, without getting in to the Arab identity and so on, to identify 
the type of content that we - as entertainers, cultural practitioners, those of us who are not 
journalists-  can do to challenge the foundation of the worldview that extremists or political 
Islam use to recruit from us and kills us with our own ideas or values, does that make sense to 
you? 
Nabil: yes 
Nagham: so, I identified 3 big themes that we need to discuss and produce content about. You 
may find them very obvious when you hear them: historical narrative… 
Nabil: yes, this is a point we’ll talk about, yes 
Nagham: rights specially women rights and those of minorities. So, everything circles back on 
the idea of identity. This is all relate to media being promoters of… 
Nabil: wait I can’t hear you, the call is bad  
Nagham: I am trying to say, this all culminate of how media, films, cultural practitioners and 
maybe theory will culminate in creating the identity of the public, how can we redefine our 
identity when needed. So, you tell me, how does that sound to you? Logical, outstretched, 
obvious… 
Nabil: Ok this is closer to my expertise, which is not politics. 
Nagham: this is my perspective as a cultural theorist not as a political expert. The thing is, it is 
argued that Political Islam changes the relationship between Muslims and their social 
environment so this where culture products can have a positive impact. You should be the one 
talking not me 
Nabil: on the contrary I need your input to know how I can benefit you. Ok. I do a variety of 
programmes, I do morning shows, weekly show, football shows, and talk shows. I used to do 
music entertainment shows and I stopped and live coverage and so on. I do not claim that I am 
a storyteller or narrative, but this is my business, this is what I follow, what I read about, and I 
watch a lot of, and… can you hear me?  
Nagham: yes 
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Nabil: after years and years in TV, and years in ALBA and years of exchange with experts, at the 
end I learned, I made sitcoms and dramas and short movies. I am not talking from a theoretical 
perspective, I have practical experience 
Nagham: I know 
Nabil: let’s start with the historical, today the crime that is happening in the drama, especially 
Lebanese drama, is when they produce costume drama. This is the hardest type of drama. Why? 
Époque drama retells history, when you are dealing with history if you don’t have a historian, 
an expert research, the results is like you said earlier, is a lie. If you are speaking on a certain 
era, let’s say the farmers’ revolution. The farmers’ revolution, Claudia Marchalian wrote the 
script, they built a castle is a village somewhere and got their sewing machines to incorporate 
as props, but Claudia Marchalian did not seek a historian to confirm what was going on in this 
era. In the era of the farmers’ revolution and Antoun Chahine, the clergy owned all the land in 
Mount Lebanon, the clergy was the ruler, the series did not have one priest. She lied about 
history. She side-lined history. We cannot produce époque without having at least an expert 
historian. On the other hand, Egyptian and Syrian dramas are worked correctly in all details. I 
will give you some examples, I am watching Netflix a lot lately. If we are going to open 
parentheses Netflix, well I watch more foreign series than I watch Arabic series.  
Nagham: yeah, most of us do 
Nabil: Or Shahed, Shahed is evolving. The series are acquiring more cinematic language, you can 
see the cinematic language in each episode as if it was a feature film. I will give you an example, 
Pablo Escobar, they got experts to create how people were dressed in the 80s, the cars, the 
furniture and the colours, how Pablo Escobar walked and how he combed his hair. Why? 
Because when you are working on époque, it is not a docu-drama, but if you don’t have the 
document, if you haven’t researched how they lived in the era you are doing it wrong, if you 
can’t do époque than do contemporary. What exists today is easy to know. An example I 
watched from Egypt, Gand hotel secret of the Nile, besides the historian, in the end credits they 
have furniture makers they recreated the furniture of the hotel in the 40s. Khatat to write the 
office of director, this is content. This is content. If you give the viewers wrong information, first 
half of them are not stupid they will laugh at you, and the other half if they are not intellectuals 
you are fooling them, and you are giving them bad information. This is the content, this is the 
writer, this is the vision of the director and the producer who need to know who to get on his 
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team. If you got Nicole Saba to do a historical series, she has Botox. In the 40s there was no 
cosmetic surgeries. This is content not just an image.  
Nagham: there’s another problem. Sorry did I interrupt you?  
Nabil: NO no I was trying to remember the 3 topic you asked me about 
Nagham: let’s keep discussing historical narratives since we started pinpointing problems. There 
are a disaster in documentaries as well, I will give you an example from Qatar, I know the Qatar 
TV quite well since I worked there, it epitomises some problems we might find. A friend of mine 
was doing a degree in UCL in Qatar foundation so they oversaw some archaeological digs, he 
was telling me that the documentary produced by the local TV claimed that the civilisation 
uncovered civilisation is 10000 years old when the land geologically was 8000 years old. So not 
just the lack of experts in representation, the information it relays is problematic 
Nabil: well the danger is that it is a documentary [Interviews interrupted] 
Nagham: Moreover, when it comes to the films that I looked at, those films who shaped our 
perception of early Islam. This perception enables our acceptance of political Islam’s project and 
the Caliphate. There is no historical evidence to prove it. So, this is a problem. We have a 
problem as professionals as in how we produce… and… we have a problem in history that is not 
quite accurate  
Nabil: that is the important thing. Everyone gives his own perspective of history. You cannot 
make mistakes in history, especially in documentaries, it is called documentary, document, it is 
derived from document. This either happened or did not. This is a problem. Everywhere. One 
might make a documentary on John Kennedy, and someone else will do another documentary 
from another point of view, there might be difference of opinions. Lebanon’s history in schools 
ended in 1923. In schools they do not study what happened in 1975 till today 
Nagham: it ends in 1943 
Nabil: oh God yes 1943, sorry yes. It ends on the independence from the French Mandate. 
There’s nothing else. So, if you want to divide that, in the East what did Bachir el-Gemayil do 
and in Hamra what did Yasser Arafat do and Mostafa Saad in Saida, you cannot divide history 
locally, you have to talk about the state  
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Nagham: well maybe we have to approach history more locally. Lebanon has an identity crisis. 
There are different worldviews, they are clashing and the diagnosis for the problems it suffered 
is not quite right.  
Nabil: we got to a very important topic; it is identity. I always fought for it. At the end I 
surrendered. When I got employed, when I decided to get employed, if I gave my opinion my 
salary will be the same paid on the 27th and if I did not give my opinion my salary will be the 
same paid on the 27th so why should I get into this, if people follow a certain politics and they 
have the green light after all I am just an employee. But I cannot stop debating with people with 
similar education, intellectual and practical level on such issues. We have a show, if the 
viewership fell then change the set, it didn’t work, change the graphics it didn’t work, get a nice 
girl to do some games in the show, the show lost its identity. Télématin is 30 years old, it is still 
the same. Good morning America is 30 years old; it is still the same. Good morning England, 
Britain, you have a morning show that is still the same for 30 years. Why? Because it is identity. 
The viewers….you do not have to keep changing things around. Why the most successful 
entertainment show in the last years was Star Academy? Because it was the same. The same 
jingle for 10 years, 10 seasons it stays the same. The dances are the same, the surprise in the 
prime set is the same. The nomination on Tuesday is the same. Enough! Identity! Stop changing. 
The viewers are happy, it is not necessary to change everything. The voice stayed the same since 
its inception. These big formatted shows stay the same. You get someone who wants to feel 
smart and starts messing things about. Bro leave things be. It is called identity, character, it is 
the way it is. It is successful this way. A falafel sandwich is not grilled, if it was it won’t be falafel 
anymore. You cannot make the shawarma Mac Donald. You cannot make it combo. You cannot 
cut the meat with an electric knife. It not shawarma if the chef is not hot with a towel placed on 
here [points to his shoulder]. I am not comparing programmes to shawarma; I am saying identity 
is relevant everywhere. There are things to which we create Bibles. Why is it called Bible? Every 
programme has a Bible, the book is that thick, why is it called Bible?  
Nagham: I s… 
Nabil: Because the Bible does not change. It is written by the apostles and does not change. This 
is why it is called Bible for you to stop messing with it. This is my answer to the identity. I live 
that everyday 
Nagham: I a… 
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Nabil: Producers younger than me, they are young now in their 30s, the content producers, the 
TV has changed. Now, you have producers, they are called producers despite that they are in 
fact line producers. In the middle of the show, he comes to me and says hey why don’t we put 
the presenter here instead of here. What? How? Her light is there not here. Her cadre is there 
not here. The background is there not here. The viewers will find it odd; they are used to her in 
that environment do not change it. This is what is making people flee to social media. This is 
putting the TV in danger and causing loss of viewership.  
Nagham: The TV industry…. 
Nabil: we were doing a cooking show, you go ahead 
Nagham: I disagree that social media is a danger to TV because the industry is surviving  
Nabil: I hope so  
Nagham: the quality that you or TV gives to people is very different than the one given by social 
media. Even in cooking, since you were talking about the topic. I am not a fan of these shows, 
so I go on social media, I don’t want the 30 minutes video I want videos with one minute. TV 
content has adapted, the BBC directive in 2010 or 11 was to slow down content because they 
wanted to accommodate viewers looking at their phones. The rhythm did not follow social 
media it slowed down to accommodate people’s usage of them. However, our TVs and I am not 
attacking any TV that posits itself as cross-regional or anything 
Nabil: on the contrary 
Nagham: they are aggravating the identity problem. I am all for diversity and maybe we can 
touch on the issue later when we talk about minorities, but these TV are not drawing multi-
talents to a melting pot 
Nabil: Multi-talent to a what? 
Nagham: melting pot. Let’s say the States, they drew immigration from everywhere and they 
had a culture of their own. For example, you have jazz as a cultural product that is a result of 
that fusion. But in the case of these cross-regional TV, it is a mish mash or a collection of different 
people reflecting their own culture in an allocated time share. These TV are mostly funded by 
the Gulf states; however, we hardly see any content from the Gulf or that promotes their 
culture. What do you think? Will this change or this is what we will be stuck with?  
 148 
Nabil: Look there is a new generation, there are new ideas, there are new writers. There are 
people with new content. We have to wait and see. Already the quality is better. The language 
is getting better. The level is high, I am not saying it is a low quality, it is a high-level quality. The 
new generation does not have enough baggage to produce a heavy content. I am not 
generalising.  
Nagham: no no 
Nabil: 50-50. We have a generation that came after the tv. They came directly to digital. The 
immediately handled 5D and laptops they did not start with the Umatic and evolved. This is the 
generation that has a bit of a weakness. Maybe this generation they passed a milestone, they 
are digitally oriented that they have the cultural baggage. Maybe, because they had a different 
formation. I am not saying that social media destroyed TV. NO. I have examples in front of me I 
live them every day.  Every day, we do a rehearsal of the titles before we start, the presenter 
opens her live broadcast on Insta, she gave her fans the titles, they know them already, they 
have the summary they left.  They left. They got the short content; this is what they wanted. The 
sweetheart could say now we are going to do the titles watch us and cut her live feed. So, they 
get motivated to tune in, otherwise they got the summary and they’ll go to something else.  
Nagham: this is… 
Nabil: a second example on cooking 
Nagham: ok 
Nabil: resolve this if you can. They claim that they have followers and sponsors and we have to 
do it, whatever, plastic generation. Another example on cooking. I do cook programs. Every 
recipe has its method, there is the general identity and the set and the cuts. One time she was 
doing Shrimp curry. It is a complicated recipe with loads of ingredients, ok? What she’s doing, 
the best way for the viewer to see is from a top view camera 
Nagham: of course 
Nabil: the viewer does not care about the beauty shots; she wants to know what the cook is 
doing with this hard recipe. I received a phone call, why didn’t you do a variety of shots, why 
there weren’t any crane shots etc? I said it’s fine. The next day, the presenter was doing crêpe 
au chocolat, she had a guest with her, and we sent on set the producer’s daughter. I had an 
animated set, and who doesn’t know how to do crêpe au chocolat, I did everything possible in 
covering the segment, from crane to movement, I had fun. The same person called me, why 
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today the work was very beautiful with cranes etc and yesterday there was only a ceiling cam? 
I answered him, I said today you’ll get the answer. The curry is difficult, the woman in her house 
doesn’t care about the crane, she wants to see the ingredients, I put my camera to show the 
measurements. He was silent. He said and today? I said who doesn’t know how to make crêpe 
au chocolat? What an original recipe! Besides I have content to cover, the daughter of the 
producer, the guest, the balloons, I have a reason to cut. I said do you want to present content 
or just images? He said no, present content you are right, thank you and goodbye. And they 
keep asking me why people go and watch cooking on YouTube, this is why, YouTubers are using 
their phones’ cameras and showing the food, they’re not showing off their makeup, or the set 
lighting or crane. The viewer does not care, she doesn’t care, she wants to know how to make 
this curry for her husband. She just wants the ingredients and their measurements. 
Unfortunately, this is it.  
Nagham: no I agree with you, we have a problem in content, entertainment as I see it has a huge 
role to play and is not playing it because there is a lack of strategy from the management, there 
is a lack of cultural policies from most government in the area, I am yet to see one. Even Lebanon 
after 30 years of war, there was no cultural policy to create unity.  
Nabil: yes, if you want talk about this, 100%. But we excelled in entertainment. We made 
formats… Technically we excelled  
Nagham: technically, there was never a problem. I testify to that  
Nabil: we excelled, we excelled… The content starts with the candidates, do not forget that the 
candidates come from 20 Arab countries, so you have this mixing. You are not watching Star Ac 
or The Voice France, where there is just French, the same culture. This is… no be sure that the 
politics of the big respected channels, they know what they are doing, they have strategies, and 
everything you want, sponsorship and product placement… 
Nagham: this is not what I mean  
Nabil: yes, the strategy exists, content you are right, our personal preferences play a big role. 
You cannot have the emotions from 20 nationalities, it is different, this is where we cannot 
compare. In my opinion we cannot compare. I can only talk about the technical aspect and we 
excelled in it. The content (shakes his head), we cannot say that Star Academy didn’t have its 
own identity, or Voice, or Got talent or X Factor, these big shows  they made an identity, they 
had an identity till a certain season, till they started messing the jury they started losing their 
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identity, when they messed the academy they lost the identity. Till a certain season, 5 or 6 
perhaps, I think we left a mark in international TV and we made an identity.  
Nagham: you think that was a good example of cultural exchange or an identity erasing 
endeavour? Local identity erasing? 
Nabil: exchange is a bit of a difficult claim, because, because …. 
Nagham: but you are putting the Egyptian with the Tunisian with the Lebanese with the Khaliji 
and each one is giving a song from their country 
Nabil: no it did not do any exchange, because culture and tradition of each one is more closed 
off than the other. They claim to do exchanges, but I don’t think this happened  
Nagham: did we erase cultural boundaries then? Because there’s no unity, you have the politics 
worldview that is being translated by media, the unionism under Islamism or the Arabisation or 
Arabic unionism. Minorities, and there are loads of them with all the problems and 
fundamentalism in their discourse, to a certain extent these people may feel that their culture, 
history and their narrative is being taking over and another one is being forced on them, and 
now they see their culture is being adopted by these big TV channel, most of it funded by the 
Gulf states. So, the resentment from the denied history is now added by the cultural 
appropriation. These entertainment programs are just collecting cultures and showing it one 
after another, since there is a lack of documentaries or any programming that present them 
with their history or any recognition to their contribution to culture and history. These 
entertainment programs might be aggravating this resentment. What do you think? Makes 
sense? It is a very harsh criticism but what do you think about what I just said.  
Nabil: you are perfectly right. But I have to be fair to everybody 
Nagham; of course, please 
Nabil: Saudi Arabia was cloaked in darkness; we never knew anything about it. It turned out they 
have an amazing history and breath-taking landscapes, we finally started discovering it once 
they started opening up. Saudis are hard workers, it is a big population, so they have local 
working force, other than the expatriates. We will talk later about the Saudi history and how 
they are doing their exposure. The UAE is very young, they never claimed they had history and 
museums and Louvre or writers, poets or historian. UAE is younger than me, it is not 50 years 
old 
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Nagham: yes  
Nabil: automatically UAE has a modern history. This is its identity, modern, new comfortable, 
secure. It is a very short history. The Emiratis are educated, they travel to study abroad. They 
have international universities. It is a well-respected population; they know they are very young. 
Their television promotes the malls, the sea and the entertainment, what will they show, they 
can’t lie, they don’t have it 
Nagham: they are not required to lie at all  
Nabil: Saudi Arabia weren’t opening up, there wasn’t any exposure from there. Since a year, it 
stopped in the era of Corona, we started to discover Saudi Arabia and there is a marathon so 
they can catch up, firstly so they don’t rely solely on petroleum resources to survive, to find 
other resources and to introduce people to Saudi Arabia. It turned out to be a country with 
breath-taking landscapes for natural tourism, they have incredible natural resources, forests, 
valleys, mountains, rocks, it’s amazing, it’s amazing. A year back, and before that, their tv and 
their series and their content were handcuffed, and we know what that was. We have to see 
from now on, so we can get a better answer if this an image of their history or…or what you 
said. We can’t now. We can’t now. They have a plan, every day they have a press conference to 
say what they are planning to do. Their plan is really huge. I hope they will achieve it. From now 
till the end of the Corona pandemic, nearly everything is on hold. Saudi Arabia has poets, writers, 
musicians, singers, painters, Saudi is history, it was closed off 
Nagham: concept creators like atheism too 
Nabil: I work in a purely Saudi television, we have one programme called MBC in a week, it is a 
resume of what happened in the week, in Saudi Arabia. Besides that, the channel is pan-Arab, 
international, it’s open. I don’t think I have a defined answer in that topic 
Nagham: and that’s absolutely ok. We can pinpoint the problem, it’s not necessarily that we 
have a solution  
Nabil: yes. I don’t know if we call it problem  
Nagham: ok as well 
Nabil: is it a media problem? No. what do they have in their house and in their society, it’s not 
our job to do the… 
Nagham: no no this is not what I meant… (phone interruption) go ahead 
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Nabil: I hope that I helped a little bit in your study, my inputs are… 
Nagham: of course, they are Nabil, it’s very important for me to run my framework or strategy 
if you prefer by practitioners. Simply, if we want to challenge extremism, yes, we need to keep 
working politically, but there are social and cultural problems that need addressing. This is 
where a coalition of cultural and media practitioners can have an impact with content on 
mainstream media and online platform, not just online, and of course researchers who can fill 
the gaps and study representation. To your point, the films that shaped our perception of 7th 
century Arabia is not similar to the historical texts.  
Nabil: that is true, we have a big role and you are putting a big responsibility on us. This is my 
work and you are drawing my attention…it’s true we have a big role to play, 100%, we have a 
big role to play 
Nagham: In a way artists and media professionals can sense audience trends. For example, 
Albert Camus predicted fascism and Michael Moore with the Trump win. Do you remember Al-
Massir? 
Nabil: yes, Youssef Chahine was a visionary 
Nagham: well the movie still encapsulates our struggle today. I am not attempting to put a 
responsibility on you, I am trying to understand if you think this makes sense how it can be 
supported 
Nabil: I did not mean that in a negative way. You made me realise that there is something I live 
on daily basis, without considering important till you shed that light 
Nagham: well if we like it or not, media shapes perception and representation matters. I made 
a video-essay to explore hoe Copts view their representation in their national cinema, and I took 
the most fundamentalist angle, it is an uncomfortable discussion. I had Al-Irhabi with Adel Imam, 
do you remember the movie? 
Nabil: I never watched it, but I know of it 
Nagham: there a Coptic woman who forbids her husband from drinking beer or watching TV, so 
one of the lines said by a minority member that stood out to me was: if they present this as a 
problem in Christianity then there is nothing wrong in Islam. This is why I said there is 
fundamentalism in minority discourse  
Nabil: (laughing) yes of course it is present in minorities discourse 
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Nagham: well they might feel their history is stolen from them and they are angry or victimised. 
Where is minority representations in the big channels now, how do you think it can make it to 
entertainment or to social networks sorry programming?  
Nabil: they are very marginalised, there might be one programme in a year, they are 
marginalised, they don’t have a voice 
Nagham: Copts or everybody like Amazighs etc 
Nabil: all of them. Once upon a time you stumble on a documentary in al-Arabia about Copts or 
about another, they are marginalised  
Nagham: does it looks like the Copts? Corresponds to what is known about them. Or do they 
keep criticising that this is not us 
Nabil: I don’t know. I never watch it; I am not very sure if I am honest with you 
Nagham: I appreciate that. Ok How about women? Women’s rights? We won’t talk about gay 
rights because… 
Nabil: you still want more rights (laughing). In my opinion these words should not exist. What 
does women rights mean? What is difference between women and men in the first place? 
Nagham: citizenship rights… 
Nabil: why not men rights? 
Nagham: Citizenship rights are not fully equal yet…. 
Nabil: Unfortunately, yes. There is nothing 
Nagham: No content that addresses that? 
Nabil: no nothing. They consider that this is normal. That woman situation is normal as it is. 
Beware, in the UAE women have more rights than men. Here, women are very well respected. 
In Lebanon, they made the domestic abuse law and today L’Orient reported one was killed by 
her husband and he ran away 
Nagham: they gutted the law when they passed it.  
Nabil: what? They didn’t implement it 
Nagham: they gutted it, it was led by Hezbollah MP or was he from Haraket Amal, they gutted 
it, meaning as long as the damage is not permanent or does not leave marks, it is fine. 
 154 
Nabil: I don’t discuss the topic really, I reject the whole premise, for me there is no difference 
between a man and a woman. Why should we have women rights, it is just rights. She has rights 
to begin with, why this exist in history and all civilisations, why? 
Nagham: I can answer that, but it’ll take a while 
Nabil: there is not enough content about this. I don’t know if they avoid because they think 
women have achieved their full rights or because it is the culture. I don’t know. It is common 
sense, what is women rights. It is the same. No, there is no content. Once a year on women’s 
international day…or something about breast cancer. That’s it, 2-3 times a year. I don’t know 
why! If they agree with me or is it forbidden to talk about this. I don’t know. We should have 
solved this a long time ago; we are in 2020 
Nagham: well, we still have no full citizenship in many countries.  
Nabil: I can’t understand why. Lebanese women don’t pass citizenship 
Nagham: I know this is why I am saying it is not full citizenship…. 
Nabil: They say it is for the refugees they are not passing the law, there are 1million Palestinian 
with the nationality  
Nagham: this is the claim, but it is not true. It is a justification. A man can pass his nationality to 
a Palestinian woman even if he married 4 and all their children regardless if they stayed 
together. See why, this is an example of many. This is why I am talking about citizenship and 
women rights. 
Nabil: why it is not the same. I don’t know. To me they are the same, and I can’t understand why 
we are still talking about this 
Nagham: we are still talking about it worldwide because the same is not the case 
Nabil: yes yes worldwide  
Nagham: the problems are tailored to each country, but the issue is not fully solved. So, the big 
question is how cultural practitioners can be supported in creating this content? In shouldering 
risks financial risks or how can we lobby media organisations into adopting these types of 
content? What do you think can work? 
Nabil: of historical narrators? 
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Nagham: all 3, there is no specific numbers to productions in each case. All these can help, 
historical narratives, women status and minorities rights, something similar to Orid Hallan for 
example…. 
Nabil: I will tell you how. The ideal solution is to open things up. Make a competition get various 
talents in all these themes…you make a competition and make room for new people to enter 
the market. Unfortunately, you are in media and you know how it works. Every producer or 
production company is an agent for their own writers and actors, this is the system. I am 
watching now, a French series called Call my agent on Netflix, watch it and the answer is there. 
The solution is ideal. Put out an ad we are recruiting writers… 
Nagham: yeah 
Nabil: will they survive or will be targeted by the sharks? Because you know the system, not just 
here, everywhere. Since the days of Charlie Chaplin and the silent cinema the clicks exist, it is 
the system and we are unable to get out of it. The same writer on 6000 series with the same 
producer and director, it is what it is; this is the system. I am not saying we should give up. You 
are asking me what’s the solution. For me it is launching a competition or recruitment in a 
competition or advertising campaign to attract new talents. This is the solution, in media as a 
man of media, I think this is the solution. What else? There are writers with drawers full of scrips, 
no one bought them. You have to tell this producer, get this writer meet him maybe he’s good; 
for this director to meet this writer he may be good. Go beyond your circle. It is a closed circle. 
This is why…. take me as an example. Personally, I got employed for this reason. We were 10 
directors, we monopolised the programmes of all TV channels, I reached a point where the 
programmes I directed cannot be made unless it is inhouse, and I couldn’t pierce through the 
entertainment circle. They had their system and their people. I made exceptional entertainment 
shows; I wasn’t given credit. 2 or 3 people, the well-known get the credit for entertainment. So, 
I said I don’t need this, and I will focus on talk shows. And I got employed. When I had this 
opportunity, I did not turn it down. As I am telling you, there are things you can’t pierce through. 
In my position I won’t be overstepped. If there’s a project, we are 3 or 4 earmarked for it, pierce 
through if you can. This is it, this is the solution 
Nagham: I am suggesting engaged scholarship to get involved and put out some content, mainly 
universities that have film schools are best placed to make content and maybe it will influence 
mainstream media. Also, adjusting the international funds’ politics of selection mainly from the 
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West; because there is no alternative. Mainly to stress the need to invest in cultural productions 
instead of ad campaigns that don’t work  
Nabil: you don’t need a broadcaster for that? Pierce through it if you can! This is a solution, yes. 
Get them to a broadcaster. If the students, teacher or the dean of the university does not belong 
to the click of the of the broadcasters, their content may stay in the drawers of the university. It 
is not just here, Nagham. Go to TF1 it is the same. Go to NBC it’s the same 
Nagham: this is why online content… 
Nabil: what you are suggesting is an amazing solution. Online! This why online… yes 
Nagham: yes, online! We won’t be stopped from distributing content and may succeed in 
influencing the media 
Nabil: yes, but will you attract ads on online content, without going through Chwairy? Get ads! 
Get Nido to sponsor your series 
Nagham: this is it! If funds can shoulder risks from the practitioners, it can work. The Danish 
experience as a small nation cinema, because you know we are talking about TV series, films 
and documentaries even, the Danish cinema found a solution to that 
Nabil: syndicate? 
Nagham: they are funders, but they increased their funding percentage from 40% to 50% 
following the big influence that Lars Von Treer had on the Danish cinema. For new comers they 
reduced the amount of money available and made the funders’ employees partners in the 
creative process, so they work with the artist to develop movies and get involved creatively.  
Nabil: I see, and they take a percentage from each ticket  
Nagham: this allowed Danish cinema grown from a small nation cinema, like Lebanon, Tunisia 
and Algeria, and they reached production size of a medium size nation because of their increase 
outputs of productions and they are now recognised in the market. So, there is a way  
Nail: their crew is small. The cinema crew is reduced nowadays thanks to the new digital cameras 
and the cost of the film stock is scrapped. So, a 10 people crew became 4. All of this serve. It is 
true 
Nagham: true and we can get artists to make content, focus on creating content and make a 
living from it. 
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Nabil: we are going back to ground zero content content content 
Nagham: yes indeed 
Nabil: content. If it’s good I can make with a mobile phone, if it’s not 7000 Alexa and 800 Ari 
won’t make it good. Content is the hero, we agree 
Nagham: I agree 100% 
Nabil: I hope our discussion was helpful  
Nagham: it was very helpful thank you very much for taking the time especially today I know 
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Greetings and catching up; recording permission granted, explanation for changes since Nabil 
Asmar had to cancel the day due to his best friend virtual funeral. 
 
09:44 Before telling you about the project, let me get your first impression about the idea itself 
and then I will brief you more about the details. By the way please express yourselves in the 
language you feel more comfortable with; not Dutch Toni (laughs) 
If you are going to think about: how as media professionals we are going to counter extremism, 
what would you think? What is the first thing that comes to mind? Or what would you do as a 
strategy? 
Sanaa: I am a bit extremist in what I am going to say. We have to monitor Social media 
Nagham: yeah? 
Sanaa: Yeah mainly. because I think extremism is getting stronger not due to mainstream media 
but due to social media 
Nagham: That might be the case, but as a narrative? Their narrative is present in the cultural 
discourse  
Sanaa: True 
Nagham: They are using social media as a recruitment tool. So, they can target certain pockets 
of the community to recruit them. But the narrative is very available culturally and on 
mainstream media. If you want to counter the narrative what would you think? 
Toni: Are we limiting it to the social media? 
Nagham: no, we are talking as media professional what do we think? 
Toni: because the media is now on social media, all content. So, for me, it is happening on social 
media and there’s a problem that all social media, the laws of social media defer to the US law. 
YouTube, Facebook, Instagram they follow the American law. They not geo-localised like the 
content. For example, I reported a content where a woman said they deserve to be bombed; 
referring to the gay pride. I reported it, they opened a file here [Netherland] because she lives 
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here, and the police arrested her, and she was made to apologise and throw a press conference; 
it was a big deal. Facebook did not delete her account or comment. Their response claimed that 
they don’t go against the standard of Facebook, which follow the American law. Another 
example, you put a picture, someone reports it, if it has nudity for example, the European law 
accepts that, but the pictures is deleted and maybe the account get deleted because of the 
American law… So, all of it are going back to the American law, and not the national law or the 
European Union or GCC. You know what I mean… So, it is not controllable because one is 
controlling all the communication  
Nagham: It may dictate the laws of the platform, but the platforms can do their own things. 
Congress is talking about the possibility of breaking up Facebook. Twitter for example has a 
different stance on the issues you mentioned. Extremists recruit on both. However, the 
European Union have a big influence on Facebook, concerning data and sharing content, they 
were able to influence a lot of how Facebook geographically handles, particularly Facebook, 
handles our accounts. In Counter-narratives, the EU is dismantling accounts from social media 
and countering narratives: so, if you are going to these accounts, they intercept your traffic and 
redirect to counter-narratives. The problem with the counter-narratives is its content is not 
appealing  
Sanaa: Yeah that is a problem 
Nagham: so, you have an animated video of a talking head telling you stuff 
Sanaa: Exactly, it is not attractive  
Toni: It is not done by geniuses not just with media expertise but marketing and sales 
Sanaa: marketing neuromarketing… AR, the algorithms available to serve social media, the 
mainstream are not to be reckoned with, it’s true 
Toni: You let a humanitarian organisation speaks with emotionality and poetry, which doesn’t 
work, it doesn’t communicate  
Nagham: They don’t do that. In all fairness to them, they don’t do that. They have people. They 
are talking about Jihad and going to Syria but not targeting the underlying problem. Let’s be 




Nagham: This is the content that they are practically giving to them: Jihad, war, Syria, migration, 
Democracy…. 
Toni: They don’t dare discuss the subjects as it should be discussed. They have to consider every 
word; they overthink every word, so they won’t be accused of extremism or racism. They avoid 
addressing certain causes because of fear. They made laws that are working against them now. 
They made laws in Europe or elsewhere that prevents them from speaking freely. 
Sanaa: We are getting to a point where the politically correct is becoming too restrictive. 
Correct? This is what you mean? 
Toni: yes 
Sanaa: There was a question Nagham asked concerning mainstream media, how can we control 
incitement to extremism, correct? 
Nagham: yes 
Sanaa: Yes. I think one of the main problems in the mainstream media if we are talking about 
the Arab World media, it’s a media that does not respect the minimum ethical requirement that 
has to be respected from a journalistic perspective. You have people who make statements, you 
have an introduction for the news: a statement with a political concept and an opinion. This is 
not how it’s supposed to be, honestly. Plus, we have another problem in the mainstream media 
news, which is news reporting that is focused too much on politics, focused so much on 
problems, refugees, rape, theft, devastation, poverty. It is always focused on that and there is 
nowhere we are offering people a real positive content, like what’s done in European media. 
When you watch the French news bulletin, for example, you have the bomb, the theft but you 
still have the man in a remote village somewhere who is making something: organic cattle food 
and making profit. You’ll have stories of how people are surviving COVID. Let’s take COVID, not 
a political topic, in Lebanon or the Arab world how they cover it, people in hospitals dying in the 
ICU, everything is negative. Other places they focus on family reunions due to COVID and how 
they are reconnecting. There is no balance. It is all targeted to a specific place. And it is very 
very… I understand that all media have agendas, there is no media with no agenda, except very 
few, like BBC maybe and it is now under attack. No? 
Nagham: BBC is a big issue on its own, yes there is that 
Sanaa: Yes, there is loads of problems surrounding it. There is a code of conduct that needs to 
be followed. All media have agendas, but there is a minimum of reputation preservation. That 
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is something that, in the Arab world specifically, is not respected. Even CNN can provoke with 
or against Trump, ok. Correct? 
Nagham: Yes, Trump was a special case there 
Sanaa: Exactly, in a certain way. But it is not similar like for example Al-Arabia declares war on 
Qatar. This is the problem. There are no boundaries. The agenda is crystal clear there is 
subtilties. This drive and incites extremism in people. There is no media that is presenting 
material for thinking. You either like Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabia, either one is your source, and none 
is giving you the other side’s story.  
Nagham: It is very interesting point you are raising. You made me think of a study that looked 
on those who resisted recruitment. Those have a way to express their identity and had a positive 
outlook on how to be active on the ground. So, to your point, all the information they’re getting 
is blocking them from having any positive outlook or any hope… 
Sanaa: correct 
Nagham: it is a very interesting point  
Sanaa: yes, exactly. I always bring this up. There’s a problem. We like to highlight the bad side 
of things. This is how we conceive journalism here, and content. You have 2 types of content 
from the Arab world, if this is what we are talking about, correct? 
Nagham: Yes, yes 
Sanaa: You have the complete drama or the super shallow. But you don’t have this content that 
is targeting people who want something constructive and entertaining. It is either you watch 
and get depressed and to counter them what do you have: this is the example of social media 
or Joelle Mardinian or Hoda Beauty. These are the examples. Either destitute refugees or all-day 
long makeup sessions. Where are the remaining people? Where are the daily lives of normal 
people? It doesn’t exist in our media. This is my point of view, I don’t know. What do you think? 
Nagham: It’s very interesting, Toni did you want to add something? 
Toni: yeah, I wanted to say that we are now referring to the media in the Middle East. I know, 
the media’s role is… This comes culturally by default with every negative news, let’s say 
something happen aside a bomb, an earthquake is followed by something positive to neutralise 
it, just for the public opinion to avoid a mass panic simply… 
Sanaa: True 
 162 
Toni:.. in a way it will affect, it won’t cause a war, but it will have an effect on the community 
Sanaa: true 
Toni: but the thing in my opinion that can neutralise or incite or do whatever are a handful of 
media globally because they can mobilise public opinion not just locally, globally. I don’t think... 
ok there are people who won’t watch CNN because they don’t speak English but it’s not about 
Al-Arabia or LBC or MBC in my opinion. You need to target those who have control on the world 
stage, the media that are controlling the world: CNN, Sky, BBC. I wouldn’t even say LCI or TF1 or 
Canal+ from a news perspective, they are barely watched by the French citizens 
Sanaa: True 
Toni: So, in my opinion, you need to target the giants, are they targetable? Or do they need to 
finance something like Al-Jazeera English that terrorised Israel and they requested from their 
congress to open a news channel on its level. Someone who can make a difference when it is 
not expected from him. So can we fight or get to these media to change their politics or their 
agenda, or their way or communication? Or in my opinion you need to create a media on their 
level and maybe bigger if it has a leg to stand on, because obviously it will come under fire. 
Sanaa: umm 
Nagham: no please you go ahead 
Sanaa: no please, I am just thinking 
Nagham: if you have a point to add because I am going go towards local… 
Sanaa: I am not totally aligned with Toni on this point to target international organisations, I 
think we need to work more on the local content. There is a problem, when we are talking about 
the Middle East, we may be talking Lebanon or GCC, there is an interesting market that are 
tackling extremism which is Egypt. It is an interesting Market to study also, I don’t know Nagham 
if you are… 
Nagham: Egypt is my case study  
Sanaa: Exactly. Egypt is very interesting. They decided to fight extremism, extremism between 
quotation marks: it’s the influence of the Brotherhood. But I am not sure how smart this is. Their 
way is to control all media and make a specific type of content, even series and advertising is 
controlled; everything is one sided. This is something that is quite interesting and dangerous, 
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honestly. But for them, the best way to tackle extremism is to mute their voices completely. And 
this is why they go on alternative channels. So, we circle back to social media. 
Nagham: And now people are bored and locked with COVID, so they are seeking them out 
Sanaa: Exactly. So, I don’t think we can talk about redirecting content without talking about 
social media. Even for me as a TV producer mainly, I produce a lot of online content. I am more 
interested in platforms; I am more interest in YouTube and online content. The thing is, I as a 
media consumer or audience, I don’t follow a lot TV as much as I follow the social media accounts 
of the mainstream channels. 
Nagham: same here, I get my news from Twitter from mainstream sources. Let me tell you now, 
what I did in this research and get your feedback. I think there need to be a cultural intervention 
and this is where we have to go local. Egypt as you mentioned, is my case study 
Sanaa: oh great, amazing  
Nagham: because of the obvious, their productions, al-Azhar, the Brotherhood was born there, 
and we can agree or disagree that this organisation sets the basic concept from which extremism 
organisations was based on  
Sanaa: correct 
Nagham: interesting that for us who lives in countries where they have presence, we agree 
instantly on their role  
Sanaa: yes 
Toni: can I add something before you go on Nagham because it is a little-known info. The 
brethren took the rule in Egypt and then there was a coup against them. Since then, they were 
deported, or subjected to capital punishment, or ran away. They can gain a refugee status in 
Holland, because they are considered a persecuted minority. I am not sure if the Dutch 
government is aware, I don’t think so. Personally, I am not sure about the risk I am taking but I 
am spreading this news at least in the gay community, they are shocked as in to how…. They 
organised a petition as in to how this is permitted? They thought, it is a Muslim named 
Mohamed who fled because he changed his religion or became an atheist, they weren’t aware 
that these people are coming in as minority with their ideology after they were destroyed in 
their country because they were drifting to an extreme. In any case, Egypt is a different culture 
and it is not a step too far from them in my opinion, maybe there are minorities who are atheists 
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or open minded. To me, there is no difference between someone who has an elaborate reaction 
to someone’s nudity even if he’s a believer, to me he is an extremist.  
Sanaa: You are extremist in your vision of extremism (laughs) 
Nagham: Sayid el-Qemani, an Egyptian scholar is very close to you in that. He sees everybody 
who wants to apply, the Quran, I think this is a direct quote, as an extremist since committing 
an extremist act becomes a matter of opportunity. It is the whole worldview that needs to be 
challenged. By the way, the ICCT-the Hague has plenty of studies that claims that political Islam 
is the antechambers of extremism if you are interested in some Dutch resources.  
Sanaa: I am interested too 
Nagham: I actually used this paper to make the point that we need to address a worldview… 
well, back to choosing Egypt. Egyptian films helped shaped the perception of early Islam. They 
are repeated on every holiday… 
Sanaa: yes, true  
Nagham: we can add to that the critics who came out from Egypt, and the private sector like el-
Kahira wal Nass who produced Islam el-Behiri. We can agree or disagree with him… 
Sanaa: yes true  
[flow of conversation interrupted by the Zoom announcement] 
Nagham: I had in my textual review of Islam el-Behiri, Sayid el-Qemani and unfortunately an 
apologist show, Daring Question, because you know, there are not a lot of choices for 
programmes tackling these issues. I think Al-Hayat channel anyway is producing Hamed Abdel-
Samad and Mohamed el-Messayeh. All of the above can be simmered down to 3 big themes: 
Historical narrative, women status and minorities rights. Yesterday when I talked to Nabil, he 
confirmed that women and minorities are absent from MBC content and we all know the huge 
audience share of MBC 
Toni: yes 
Sanaa: correct 
Nagham: how does that sound to you? How do these 3 themes sound to you from a content 
perspective, we are not just talking about documentaries, it’s TV drama, cinema, talk show…we 
are discussing a wholesome media strategy. How do you think that might translate…. 
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Toni: I might know the reason, or I have an idea I have no… 
Sanaa: yes? what is the reason?  
Toni: To me, in Dubai the media or MBC is handled by Lebanese. It’s true that its PDG is  
Sanaa: Foreign, he is French now 
Toni: Israeli, I thought… Issam Bernadgi left? 
Sanaa: yes, he did 
Toni: this is the façade because in Dubai’s top management there is always an Australian, 
American or British, no one else 
Sanaa: that’s true 
Toni: I think that 95% of MBC is run by Lebanese as in content and producers who make that 
content. I am not saying it is their fault, but what is their background? Where is the Lebanese 
media? Did anybody teach them? Did they grow up on different values? No. I think it’s cultural. 
They claim it’s a mafia. That the Lebanese mafia is in charge of advertising and the media. yes, 
it’s true but not as a mafia as a business. But yeah, there’s no one else in charge, there’s a need 
of someone in charge who has the right background and knowledge.  
Sanaa: I think there’s change coming. This change might be caused by Netflix and its introduction 
to the Arab world. Since I am a producer, I am pitching to broadcasters and platforms and so on. 
There is one recurrent word when new content is requested in the Arab World, and that is 
Netflixable  
Nagham & Toni: yeah  
Sanaa: which is good from my perspective. Because there is a lot of things, we used to present 
without anyone hearing about it. However today, there’s a new generation of directors and 
content creators who are daring to think about new ideas, before them no one dared to think 
about. Plus, the fact today, that Netflix is offering an opportunity to all talents worldwide, so 
there’s more pressure on Arab media or Arab platform to produce competitive content step by 
step with the new generation. This is one issue. Concerning women content, it’s true there’s not 
a lot of women content in the Arab world. And if it is available, it’s always in a way… that I as 
[draw quotation marks] an empowered woman doesn’t speak to me. 
Toni: You empowered yourself (laughs) 
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Sanaa (laughing): yes, I empowered myself exactly 
Nagham (laughing): the only way for empowerment  
Sanaa: True 
Toni: I was talking to Hammoudi the other day, if you watch Suits? It’s a bit as if they are over-
empowering women in there 
Sanaa: True, true, yeah 
Toni: At a certain point, even to me as a gay guy, if you empower women even if it doesn’t 
concern me, it gives me hope that there’s a mindset that is shifting and it is going to help me in 
some way 
Sanaa: True 
Toni: But I saw it as too much, I saw it as over-empowering and I thought it may be a wave that 
needs to come by and go; to help pass from an extreme to another before coming back to the 
centre. You want to change public opinion you need this hammering, so I think this is what is 
lacking, maybe Suits …. {overlapping conversation) 
Sanaa: yes, this is what is lacking… Suits… We don’t have to go to that extreme. Because there 
are empowered women who are there and they are not like that representation, not to the 
extent of: a slightly masculine figure with an androgynous type of femininity. Ok, this is a 
personal opinion, I don’t feel the need as an empowered woman to dress in a suit and shirt and 
talk like a man to be able to do what I want. But I am talking as content in the Arab world how 
do we see women empowerment, when they decide to do something it. Always, the 
representation in series and drama, a successful woman is a woman who suffered beforehand 
and succeeded as a show of hand to the catastrophe she endured. No, it is not necessary. I can 
be a normal woman… 
Toni: exactly 
Sanaa: and I am living my life, I have a boyfriend, or I have a husband, or a family and I am smart, 
I am doing well. No, it is always a woman who is coming to take revenge and became strong 
despite the society. She is coming to achieve… coming with repressed anger, this is one. Or when 
we want to try to represent women empowerment in social programming, what do they bring 
you? In Egypt, they bring you this woman who opened a chariot of liver and started making 
sandwiches to support her children 
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Toni (laughing and shaking his head affirmatively): yeah  
Sanaa: The woman who changes the car tyre. I will give you an example Nagham, I have a series 
for Sadim, which is a Qatari platform financed by Al-Jazeera. They wanted 2 series for women 
empowerment. For one of them, they got me a fun woman, a new talent, she is veiled and 
young. She is supposed to go and meet women who made it in Egyptian society. When I request 
suggestions from my research team in Egypt, what did they send me? The carpenter who helped 
her husband in his business and became a carpenter herself; the one who opened a liver cart 
and so on. I said there isn’t a woman, I mean I want a normal woman, I want painters, a 
caricature illustrator, a woman who opened a normal business. It was a struggle to tell the 
research team working in mainstream media in Egypt, to find us positive example that 
succeeded without tragedies. We found those, and it was interesting. As a producer, I was 
interested to see that there’s a 28 years old girl who needed a medication that she couldn’t find 
so she developed an application with her friends; it is working well in Egypt and she is selling it 
to Netherland and Finland. You know? We found them but finding them is not the first reflex in 
media in general.  
Toni: yes 
Sanaa: I am talking as women empowerment 
Nagham: no, you are absolutely right, I was talking to Nabil yesterday about this, I don’t want to 
sound… or maybe I do you can challenge that 
Sanaa: (laughs) yeah 
Nagham: There’s a lack of cultural policy in all governments. You mentioned Egypt had one 
regarding extremism. By the way, the persecution of Brotherhood happened twice, once under 
Abdel-Nasser and another under Sisi, both are dictatorships.  
Sanaa: yeah 
Nagham: When Abdel-Nasser persecuted them. Due to his torture in jails, they fled to Saudi 
Arabia and acquired some Saudi funding, went to Saudi Arabia and acquired some funds, not 
necessarily a government funding. Once they went back they changed the social fabric of Egypt 
to what we see today. 
Sanaa: in Egypt? 
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Nagham: yes, Leila Ahmed talks about that about how this money that came from Saudi Arabia 
lead to the Islamisation of the social fabric in Egypt. This is when you have more veiled that is 
seen more frequently in the late 80s. If you look at the 70s not just in Iran, in Egypt… [The call 
was interrupted] 
This is what underpins my media strategy -or if you prefer the thematic content suggestions- on 
how we can challenge this worldview and influence the social fabric to stop the recruitment and 
have our lives be better. I am just giving a little context. But what I am trying to say, for 
empowered women to exist and to have more of them, there is no obvious path. It either you 
have to be from a certain middle to upper class background to have this digital marketing 
background in order to have this opportunity; or to be on the very poor side where women can 
work the menial jobs that certain men don’t want to.. 
Sanaa: True 
Nagham: It’s maybe dismissed as a typical feminist thing to say, there are this and that but there 
is this middle... 
Sanaa: gap 
Nagham: yes, there’s a middle gap 
Toni: yes 
Sanaa: you know there is one thing, I am not sure you probably know better in your research. 
At a certain point, in the days of Mubarak, Susan Mubarak worked a little bit on empowerment. 
Contrary to popular belief, they worked a little bit on a raising awareness targeting women in 
the remote and poor areas. It was a big challenge, to start with in the time.  Back then, they 
attempted empowering them to stop the circumcision 
Nagham: yes 
Sanaa: we are talking about Egypt. They started…. Susan Mubarak worked on that in a way or 
another. The current first lady, the Sisi lady is not working on this at all. There is nothing of the 
sort. The only thing they are working on is to mute the Brotherhood and to promote everything 
economy and industrial: new Cairo the new capital and the sorts. The media discourse is focused 
on these topics, there’s nothing else, I think. When women empowerment is concerned, I think 
UAE has a very interesting development in this subject in the late years till now.  
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Toni: regardless, sorry between brackets, regardless if it is all about the image; it’s all because it 
is a marketing and business driven country. But it can change a mindset because the people, the 
Emiratis, are a minority who want to differentiate themselves from other GCC states and the 
whole area 
Sanaa: correct 
Toni: you can tell. It started in Dubai where the hub started despite that Sharjah was the first 
hub; but Sharjah is something else. You can tell after 20 years, how the Emiratis from and living 
in Dubai have a different attire, walk and communication from the rest of the country. They 
learned, they did learn and it’s spreading. Ras el-Khayma no one talks about, it’s all about Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi, I know that. 
Sanaa: yeah, yeah. They are half the country anyway even from a population concentration 
perspective, demography I mean 
Toni: so, the marketing approach they used was beneficial to the mass. When we used to go out 
with Jad’s brother in law, his friends who joined us with their wives: the Emiratis with Emirati 
roots not those married from abroad. They sat outside in a restaurant with us, a very common 
one, it’s not about luxury, and in public the women had no veil they were showing their hair, 
and no Kuwaiti makeup or whatever they called it, because there is confidence. The tar7a is for 
them not even tradition 
Sanaa: Folklore 
Toni: Yeah. It has nothing, it never had anything religious in my opinion sine it is not their 
costume. But there is a contribution from the government that changed the cultural perception 
of the country’s citizens. This I experienced and I saw when I was living there.  
(Talking overlaps) 
Sanaa: The UAE example is very obvious, it is shocking. How much women are different like you 
said? Today, I deal with Emirati women. 10 years ago they were very different, it’s a different 
approach; everything is different, they are scary. I prefer to deal with Emirati men over women 
because they are sharks, they are strong to this degree, strong and empowered they are 
confident in themselves and what they want. It started as you said as a marketing strategy, but 
it is supported by governmental decisions. You have a certain women quota in governmental 
positions, and it paid. I don’t know Nagham what do you think?  
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Nagham: I am not claiming that my media strategy is a replacement to a cultural policy. What I 
am saying a cultural policy needs to start from here. I’ve done your work cause your government 
hasn’t done it. That’s it 
Sanaa: Exactly, it’s interesting but it boils down to how we can convince governments. We can’t 
convince governments, so we have to find alternatives. 
Nagham: we have to find alternatives, yes  
Sanaa: do you think. This alternative, do you think I am asking you if today NGOs were to be 
created in the Arab world they can find funding? Of course, there has to be a political reason, 
let’s not fool ourselves, to be able to get funds from abroad to create this sort of content. 
Nagham: this is what I am arguing for my funding bit.  
Sanaa: ok interesting  
Nagham: in the end all this boil down to national identity. How do we define ourselves and how 
do you define your identity? We have a problem, precisely in how to define and do we perceive 
our identity. The transnational concepts of Arabism, Islamism as in the same borders 
approximatively vs. the localism of the minorities and the fundamentalism that is present in the 
minorities’ discourse. We can debate however if they can give a local identity or certain 
difference between this country and another. From that angle, since there is lack of funding 
schemes, I am arguing that we need engaged scholarship: you know these universities that have 
film schools and can produce films, maybe they can be lobbed to produce this sort of content 
and hopefully it will trickle down to mainstream media. Hopefully, lobbying government to 
create cultural policies and allocate funds either in locally or abroad. Because if we change the 
representation and we have minorities that can identify…Take the Copts as an example how 
present they are in the public space. 
Sanaa: That’s true, they are inexistent  
Nagham: I made a video on how Copts view their own image. It was an eye opener 
Toni: please share 
Sanaa: Really, that’s interesting  
Nagham: I’ve emailed the founder of Coptic nationalism, to ask him about how do they cross 
themselves, because its representation seemed odd to me. The Coptic woman is a 
fundamentalist woman doesn’t drink beer, her clothes are buttoned up with no veil, she doesn’t 
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watch TV, so he goes to his friends’ house, the socialist Muslims, the moderate ones to watch 
news or football 
Sanaa: yes, the socialists  
Nagham: yes, when socialism was nice (laughs). He wrote back responding to my question and 
adding Muslims tend to project their own problems on Christianity so if extremism exists in 
Christianity then it is not a problem in Islam. Ok, so he is in the states, he may be able to talk 
freely but what about the….  
Toni: I didn’t understand. The Copts are masochistic in all their behavioural trend. I am not sure 
if I get this right, are they blaming themselves? 
Nagham: no, he’s not blaming himself. He is pointing out a ….. [interview interrupted]  
He is claiming that Islamists project Islam’s problems on Christianity to avoid addressing the 
issues. Same as Majdi Khalil who is frequently interviewed even on Al-Jazeera and he also has a 
similar angle. 
Sanaa: ok 
Nagham: so, we have another problem to address, angry minorities  
Sanaa: True 
Nagham: who cannot find a direction to act on. They are angry with everybody. There is a 
narrative in minorities as well as the mainstream Islamic narrative, that there are people who 
came in and colonised, enslaved, raped their ancestor and replaced them. It is similar to the 
narrative of the Native American narrative yet the parallel is not very developed. And on the 
other side, the Christian discourse from Copts, orthodox in all the Levantine Churches who are 
still upset that the West have adopted their religion and ruined it. The discourse is not 
developing, nor we are looking to the underlying causes of resentment 
Sanaa: There is an identity problem in minorities particularly the Christians. You can understand 
to a certain extent how difficult it is for the mainstream media to tackle them, outside the cliché.  
Nagham: they are stereotypical in their representation. Egyptian films either portray them as 
the fundamentalist Copt 
Sanaa: correct 
Nagham: or the Coptic thief who is stealing  
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Sanaa: (laughs) that’s true  
Nagham: And of course, there are Ossama’s films that I looked at: Janat el-Chayatin and Bahib 
Issima 
Toni: (smiling) Bahib Issima nice no? 
Nagham: yes, his movies are among if not the best Egyptian movies in my opinion 
Sanaa: True 
Nagham: The Coptic Church waged a war on Bahib Issima 
Toni: of course, they will, any Church would have 
Nagham: it didn’t speak to them. Apparently, it is not a hell perception that they have 
Sanaa: I am going to speak outside the media, as someone who lived in Egypt who knows the 
social fabric and I love Egypt. Concerning the Copts, I walk in a street, you know Shobra and 
those areas are divided, there are mixed areas, if I see a non-veiled woman in the street of Egypt 
I can immediately recognise if she is a Copt or not.  From the way she looks. The Coptic woman 
is non-veiled in appearance only, but she has a veiled mentality. Her posture, her dress code, 
how she walks, and all gives you the feeling that it is a woman who is not wearing a veil, but you 
can see how conservative she is 
Nagham: yes 
Sanaa: from her looks, when a Muslim woman is not veiled, she is not veiled. She gives you the 
feeling that she is more liberated.  
Nagham: I understand that  
Toni: but this because they are a minority true? One of the reasons maybe 
Nagham: They abide by societal rule, Coptic women are circumcised in el-Sa3id 
Toni: yeah? 
Sanaa: correct. It’s not a Muslim by the way, it’s an African thing  
Nagham: absolutely. This is another misrepresentation in reporting about the issue. Raseef for 
instance, they covered the topic, they had a list of countries that included Lebanon and Syria 
and others claiming they eradicated the practice. Not sure there are cases in these countries 
Sanaa: exactly it was never present in these cultures 
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Nagham: it is recently introduced in Kurdistan  
Sanaa: Oh 
Nagham: and Syrian women who remained in the Caliphate apparently many of the have been 
subjugated to that. There is a Kurdish woman, I met in London who was doing a PhD thesis on 
the subject in the rural areas of Slaymaniyeh in Kurdistan, where extremism conservatism or 
whatever you want to call it have made this pop up again.  
Sanaa: No! really! 
Nagham: It is surprising in Kurdistan, considering their major political parties have an ideology 
that is constructed around empowered women and how Sumarian actually caused the decline 
of women status. 
Sanaa: True, that is correct  
Nagham: So, I am dividing the approach in tackling Islamism on two levels: the mainstream issue 
tackling the historical narrative; the second going more local on identity issues with women and 
minorities. Again, I am seeking your input on how that might work; how does that sound at first, 
how that might work and how can we support you funding wise? 
Sanaa: for me, if we want to create content tackling these issues, we have these problems we 
covered before which is how to tackle in an entertaining, nice way not in an informative kind of 
lecturing speech 
Nagham: yes absolutely  
Sanaa: it will be great to create or to produce a kind of series, that is really nice built around 
women, that has good production values, Netflixable (drawing quotation marks) that would 
make it appealing for Netflix, or Shahid. Working along these lines instead of doing what has 
always been done, which is not getting to the wider audience, which is we do very nice 
documentaries with scholars, with people thinking with too much information. At the end of the 
day, at home the audience member who puts on Netflix at home, if he does not belong to a 
certain intellectual class, he will not watch them. What do you think Toni? 
Toni: 100% agree. But I want to say something from my point of view concerning overdoing it. 
To me, women do not need empowering, they are already powerful. Doing something to 
empower them means someone is working to empower them when they have no power. For 
me content and media should not empower, it should normalise powerful women 
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Sanaa: yes, normalise powerful women  
Toni: expose them  
Nagham: that’s a great way of putting it 
Toni: Exactly, put them in a context that is normal. Yes, she is doing everything not as an iron 
woman or femme fatale. Not all women are femme fatale. Just normalise 
Sanaa: It can even a housewife that is very good, that is powerful. That’s normal. Even a 
housewife has her mark, she doesn’t need to be a CEO to have that  
Toni: We are all at home now. Anybody who has an impact on the world and the economy is at 
home now. It doesn’t matter if she is a head a company. For me, if you empower it is like a 
propaganda, and there will be a counter-propaganda. There are people who are going to react. 
So just normalise, so they can see and understand where we are at  
Sanaa: You know, this is quite weird, the ads that bombard me on Facebook, I always receive an 
ad for Masters in Women Leadership. And I am like why do I need a Masters in Women 
Leadership? It’s from a university. Why is there a need for such a specialisation? It pisses me off, 
it gets on my nerves. And why are you targeting me first of all? (laughs) why women leadership? 
It can just be leadership without the women 
Toni: Ok this is a mistake if they want to be very conscious of what they are doing they wouldn’t 
do that. But they are following a marketing plan 
Sanaa: Marketing yes 
Toni: they are following the market, and responding to how the market thinks, yes. But do we 
start with the market or do we start with them. I think both need work 
Nagham: unfortunately, a fight/war is not fought on one front. A coalition might be needed, and 
this is why we need engaged scholarship to push some representations instead to have it solely 
relying on mainstream media. Do you know Ordi Hallan, Fatin Hamama 
Sanaa: Yes Fatin Hamama 
Nagham: Fatin Hamama starred in a film where she was trying to divorce and failed. As a result, 
the law was changed 
Sanaa: exactly  
 175 
Nagham: so, this type pf content where you are representing struggle with an activism 
undertone is very needed on the local level 
Sanaa: exactly but it was done in a dramatic way, drama-film 
Nagham: voila 
Sanaa: a normal film without the talking head of women must… For example, in Lebanon if we 
make a nice movie, without an excess of drama, a nice entertaining film, about I don’t know a 
very nice working Shia woman and what she was put through by the Ma7kameh el-Ja3fariyeh. 
And how she struggles in her day to day life, we can even see her have a drink with her friends, 
and we see her working and maybe have a boyfriend other than her husband, I mean her 
boyfriend since she is divorced. While she is struggling with the court to take back custody of 
her son or daughter 
Nagham: or even to see them in some cases  
Sanaa: exactly, even to see them 
Nagham: Exactly. So, just to tell you are very helping in articulating the ideas, and it is very 
appreciated.  
Toni: I want to go back to something that Sanaa has said.  
Nagham: yes please. 
Toni: I was saying that we need to target giants or to create another giant. Sanaa said that all 
the content that is requested by the Dubai media needs to be Netflixable.  
Sanaa: yes yes this is the word right now, le mot-fétiche if you want 
Toni: Even-though in Dubai there were other providers on the same level of Netflix and 
international. 5 years before Netflix, STARZ started… STARZ, which was at the same level of 
Netflix, maybe not in reach, but as a quality of content. ICfix the first one started in the UAE was 
powered by Netflix. It had content from Netflix. The Netflix content was available on OSN. That 
was Netflix was late to enter the market because the right to the content was acquired by OSN. 
Netflix started with maybe 10% of its content till the contract of OSN expired then they 
requisitioned it  
Sanaa: True, true  
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Toni: There wasn’t any influence before Netflix entered the market because Netflix is the giant, 
not STARZ, nor ICFLIX nor OSN. That’s my point from the giants, Nagham 
Nagham: I do understand that. Netflix business model tells wall street that we are the masters 
of the market. They are now producing their own content in the Middle East, the series that was 
produced in Jordan,  
Toni: Yes, it was fun. It was the first time Jordan was seen from this perspective or you see 
something with paranormal narrative coming from the Middle East, produced there I mean. 
Nagham: yeah despite that the paranormal is very present in the Middle East. Honestly, 
Thousand and One Nights… 
Sanaa: correct 
Nagham: it is still present in our daily lives. Apparently in Egypt, people file police reports 
claiming that Jinn kidnapped or stole or whatever.  
Sanaa: that’s true 
Nagham: that shows the influence of the Hadiths and their impact on people  
Sanaa: true 
Nagham: just for comparison, the most watched counter-narrative for example has a couple 
thousands of views. A channel with a couple from the UK, I am comparing animated videos from 
the UK had around 4000 and this British couple went on YouTube live talking on the evil eye, 
they had 1million live views. Paranormal is very popular and very present in our daily lives  
Sanaa: yes, it is. Do you know this sheikh, they ask him for stuff, I forgot his name, he goes on 
an Egyptian TV channel do you know him Toni? 
Toni: I thought you were taking about the Lebanese one who gets call to make Khireh? 
Nagham: this is common everywhere 
Sanaa: no no  
Toni: no I don’t know him 
Sanaa: I will send you a link. He gets millions of views. He says stuffs that are really completely 
nonsense, like really completely nonsense. You see the huge amount of people who follow 
them. In the Arab world, you have people with capacity to follow  
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Toni: yes of course 
Sanaa: stuff that doesn’t make sense in an abnormal way as you said. 
Toni: yes, but I don’t think there’s much difference between them and those British, British 
Muslim right? You have it Nagham? 
Nagham: Pardon? 
Toni: There’s a British channel called British Muslim. They communicate in the exact same way 
that we see on these evangelical or Egyptian channels, or even Iraqi, there’s a lot of Iraqi 
channels, el-dawa3i da3iyat something  
Sanaa: Like Ikra2 etc… 
Toni: yes 
Nagham: It is the same technique  
Toni: on the street  
Nagham: understandable, when a worldview is solely based on scriptures and tradition, setting 
the Sufis aside, Shia and Sunni have similar worldview and similar talking points. The difference 
between Hezbollah’s and the Brotherhood’s vision is who rules us. There’s not much difference 
on the internal concept of the regime. An Iraqi sheikh, Iyad I forgot his family name, was talking 
about a Lebanese sheikh who puts the foundation of wilayat el-Faqih in al-Azhar. They are 
aligned on how to implement political Islam in our daily lives. I am not concerned with the route 
to heaven, but I am concerned with how these laws stemming from a certain political 
understanding does affect my life as a woman, maybe a minority member, as a straight or gay 
person.  
Sanaa: yes 
Toni: yes, but  
Sanaa: it is challenging but to be able to find the funds I think the politics will play a very big role 
in this 
Toni: are the funds you are planning for governmental funds; do they have to be governmental 
funds?  
Nagham: they can be anything. There is nothing binding about a PhD. If I said we need a cultural 
policy, or said to Les Fonds Sud, they are now integrated in the CNC you need to prioritise and 
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rethink how you fund certain types of content, or reconsider your spending rules since they 
require 50% of their grants of their money to be spent in France  
Sanaa: correct 
Nagham: if you reconsider that you might have a bigger impact on these particular issues. There 
are many ways with what’s available to increase impact. There are funding channels. Europe’s 
neighbours for example, they still funds campaigns, campaigns don’t really work  
Toni: they don’t, they don’t. I have a solution that is very basic and primitive. The way I see this 
from our conversation; a humble smart solution would be, whenever you propose content, keep 
the funds the same, the one that is coming to the production, it can be used instead of reaching 
out for another funds, we can start implementing or integrating some smart solutions or 
characters or protagonists in the content that you are sending, Sanaa, for the MBC or any other 
Arabic TV. So, you don’t go through the campaigning, the propaganda and the push back and 
get more attention to what you are doing.  
Sanaa: this is what I am saying, use the mainstream media indirectly  
Nagham: this is the heart of it… 
Sanaa: we create a nice content, this way we can pass on what is needed, we start pumping 
things and in counterparts… 
Toni: yes, create a new… 
Sanaa: yes true, get a big star. Today, instead of paying 500,000$ to produce, it’s a hypothetical, 
to produce 5 documentaries that might be viewed at the end by 100,000 persons 
Toni: nodding approvingly: yes 
Nagham: umm we still need both, ok! 
Sanaa: maybe I can pump 2.5 million$ on a series, good one with a star and we’re telling a nice 
story and we are passing the message behind it. Ipso facto there will be a campaign on this series 
because it has this mega star, dunno Nelly Karim or Minna Chalabi or whomever. This can pick, 
it can create an avalanche on social media and the message gets out faster for a wider audience. 
Nagham: Absolutely, that is… 
Sanaa: Because where are the funds are granted? They are granted for specific people. Tell me 
if I am wrong, the money is always given to Nadine Labaki 
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Nagham: True 
Sanaa: Nadine Labaki makes a very good movie, a very strong movie like Caphernahoum. 
Regardless, many people liked it others didn’t. I recognise the amount of work and effort put in 
the movie, but this movie didn’t touch me, this is personal. These movies are done for who? 
They are doing it for a European audience. Is it changing really anything really in the reality of 
the population? Is the big mass-public who is suffering were touched or felt that their voices are 
heard or even watched the movie? No 
Toni: these movies are being made because the producers are foreigners. They are seeking 
exotic topics that they can sell in their home countries and can be entered in a film festival. She 
is not even targeting her own mass-audience.  
Sanaa: this is why I mean. To be entered…. This is a problematic perception that we have from 
funds coming from Europe and America, it is Orientalism. These are Orientalists who are coming 
to speak of the Orient. But we want to change the things for us on our soil, we need people from 
the land, the (Orientaux) Orientals who are working with the lived reality, not the phantasm of 
the Orient 
Nagham: Orientalism is another issue to be reckoned with. To your point, I took issue with the 
book Lebanese cinema by Lina Khatib who considered that Lebanese cinema is a war cinema  
Sanaa: This is not true; this upset me. It bothers me a lot. Enough 
Nagham: I will send you the suggestions of the book on how Lebanese cinema can be funded. It 
may not sustain a dead cat. (laughs) 
Sanaa: True 
Nagham: anybody who drank a coffee on a film set can see it is a viable plan 
Sanaa: correct and this is the problem with Lebanese cinema, all of it is built on the idea of the 
war 
Nagham: absolutely, that was enable by Les Fonds Sud who supported films that corresponds to 
their depiction of the country and addressed to their own audience. You produced something 
Toni on the topic, Itchy Hummus? So did I in my graduation movie  
Toni: Yes 
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Sanaa: yes. I want to give you an example of a content that I consider very funny, a very simple 
Lebanese movie addressing the problem of a girl who wants to get married, the relationships, 
homosexuality, called Khabsa, did you watch it? 
Toni and Nagham: No 
Sanaa: Khabsa by Chadi Hanna, it’s kind of a dinner between a girl who wants to incite her 
boyfriend’s jealousy because she met the perfect man who turns out to be gay. But how she 
discovers him and the plot, is extremely funny. But you find that the gay character is funny and 
nice, and they touched on how much he is challenged socially. This poor gay guy who doesn’t 
like women, but he has to get married because he has to inherit and provide a successor. The 
girl is living for 4 years with her boyfriend, and he suddenly decided he doesn’t want to get 
married anymore and his parents gets involved. It’s so funny, really. It touches on social issues 
without the militarism  
Nagham: Thank you and without preaching  
Sanaa: exactly 
Toni: voila 
Nagham: and these never-ending monologues. Tell the story show don’t tell 
Sanaa: watch the film seriously you’ll enjoy it 
Toni: Netflix is releasing Lebanese movies… 
Sanaa: It’s on Netflix 
Toni: They don’t appear in Holland 
Nagham: you have to look for it 
Toni: there are some series I started in Dubai that I can’t find here, it’s really basic around here, 
maybe I will find it on Apple TV 
Sanaa: Khabsa is a thing  
Nagham: I stopped Netflix (laughs) 
Toni: There was a discussion, I know it is the trend and Sanaa you said something that we all 
believe, this was going to be the future but at some point we suffocated, we bought a box, it 
was cheap enough 80 euros and you top it up yearly, you have access to all the channels and 
you can’t imagine how sweet it is, we missed zapping… 
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Sanaa: I had a project a few years ago to create some kind of platform, a hybrid platform. I am 
looking for funds for it. It will contain VOD and you can open and access programming. You can 
either be catered or access video on demand, a hybrid one. I had this theory  
Nagham: like Hulu? 
Sanaa: yes, something like Hulu, I have the theory. We have CDs and there’s anghami but I still 
like listening to the radio. There is a difference between playing the song you like and stumbling 
on it when you are driving, it is a completely different feeling  
Toni: yes 
Sanaa: the same thing. You go to a restaurant and you order a la carte but sometimes you enjoy 
the set menu 
Toni: yes 
Sanaa: think for me and give me the food  
Nagham: this is a why we check our tv channels before going to Netflix and browse for hours 
without watching 
Sanaa: correct 
Toni: What they managed to do, I know about this because I worked in a company that was 
producing this kind of technology, Celevision 
Sanaa: I remember 
Toni: we were the ones who built the platform for Elife Etisalat that was the first in the region 
or in the UAE, that is providing content with its own box. It did not work the same way Netflix 
worked, Apple TV didn’t make it in the region except with a few gay people, it was Netflix   
Sanaa: correct  
Toni: I wanted to say something, damn I forgot 
Sanaa: Celevision 
Toni: yes, the hybrid platforms, other that Hulu and what you talked about Sanaa, there was a 
time when we participated with something called HBBTV, hybrid, broadcast, broadband TV 
which goes on satellite and you merge it with the internet, so it’s a satellite but it’s called hybrid 
because the internet is combined with the Satellite. So, when you watch, you get to watch your 
 182 
media but at the same time you click on the remote control and you buy the tie that the actor 
is wearing. You participate in quizzes. They aimed, to combat VOD to do this 
Sanaa: to do something interactive 
Toni: it was overwhelming, because it is not what people want. Imagine, you are opening an 
important article, and you pay for access, you get pop ups from Google, because Google is on 
top, its laws is on top of any laws of any website. We were being harassed; this is harassment…. 
Sanaa: we are solicited to the pointed that we don’t want it anymore  
Toni: voila, so if you want to communicate you, you need to choose a platform that doesn’t 
harass. That’s one other thing  
Sanaa: that’s interesting. So, if there are funds to be allocated for this sort of thing, it needs to 
reconsider granting its support for a content that is popular, “grande surface” if you want 
Toni: voila 
Nagham: absolutely that answers local needs and how they consume 
Toni: underground and alternative is a minority, they can’t change the society 
Sanaa: yes 
Toni: from my perspective, I give you money Sanaa to produce whatever you are producing and 
to integrate not even in a subliminal way, but you integrate the characters and the culture 
within. Me, I know that the world is digital, and the influencers are more important that 
celebrities, so I go to influencers and I say look highlight what’s in this show, make a big thing 
out of it 
Sanaa: you know, I don’t know if you know or follow her Ashia.  
Toni: No 
Sanaa: Ashia is quite a big influencer in Kuwait. She’s a American-Kuwaiti. Ashia is a very 
interesting personality. She is an Americanised Kuwaiti, she was veiled. A year, a year and a half 
ago, all of a sudden she took off her veil… Hello….. (problem with earphones) 
Sanaa: so, she unveiled, and she became a curls’ ambassador in the Arab world, her hair is that… 
Anyway, she launched a campaign last week. She was circulating with her hair or something and 
a car followed her in Kuwait. She did a campaign on harassment in Kuwait and how women are 
harassed, she did it, from her own stories and created did a big buzz in this issue, like huge 
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Toni: yes 
Nagham: yes, that’s how you do campaigns 
Sanaa: and stories like the girl of Fermont you know about it? 
Nagham: no 
Sanaa: In Egypt, a story broke early summer called Fatat el Fermont. It’s a girl who was partying 
with her friends in Fermont Nile City, obviously, she got raped 
Toni: gang raped 
Sanaa: yes, and she had the guts to call out the people who raped her. There was a big avalanche 
around her in Egypt on social media. Mainstream media had to address the topic eventually. 
The police were forced to capture the kids of very important people in Egypt due to the big 
campaign and laws were made regarding harassment and rape and the length of the sentence. 
They modified their laws due to this campaign. It started by her speaking out, and women 
started following her. She is from the Khodir family, I think Canada granted her a refugee status 
for psychological reasons 
Toni: the gay community helped a lot in this 
Sanaa: yes, the gay community did help in this, definitely 
Nagham: well digitally how can you get anywhere without gay community being engaged 
Sanaa: especially in media let’s be honest, the gay community has a very big influence on media 
worldwide 
Nagham: being gay needs to be normalised in representation too. We talk about democracy, yet 
rights of equal citizens and representation is inexistent 
Sanaa: You know UAE is making big moves in this topic. You know UAE will be hosting one the 
biggest conferences about the sexual identity in the world  
Toni: I know for a fact that, not regardless, there was gay clubs in Dubai, official gay clubs, one 
of the best. They know there is a gay community, but they are benefiting from them. They were 
the ones changing their furniture every year or 6 months 
Sanaa: true 
Toni: they created parties that became international and attracted visitors, take the wonderland 
or the wasteland as an example. It doesn’t have drugs like in Europe; this was all done by the 
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gay community. But it’s not all about that. In UAE and Dubai specifically, Ramadan barely exists, 
they open restaurant, it’s very commercial  
Sanaa: cohabitation is not forbidden anymore, it’s legal now in UAE 
Toni: yes, you don’t find the restaurants covered up anymore  
Nagham: Dubai or all over the country? 
Toni: Not in Sharjah I am sure 
Sanaa: I think it’s all over the country, but mainly Abu Dhabi and Dubai. It is no longer a problem 
for 2 non-Emiratis to live together if they are not married. Before, it was happening, but it was 
illegal.  
Toni: it was legalised 
Sanaa: if they decided to pick on you, they can jail you for it. It may have not happened, but it 
was possible. This is no longer the case  
Nagham: It will be interesting to see how this will pan out. When it comes to gay rights, there’s 
the bulldog approach. The extremists threaten then mainstream institutions steps in to prevent 
the bloodshed, the examples are many take the Beirut Gay Pride, El-Olama el-Mosslimin 
threatened the organisers and Dar el-Fatwa implored the authorities to stop the conference. So, 
they pitch themselves as the moderate ones 
Sanaa: correct 
Nagham: they never condemned those who threatened violence. It will be interesting to see if 
a bulldog will manifest in time for the Dubai conference  
Sanaa: There are no bulldogs left in Dubai anymore Nagham. With the last agreement, I think 
that’s done 
Toni: Do you remember something Nagham? We talked about once. When a police state or a 
modern dictatorship, it’s a dictatorship, I agree, but Nagham if Dubai wasn’t like that, it wouldn’t 
be able to cancel the laws that many would’ve lobbied to make it more extremist. The modern 
dictatorship was necessary. You can’t implement a Norwegian law in The Emirates because they 
wouldn’t be able to cancel the extremism of Ramadan, or the extremism that the GCC countries 
are is ruled by, they are ruled by Saudi Arabia and not UAE. So, they needed this modern 
dictatorship to get to somewhere else. For me, it was the right way to do it. There are some 
people who cannot be ruled by a democracy, full stop. 
 185 
Sanaa: I agree, I am not for democratising democracy (laughs)  
Nagham: this what scares me. You are not the only ones anyway, it’s part of the Coptic 
nationalism who claims to stop Islamisation you need a dictatorship. This our tragedy, we are 
on a pendulum that goes from the mosque to the armed forces.   
Sanaa: correct 
Nagham: it is a challenge; in a real democracy you cannot mute Islamists but how do you protect 
yourself? 
Sanaa: Correct 
Nagham: I understand your stance. A real democracy is needed to protect everybody but how 
can you eradicate this worldview without a cultural policy and allowing true representation  
Sanaa: there is something very fundamental is Islam, it’s the religion of the state 
Nagham: yes absolutely, this is how it’s pitched 
Sanaa: it’s a very, I won’t say impossible but it’s a very long process. As long as people are not 
comfortable, financially specially, enlightenment is not really possible 
Nagham: I am not quite sure that is so impossible. Islamist parties are built as opposition parties, 
so their ceiling is always high without having any governing strategy. The governments are not 
offering proper representation. So yes, with no actual governmental plan to eradicate the 
problems, no democracy, no representation or no cultural policies it may take us a long time. 
With all of the above, it may be what 10-15 years, a couple of decades 
Sanaa: correct, but we need to start somewhere, I understand 
Nagham: absolutely, we need to start somewhere. There is a way to dissociate the idea of 
religion and state. Yes, the political discourse is a tragedy since these political parties twisted 
definitions to what suits them particularly secularity. Media helped anchoring identity as 
regional instead of a relationship to the land, and this regional media that collected regional 
content without creating cultural exchange 
Sanaa: Correct 
Nagham: Dubai as you were saying created this cultural exchange in a globalised city 
Toni: it created standards that weren’t available in the region  
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Nagham: It sounds to me, like this is very similar to the Baghdad of the Abasside Empire where 
diversity creates progress. Which is something we can focus on. People being together created 
a certain norm and a certain progress. I am digressing, I was trying to formulate and validate a 
plan. Religion and a state is coming from a retelling of a narrative that might be false, the 4 
Caliphs upon which it is based, I won’t say never existed, but there is no historical evidence of 
their existence. If a factual historical narrative was produced and put it out to the public on the 
one hand and on the other work on our local identity perception and how we can redefine it, 
does that make sense to you? 
Sanaa: yes, it does 
Toni: it does make a lot of sense Nagham. On the bright side, when I look at Dubai, again when 
I go to Dubai not by fanaticism, it is not money that made happen because Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar have more, plus in term of sustainability the UAE does not have resources that other GCC 
countries have, but there are logistics, they think, they plan. And they are not really democratic, 
their population or suppliers there is a fine line, there is planning and a strategy, something that 
does not exist in surrounding countries. So, it is not about money, you don’t need only money, 
we can make things happen 
Nagham: yes, you need a plan. I didn’t mean democracy as in implementing plans just to be 
clear. I meant by democracy representation and being able to talk about the issues of the 
country, one of which is political Islam if they have enough votes, they have to be represented  
Toni: Democracy when minorities have a voice. It is not the voting that is democracy, if I voted 
for MPs or a president that is another format, that is democracy? What is the difference 
between them and the ruler of UAE? It is not about politicians; it is about ideologies and 
implementations of of… 
Nagham: laws? 
Toni: exactly 
Sanaa: they have a vision actually 
Toni: Also, Saudi Arabia has a vision for 2030 
Sanaa: Do you know that UAE is now working on their vision 2071 
Nagham: that’s good 
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Sanaa: I’ve received a pitch. They are preparing courses for senior government employees. This 
is in preparation for their first millennium in 2071. It is something. They don’t have a past so 
they are focusing on their future (laughs) 
Toni: yes, it is a fact, they don’t have it, they can’t create it 
Sanaa: but they can create the future this is what they are doing. Maybe we can create 
something like she was saying. Going back to the funds, if there will be funds for a populist 
media, with indirect messaging it can create a change  
Nagham: Do you think they will be appetite, if we actually said to producers you can actually 
help by doing this this and this in your content development… 
Sanaa: yes 
Nagham: you think they can be lobbied 
Sanaa: yes yes I think we can. I do think, we can, yes. I know from myself as a producer, I pitch 
ideas that I believe are really nice and that people will love but the mentality of those running 
the media weren’t accepting it. The mentality has changed nowadays. Because today, who’s 
running the media, our generation. For a certain while we handled executions, now we, the 40s 
are running the media in the Arab world. There is a different mindset, there is a different 
approach and I am able to sense that with new directors, not just the Lebanese ones, Tunisians, 
Egyptians and even Khalijis. If that is supported… Look I am going to give you a simple example, 
a series that we may find cheesy or we don’t like anymore, but I love it, it is Sex and the City. 
When it was done early 2000s late 90s it was something. You have women talking about their 
sexual lives and their partners. It was shallow but it changed how women spoke about their 
sexuality in the US from 20 years till now. 
Toni: yes 
Nagham: and in the world, yes absolutely 
Sanaa: and in the world, exactly. I don’t think the previous generation view their sexuality or 
dared to speak about their sex lives in the same way as they did after Sex and the City. They 
created icons, beautiful, they wear Manollo Blani, Christian Dior and Hermes. At the end they 
are talking about subjects, the form is very beautiful, very nice and entertaining but it was about 
serious things. They made a social change. We need to create that kind of content in the Arab 
world.  
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Nagham: I completely agree yes absolutely 
Sanaa: in relation to extremism. Even, how do we film extremists in the Arab World or in Egypt. 
In the dress with the beard that he made reddish.  
Toni: yes (laughing) 
Sanaa: like Toni said, there are people with extremist’s mindset but looks modern. It is their 
thinking that is problematic. This is what’s happening. I don’t know if you are paying attention 
to these new Egyptian Da3iya,  
Nagham: yes 
Sanaa: like Ismail 
Toni: sexy, good looking, well dressed 
Sanaa: very trendy. One is called Karim Ismail 
Nagham: yes 
Sanaa: He is young and have a hyper hipster look. Messy hair, jeans hoodies, speaks great 
English, he has a burger restaurant. His discourse is worthless. I look at him, wow very nice, an 
influencer with millions of people following him, but his discourse is disastrous 
Nagham: yes, we always represented extremism as an imported problem. Levantines and North 
Africans pointed fingers at Saudi Arabia so the Da3iyeh always looks like the Muslim 
Brotherhood look who wear the watch in the right hand not the left 
Sanaa: yes 
Nagham: the visual you described. Europe sees it as general Muslim so here in the UK it is as a 
Pakistani import, Amsterdam and Belgium as Moroccan 
Toni: Moroccan and Turkish. Practically all the physical attacks that are happening are done by 
Moroccans and Turkish  
Nagham: the discourse shifted slightly to less violent in Canada per example. Oh Gosh, I really 
kept for a long time, 
Sanaa: no worries 
Nagham: I am sorry I kept it for more than  
Toni: no no I am happy with the discussion 
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Sanaa: no don’t worry, it is a very interesting discussion. It is very interesting what you are doing.  
Nagham: Thank you. Any last thoughts, anything you want to add 
Toni: As long as you keep targeting, in your project, the mainstream, because unfortunately the 
people who thinks about these issues in our area are either homosexuals or liberal women or 
hipsters unfortunately I hate that term, it is always underground and alternative and it is the 
minority who speaks about these issues. But I think we should make the mass-population more 
receptive to these ideas either subliminally or indirectly because the flag cannot be carried by 
this second group of people 
Sanaa: correct 
Toni: they are not a reference for the mass 
Nagham: absolutely, this is the whole point of the project, to push on mainstream media. 10 
opposing people won’t matter if you can mute them  
Toni and Sanaa: correct 
Nagham: so, we need to have these discussions on mainstream media, to be able to create the 
change needed in the cultural sphere using the dramatization of content is a necessity 
Sanaa: correct and this content need to be smooth, creative and mine de rien not militant. 
Militarism for me, even in politics. One of the main things in Lebanon I oppose the civil society, 
I don’t oppose you because what you are saying is incorrect, you are correct, but you are unable 
to engage emotionally the masses. So, we have to produce more creatively and less militarism 
Toni: Like the series of Elie Maalouf 
Sanaa: yah what an example 
Toni: they might be silly or even stupid, but this is what is consumed by the population. This is 
the level of the series that gets to the masses, they love it and it touches them. Simply 
Nagham: I don’t know about that, the population are consuming American series of high 
standard as well 
Toni: that’s true 
Sanaa: I think they are producing content with the money they have. If you have more money 
to produce better content for the mass, they’ll take it. If you have enough to buy charity clothes 
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you will buy charity clothes. But if I came and told I am offering you something nice, I am offering 
you a Dior dress, you will wear it 
Toni: I know that, but what scares me that we as people from the media industry, concerned 
with the art and the quality, we have 2 things to fight, to do, we always tried to do to be creative 
and deliver a message. The 2 cannot be done simultaneously, you cannot create a very creative 
and inspirational because it will immediately be directly to the hipsters or to a certain fringe  
Sanaa: not necessarily. This is the challenge in the creative method that we haven’t reached yet. 
This is the real challenge, to find new creators, not Claudia Marchalian style, that are thinkers 
with a real varied cultural background not pretentious and can deliver nice product, and I am 
able to find them. I am starting to meet them, they are there. 
Nagham: what I am pitching Toni is that your story is the message. Your choice of story is the all 
the activism needed. It is not the one film that will change everything, we are brickmaking with 
these productions  
Toni: yeah 
Nagham: I will give an example, we can represent a subject living in an empire, like Abbasid, and 
that he was jailed because the Caliph got into one of his moods, it can bring home the idea of 
rights we have in the modern state. So your story and how you are delivering it is the message 
in itself and somebody else might build on it in the public debate. You can see where I am coming 
from? 
Toni: yes I get it 
Sanaa: yes 
Nagham: fantastic, many thanks  
Toni: Nagham, just so I know did you feel that we are answering your questions, or did we digress 
and got to other issues because we always tend to… 
Nagham: not at all that was very helpful, it was great validated and expanded the framework  
 





I received these screenshots from @Carl (2016) who asked me for a translation which he 
released on twitter. The following is the screenshots of an ISIS communiqué shared on their 
telegram channels and the translation. 
 
Spies, employed by intelligence agencies, infiltrating the social media supporters of the 
Caliphate are divided to 3 categories: 
1- First category’s job is to criticise the Caliphate, its leaders and its media, especially diwan 
el I’lam, and attempts to collect information on those featured in its publication  
2- Their job is to criticise the Caliphate ’s methods arguing it is different to the methods 
followed by other leaders. The intelligence agencies recruited Zawahiri’s orphans and 
the olama of tawaghit; as a worshiper of the cross once said 
3- 3rd category is the one that always criticises the supporters of the Caliphate because 
they are the line of defence against all 3 categories 
 
We will start by the first category: 
 
The spies in social media follow the Caliphate’s publications, then they select the pictures 
of the speakers and they share it to their social media team. 
 
Their aim is to gather information in order to identify them; so spies and those who 
infiltrated the rank of supporters publish their pictures and accuse them of Gholat (wrong 
doings). Publishing these pictures and accusations aim to: 
1- Defame the Caliphate media because it features, what they call, these gholat…  they aim 
to depict that this is not the Caliphate that Muslims dream of so you should stop 
supporting it and go back to the Taghout’s barns 
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2-  They want to gather their information so crusaders can target them, they provoke 
supporters with these false accusations to anger supporters and without meaning 
divulging while defending them  
3- Slander the Caliphate, its caliph and leaders by depicting them all as gholat 
4- Base a big lie over a small truth and create false stories about them, their sole focus is 
libelling the Caliphate and its diwans 
5- If they stumbled on a small error they exaggerate and multiply the stories to libel the 
Caliphate, its leaders and media 
6- They focus of the Media diwan, the one that exasperated crusaders and their 
intelligence and spread terror in their hearts by its publication that encouraged 
targeting them in their own turf 
Of course, they know they could not touch the Caliphate in general and the Media diwan in 
particular, but they try to cast doubt in the supporters, and they have failed to achieve that 
so far, all thanks due to Allah 
 
They tried a new strategy hoping to break the commitment of the official Caliphate media. 
So, they established new channels reporting on battles not mentioned by the official 
channels. The official channels commitment exasperates the spies because they cannot 
target supporter with fake news, they have tried and failed many times, and thanks to Allah, 
they will continue to fail  
 
Therefore, anyone who publishes a picture of a mujahid in the Caliphate and accuses him of 
anything or mocks him is a spy serving crusaders and aims to gain from them  
 
The second category: Their job is to criticise the Caliphate ’s methods arguing it is different to 
the methods followed by other leaders. The intelligence agencies recruited Zawahiri’s orphans 
and the olama of tawaghit; as a worshiper of the cross once said 
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This category’s describes the Caliphate ’s method as a method of gholat and khawarij, so they 
describe the apostate Taliban as mujahidin, and so are the Zawahiri’s al-Qaeda apostates who 
are Taliban’s soldiers originally 
 
They also see the commoners of Rawafid (Shia) as brethren, their enemies are solely those who 
wear the Amamah (Cleircs), the proof to this claim is the bay’a of Hazara Rawafid to apostate 
Taliban and Taliban accepting it, without any protest from al-Qaeda of Zawahari, their defenders 
or Taliban 
 
They question the Caliphate ’s doctrine in takfir (apostating) the elections and those who engage 
with it (both runners and voters). They pushed this in many publications. No doubt that 
pinpointing elections as apostasy is a blow to the world’s order and the Olama of taghout the 
dogs of crusaders, so they fought vigorously to scrap this order spreading quotes from 
Zarquawi’s (May Allah accepts him) and quoted from sheikh Abu-Omar el-Baghedadi (May Allah 
accepts him) and they interpret their words to their likings. But the Caliphate supporters 
published recorded messages of Zarqawi arguing the voters’ apostasy, stunning the spies and 
they failed as per usual. 
 
Regardless of the existence or absence of these recordings, this is the religion of Allah we do not 
follow men. We follow the book of Allah and the sunnah of its prophet (PBUH)… we uphold most 
dear what adhere to it and disregard what disagrees with it  
 
But those who socialise with Iranian Majouss (a slur to Zaroastrains) sitting with Kassem 
solaimani, became like the Rafida, they worship symbols (clerics) and believe men cannot make 
mistakes  
 
Every time they do not approve of a Caliphate ’s jurisprudence ruling they appear to cause 
trouble, trying to lie to the Ansar (supporters) pinpointing that this was not banned by Zarqawi 
or Abu-Omar el-Baghedadi. By God, this is ignorance. Do we take our religion from men or from 
the book and Sunna so we say Allah said and the prophete of Allah said (pbuh)…? 
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When spies quote sheikh Zarqawi (May Allah accepts him) and sheikh Abu-Omar el Baghedadi 
(May Allah accepts him) and other of the Caliphate ’s leaders, their sole aim is for followers to 
question the path of the Caliphate  and believe it is different from former leaders and founders, 
as if these spies know the former leaders or lived among them in the trenches or desert… praise 
to Allah they failed as per usual  
 
They manipulate people with fake beards from Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula, some of them 
were known and got burned out quickly, and others they were manipulating secretly till the exit 
permission, once they get burned out like their predecessors, is granted by the real masters, the 
dogs of crucifix. Upon on the exit of (…the son of the englishwoman) he advocated killing the 
caliph and his companions and called him a card-box caliph 
 
Remember the days when the orphans of the apostate Zarqawi called the Caliphate a myth 
and card-box Caliphate , now it is Jordanian Abu Lahab turn to break his silence and come 
out of his hiding to play his role  
 
And we say to Jordanian Abu Lahab, we will crush as we crushed el- Makedessi and Abu 
Kumama with Allah’s permission, and prevent you from mentioning our caliph by shoving a 
shoe in your mouth…. Time will come  
 
The third category: is the one that relentlessly attempts to discredit the supporters and 
especially the public figures because they are the line of defence against all 3 categories. 
 
God’s grace bestowed on the Caliphate  a flood of true supporters to fill the gap in social 
media websites, they are the true voice of the Caliphate , this is why the mule of the Jews 
Obama and other worshipers of the cross said (we will not defeat the Caliphate  unless we 
defeated its media). They know that the Caliphate  possess a big virtual army all over social 
media, that manages to debunk all accusations from TV channels and accounts. Supporters 
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kept control over social media and any pig or mercenary for the crusaders has to think a 
1000 times before writing one sentence to slander the Caliphate and its leaders  
 
Then the US and the rest of worshipers of the cross deleted social media accounts and 
telegram channels for Ansar (supporters). It did not deter the supporters, they created 100 
accounts instead of 1 and 100 channels instead of 1; they kept publishing and engaged with 
propaganda campaigns against the worshipers of the cross and their shoes (slur to people 
who work with them). Supporters are the ones who disseminate and incite with the 
Caliphate media outlets to target the worshipers of the cross in their own countries, thanks 
to God 10s of attacks targeted the worshipers of the cross in various places in their own 
countries… 
 
Worshipers of the cross went mad, they realised their policy of deleting the Caliphate ’s 
supporters accounts have failed, so they deployed their pigs: spies and zawahiri’s apostate 
orphans, who under the veil of support attempts to infiltrate the supporters, gather 
information on the Caliphate  and create an online opposition to the Caliphate  following 
the recommendation of Rand, an American organisation 
 
Thanks to God their attempts failed. A group of honest supporters thwarted these spies and 
apostates Qaeda orphans, supporters debunked them using proof and conclusive evidence 
so they attacked and slandered the supporters to be able to infiltrate the supporters and 
finish their failed mission. Due to their failure and weakness, the American foreign embassy 
had to support them after they were discovered and failed… 
 
Thanks to God, many honest supporters thwarted these spies and the apostates Qaeda 
orphans, these suspects are struggling to handle the flood of supporters debunking their 
accusations and defamations, the supporters rank remained pure, strong and united like the 
sea who preserves pearls and Coral but spits out dead carrions. 
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7.4 ISIS social-media counter strategy  
Since their accounts were being purged from social media, ISIS supporters shared screenshot 
from this Hassad Ansar article on their telegram channels, shared with me by @Carl (2016) on 
15/01/2017. Setting the functionality of Twitter for Ghazu (war) and infiltration, the article 
shares tips on how not to be immediately recognized as a supporter. It advises to “use generic 
names and photos, do not follow each other” as telegram is enough for regrouping. Their 
counter-strategies are discussed briefly in chapter 3 
 
 




7.5 Glossary of Islamic terms  
● Dhimmis: Followers of monotheistic books, they should pay taxes  
● Adha: A celebration to commemorate God saving of Ismail after ordering Ibrahim to 
slaughter him, the Islamic version is slightly different than the biblical one  
● Syra nabawiya: The biography of the prophet  
● Idda: A waiting period for women after divorce and is just for women 
● Jahilia: Age of ignorance used to  
● Farida: an obligation set by Islamic jurisprudence 
● Ijma’: Agreement of Islamic religious scholars   
● Sura: Chapter of the Quran   
● Aya: A Quranic verse 
● Tafsir: A book that explain the Qur’anic text  
● Awra: What should not be seen, Awra is different for a man and a woman  
● Sahewa: Islamic resurgence  
● Qur’aniyoun: A new Islamic group that rejects the Hadith and the Syra and abides by the 
teaching of the Quran  
● Hadith: is a collection of saying and teaching of Mohamed  
● Kaffir: usually translated as infidels however it does not translate the social implications 
of such a term and the lesser status in criminal law for example. The capital punishment 
is applicable in sharia law however a Muslim is exempt if he murders a kaffir. 
Furthermore, the definition of Kaffir varies according to the standing point of the 
speaker: a non-Muslim is Kaffir to establishment Islam as repeatedly said by the el-Azhar 
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BOX OF ISLAM, 2018as. از دعس دمحأ عم ةمدقم ؟ةل«­عملا مه نم :166 مالسإلا قودنصÇد .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2018at. ةسمخلا ةل«­عملا ئدا©م :167 مالسإلا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2018au. ةل«­عمللو مالسإلل ەدقنو يدنوارلا نبإ :168 مالسإلا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2018av. يحالصإلا ع$جر با©سأو اهع  ةل«­عملا لشف با©سأ :169 مالسإلا قودنصÙ® اهيلإ 
مويلا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2018ax. دسج ةلضعم :154 :مالسإلا قودنص P  ةنسلاو نآرقلا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017a. وروأ مالسإ كانه له :109 مالسإلا قودنصé6؟ .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017b. لجر عم راوح :110 مالسإلا قودنص øùجل± ةطÎL باهرإلا با©سأ نع ملسم 

اÎúجل±  .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017c. ا'وروأ  مالسإلا ل©قتسمو باهرإلا :111 مالسإلا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017d. رف  نوملسملا :112 مالسإلا قودنصàب ،اسÙ® خسلاو باهرإلاÿÃة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017e. لا دجسملا مامإ عم راوح :113 مالسإلا قودنصôرا±  ®­بbس .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017f. سرام لسم عم راوح :114 مالسإلا قودنصÎلÎا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017g. سرام «4فم :ةأجافم :115 مالسإلا قودنصÎلÎا Çقح كدنع دمصلا د©ع دماحل لوق .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017h. سلدنألا  دمصلا د©ع دماح :116 مالسإلا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017j. را±" :118 مالسإلا قودنصé6" باجحلا يدترت .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017k. راتل لخدم :120 مالسإلا قودنصÃمالسإلا تاحوتفلا خــــÎاهتقالعو ةتؤم ةوزغ :ة Iمورلا ةروس .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017m. لا دصاقم ةروطسأ :93 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنص=ùÃمالسإلا ةعÎة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017o. رات  ةمدقم:101 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصÃةكم خــــ .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017p. نجألارداصملا هتلاق ام :102 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنص¨Îيدحلا حلص نع ة¨Îة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017q. ب قرفلا :103 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصÙ® لا يداوو ةك'و ةكم©úطسلف  ءاÙ® .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017r. صافت :104 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصÎدج لÇجحلا نع ةد .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017s. السإلا قوسلا .ا'وروأ لخاد ةلحر :105 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصð 

®Ùلرب  .  
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BOX OF ISLAM, 2017t. ناملأ  ملسملا با©شلا ضع± عم ءاقل :106 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصÎا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017v. ب ةرجاشم :108 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصÙ® لصملا ضع'و دمصلا د©ع دماحÙ®  دجسم 
®Ùلرب .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017w. علا :92 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصÎمالسإلا ةحاج©لا ردصمو مالسإلل «_لخلا بÎة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017x. ك :94 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصÎف Ç؟ةأرملا± مالسإلا ةقالع حالصإ نكم .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017y. انزعأ له :96 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنص P ±؟مالسإلا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017z. ندم ةلود :97 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصÎعجرم تاذ ةÎمالسإ ةÎد©ع روتكدلا عم يراوح ؟ة 
ح$تفلا وبأ معنملا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017aa. ملسملا ةاسأم 98 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنصÙ®  برغلا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017ab. مالسإلا حالصإ نود لوحت «4لا زجاوحلا :99 ةقلحلا ،مالسإلا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017ac. مس¦ لوصأ :78 مالسالا قودنصÎأ ةÇسملا لصألاو ع$بسالا ماÎd و ةعمجلا مويلÃةفرع مو .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017ad. قحلا ةصقلا :79 مالسالا قودنصÎقÎقتلا لصأو ،ةنيدملل دمحم ةرجهل ة$Ã4يد : يرجهلا م 
؟.اÎس مأ .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017ae. بلاغ له :91 ةقلحلا مالسالا قودنصÎملسملا ةÙ® ملاسم ًالعفÙ®؟ .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017al. ملسملا ®­غ نم هفقومو مالسالا : 86 ةقلحلا مالسالا قودنصÙ® .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017am. ؟ةعمجلا ةالص ةدئاف ام :87 ةقلحلا مالسالا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017an. هصوصنو مالسإلا دقنب حامسلا نود± حالصإ ال :88 ةقلحلا مالسالا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017ao. قحلا با©سألا :89 ةقلحلا مالسالا قودنصÎقÎمالسإلا  ةدرلا دحل ة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2017ap. حلا عم مالسإلا ةمزأ :90 ةقلحلا مالسالا قودنصÿÃة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016i. Box of Islam 45 نالــعز اـــنأ اذا ملسـم اـــنأ :45 مالسالا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016j. Box of Islam 46 جلا و مالسالا : 46 مالسالا قودنصâس .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016k. Box of Islam 47 جلا: 47 مالسالا قودنصâمالسالا  داهجلاو س .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016l. Box of Islam 48 . شافلا : 48 مالسإلا قودنصÎشلا ةÎعÎة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016m. Box of Islam 49 ب ةنراقم: 49 مالسإلا قودنصÙ® سلا مالسالا و مالسالاÎا. .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016n. Box of Islam 50 . ءاøالا نعدÇدج مالÉ : 50 مالسإلا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016o. Box of Islam 51 . ع .رافلا ناملس ®­ثأت : 51 مالسإلا قودنصÜ نارقلا .  
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BOX OF ISLAM, 2016p. Box of Islam 52 دوهيلا هلويمو باطخلا نب رمع : 52 مالسإلا قودنصÇة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016q. Box of Islam 53 واعم : 53 مالسإلا قودنصÃأ نب ةé6 فسÎسملا هلويم و ناÎحÎة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016r. Box of Islam 54 ب ام ة«­ف : 54 مالسإلا قودنصÙ® واعمÃا نب ةé6 فسÎنب كلملا د©ع و نا 
ناورم .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016t. box of Islam 56 نآرقلا :56 مالسالا قودنص Çعe إ 4ب ةسدقملا ضرألاøئاÎل .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016u. box of Islam 57. Îfشلا ـ 4سلا عالل ةÎخÃراتلا روذجلا:57 مالسالا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016v. box of Islam 58 لا ةمدخ  سدقملا :58 مالسالا قودنصôهارÎسلا ةâÎشلا ـ ةÎعÎة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016w. Box of Islam 59 قح :59 مالسالا قودنصÎهتيارو لوسرلا لئاسر ةق .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016z. نآرقلا  خلاو .وم ةصق ،نآرقلا ®­طاسأ: 35 مالسإلا قودنص . Box of Islam 35.  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016aa. ب ةنراقم : 40 مالسإلا قودنصÙ® عز رلته و مالسالا 46ن دمحمÎزانلا مÃة  Box of Islam 40.  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ac. س : 60 مالسالا قودنصÎانأ :4مقلا د Éرفا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ad. قح : 61 مالسالا قودنصÎلعلا زاجعإلا ةق 

®Ùنجلا راوطأ نارقلا  .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ae. ةمدقم : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 62 مالسالا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016af. ةروص : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 63 مالسالا قودنص P الاوàنآرقلا  ناس .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ag. حلا ةروص : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 64 مالسالا قودنصÎنآرقلا  ةا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ah. نآرقلا  ةنجلا ةروص : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 65 مالسالا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ai. دهتلا : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 66 مالسالا قودنصÇعولاو دÎنآرقلا  د .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016aj. آ : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 67 مالسالا قودنصÇآ و حماس;لا تاÇنآرقلا  فنعلا تا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ak. آ : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 68 مالسالا قودنصÇنآرقلا  لتقلا تا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016al. آ : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 69 مالسالا قودنصÇآو برحلا تاÇنآرقلا  ملسلا تا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016am. لحت : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 70 مالسالا قودنصÎة'$تلا ةروس ل .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ao. سملا : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 72 مالسالا قودنصÎيحÙ®  نآرقلا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ap. نآرقلا  ةأرملا : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 73 مالسالا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016aq. نآرقلا  مارحلا انزلاو لالحلا انزلا : نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 74 مالسالا قودنص .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016ar. لثملا: نآرقلا تاضقانتم : 75 مالسالا قودنصÎجلا ةâسÎنآرقلا  ة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2016as. لا رهش و مرُحلا رهشألا : 76 مالسالا قودنصâ̧مالسإلا ل©ق ء .  
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BOX OF ISLAM, 2016at. علا روهشلا لصأ : 77 مالسالا قودنصÿ'Îاهتيمس¦و ة .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015a. 1: Islam and Mafia part 1.  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015b. 20: ةنيدملا ة«­ف < نآرقلا روطت لحارم .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015c. BOI Episode 19 ع ةعساتلا ةقلحلا - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب=ù: ة«­فلا <نآرقلا روطت لحارم 
ةÎكملا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015d. Box of Islam 29 ةفلتخملا تاءارقلاو ةع©سلا فرحألا نع 29 مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب 
نآرقلل .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015e. Box of Islam 30 باحصأ ةروطسأ ردصمو نآرقلا ®­طاسا نع ةمدقم 30 مالسإلا قودنص 
فهôلا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015g. Episode 10 اعلا ةقلحلا - مالسإلا قودنص جمانربøùنعطلا ةقالع :ة  àةصق± دمحم بس 
ة©عôلا ءانب .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015h. Episode 11 داحلا ةقلحلا - مالسإلا قودنص جمانربÇع ة=ù: ةقالع ام àةلودلا± مالسإلا ةأش 
؟ةÎطن®­بلا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015i. Episode 12 ناثلا ةقلحلا - مالسإلا قودنص جمانربÎع ة=ù: ق لشف اذاملFّ حجنو مشاهو 
؟دمحم .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015j. Episode 13 ! دوهيلاو دمحم :ù=ع ةثلاثلا ةقلحلا - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015k. Episode 14 ع ةع±ارلا ةقلحلا مالسإلا قودنص=ù: لاو دمحمâج :ءاسÿÃق©عو ةنمآ ةمÿÃة 
ةجÇدخ .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015l. Episode 15 ع ةسماخلا ةقلحلا - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب=ù> لاو دمحمâ4لا ةأرملا :ءاس» 
46نلا تمزه .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015m. Episode 16 ع ةسداسلا ةقلحلا - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب=ù> لاو دمحمâجوزت اذامل ،ءاس 
؟ةشgاع دمحم .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015n. Episode 17 ع ةع±اسلا ةقلحلا - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب=ù> لاو نآرقلا ةغل نع ةمدقمGتامل 
اهب ةÎ¨نجألا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015p. Episode 2 - (  اÎڤاملاو مالسإلا( ةÎناثلا ةقلحلا :دمصلا د©ع دماح - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب
éاثلا ءزجلا - .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015x. Episode 5 - (  لوحتلا طاقن( ةسماخلا ةقلحلا :دمصلا د©ع دماح - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب
دمحم ةاÎح  .  
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BOX OF ISLAM, 2015y. Episode 6 (  ؟دمحم لتق نم( ةسداسلا ةقلحلا :دمصلا د©ع دماح - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب
؟اذاملو .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015z. Episode 7 (  دمحم ةÎصو Åام( ةع±اسلا ةقلحلا :دمصلا د©ع دماح - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب
؟ةتافو ل©ق ة®­خالا .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015aa. Episode 8 ل :ةنماثلا ةقلحلا-مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب
ç
لو قحسإ نبإ ة®­س ة±اتك زغ
ç
 اهئافتخإ زغ
دع± امÎف .  
BOX OF ISLAM, 2015ab. Episode 9 تنعط اذامل :ةعساتلا ةقلحلا - دمصلا د©ع دماح - مالسإلا قودنص جمانرب 
؟دمحم بسà  شÿbق .  
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DARING QUESTION, 2018e. أ مالسإلا له :548 ءيرج لاؤسøدألا عÇ؟اراش;نا نا . Al-Hayat TV. 
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
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TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2017p. اهن مأ يدوعس عي'ر وه له :516 ءيرج لاؤسÇح ةú؟دوعس لآ م . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2017r. السإ يركسع دئاق :518 ءيرج لاؤسð Çسم ®­صÎحÎا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2017s. ماعلا ةوحص دئاق :519 ءيرج لاؤسÿÃو مالسإلا ك«­ي ةÃسملا قنتعÎحÎة . Al-Hayat 
TV. 
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
؟®Ùملسملا  . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2017v. لا قفاوتت له :490 ةقلحلا ءيرج لاؤس=ùÃمالسإلا ةعÎمألا روتسدلا عم ةÿÃL؟ . Al-
Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2017w. ؟باهرإلا نم ءيرب مالسإلا له :494 ةقلحلا ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2017x. آ جمانرب ®­ثأت وه ام :495 ةقلحلا ءيرج لاؤسÇ؟قيلعتو ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016a. ح ساسأ وه ام 437 ءيرج لاؤسú؟مالسإلا  ةدرلا م . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2016d. جلاو مالسإلا 441 ءيرج لاؤسâس . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2016h. ؟نودلخملا ناملغلا مه نم 445 ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016i. مالسإلا ةنجلا له 446 ءيرج لاؤسÎغم ةÿÃ؟ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016k. مالسإلاو شعاد :باتك ةشقانم 451 ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016l. ظن نع نآرقلا ثدحت له 453 ءيرج لاؤسÿÃظعلا راجفنالا ةÎ؟م . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2016m. ؟4يد ®­غأ نأ «_ح نم له 454 ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016n. ؟باهرإلاو فنعلا± نيدلا ةقالعام 455 ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016o. حلا± نيدلا ةقالع ام 456 ءيرج لاؤسÿÃ؟ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016r. اذامل 461 ءيرج لاؤس Çع± نوملسملا لفتحÎضألا دd؟ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016s. إلا 462 ءيرج لاؤسøقح ، جارعملاو ءاÎ؟ةفارخ مأ ةق . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016t. ؟ «­ح ضهان اولاتغا اذامل 463 ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016u. ؟دمحم  برعلا يأر وه ام 466 ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016v. ألاو شعا د 467 ءيرج لاؤسÇة®­خألا ما . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016w. عادت 468 ءيرج لاؤسÎع بمارت زوف تاÜ السإلا ملاعلاð . Al-Hayat TV. 




بِذاGjلا َب مÎهاربإ ناندع Üع ادر :نوُ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016y. هاربا ناندع 470 ءيرج لاؤسÎسملا مهتي مÎيحÙ® . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016z. م×احلا 471 ءيرج لاؤسÎمالسإلا تاعامجلا دئاقع رطخأ :ةÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016aa. ظن ®­ثأت وهام 472 ءيرج لاؤسÿÃع ةرماؤملا ةÜ ملسملاÙ® ؟ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2016ab. لا باهرإلا فدهتسا اذامل 473 ءيرج لاؤسôسرط©لا ةس¶نÎ؟ ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015b. جس يود± فئار 385 ئرج لاؤسÙ® حلاÿÃدوعسلا  ةÇة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015c. لمم 391 ئرج لاؤسôلا ةôهارÎدوعسلا :ةÇلاعلا باهرإلاو ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015d. راش 392 ئرج لاؤسí مالسإلاو ود©يإ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015e. راش 393 ئرج لاؤسí ملسملا لعف دودرو ود©يإÙ® . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015f. حلا ةفاقث 395 ئرج لاؤسÎتوملا ةفاقثو ةا .  
DARING QUESTION, 2015h. ثامتلا شعاد تمطح اذامل 397 ئرج لاؤسÎ؟ل . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015i. و شعاد 398 ئرج لاؤسlشحوتلا ةراد . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015j. مأ  مالسإلا 399 ئرج لاؤسÿÃúا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015k. امث 401 ئرج لاؤسé ةقلح ةئامع'رأو تاونس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015l. قح :ضفاورو بصاون 405 ئرج لاؤسÎب عالا ةقÙ® شلاو ةنسلاÎةع . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015m. ام 415 يرج لاؤس Å ؟®­فكتلا ةروطخ . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2015n. نإ 407 ءيرج لاؤس P لا موقلا يدهي الGفاÿÃع ادر :نÜ هاربإ ناندعÎم . Al-Hayat 
TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015o. ملسملا ةمدص 408 ءيرج لاؤسÙ®  هاربإ ناندع خيشلاÎم . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015p. ؟دمحم نع ءامظعلا لاق اذام 094 ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015q. السإلا ملاعلا  داحلإلا ةرهاظ 410 ءيرج لاؤسð . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015r. ي اذام 411 ءيرج لاؤسÿÃ؟نودحلملا د . Al-Hayat TV: TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015s. اذامل 412 ءيرج لاؤس Ç؟نوملسملا موص . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015t. لو عم راوح 413 ءيرج لاؤسÎ4يسحلا د . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015w. ب ةقالعلا ام 418 ءيرج لاؤسÙ® مالسإلا ةمألا ضارمأو دمحمÎ؟ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015x. اذامل 419 ءيرج لاؤس Ç؟شعاد± ملسملا با©شلا قحتل . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015y. م 420 ءيرج لاؤسÿÃم Çهاربإ ®4حÎمادعإلا هجو  تفقو ةأرما :م . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015z. له 422 ءيرج لاؤس Çظن مالسإلا مدقÿÃحلل ةú؟م . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015aa. ؟مالسإلا نوملسملا ك«­ي اذامل 423 ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015ab. ش¦ له 425 ءيرج لاؤسúمالسإلا ةرجهلا تاجوم لÎع ارطخ ةÜ ؟ا'وروأ . Al-Hayat 
TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015ac. قتلا 426 ءيرج لاؤسÎمالسإلا ةÎلا عادخلا :ة=ùm . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015ad. ؟ دوهيلا ەركن اذامل 427 ءيرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015ae. هارك له 428 ءيرج لاؤسÎ؟دمحمل رأث دوهيلل مالسإلا ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015af. ام 430 ءيرج لاؤس Å ضقلاÎزامألا ةÃغÎ؟ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015ag. را± ةوزغ له 431 ءيرج لاؤسb؟مالسإلا± ةقالع اهل س . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015ai. ام 434 ءيرج لاؤس Å ؟ باهرإلا راش;نا ءارو با©سألا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015aj. ك :مالسإلا كرت ةرهاظ 435 ءيرج لاؤسÎ؟اذاملو ف . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015ak. إلا قوقح عضو ام 436 ءيرج لاؤسàدوعسلا  ناسÇ؟ ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2015al. نآرقلا له Éمال Pب ةرظانم ؟Ù® شر خألاو قراط خيشلاÎد . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014a. ةسدقملا ةوشرلا : مهــ'$لق ةفلؤملا 343 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014b. ؟ ¸¶ع ةصق نآرقلا ذخأ نيأ نم 344 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2014c. دمحم ةوبن تامالع نم ةمالع : ةوبنلا متاخ 348 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014d. ص 4عم ام 349 ئرج لاؤسÜ P لعÎ؟ملسو ه . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014e. سم 351 ئرج لاؤسÎلا ويح=ùلاو قÿ'رعلا عيé6 . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014f. مالسإلا  ةالصلاو ءوضولا ساوسو 353 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014g. اهل رقتسمل يرجت سمشلاو 354 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014h. رات 355 ئرج لاؤسÃالسإلا وزغلا خــــð فإ لامشلÿÃقÎا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014i. مالسإلا دئاقعلا رطخأ : ءا­6لاو ءالولا 356 ئرج لاؤسÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014j. ثملا مامإلا 357 ئرج لاؤسÜ Çمالسإلا± هتيلثم نع عفاد . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014k. جنإلا نا نآرقلا لاق نيأ 359 ئرج لاؤسÎ؟فرحم ل . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014l. سانلل تجرخأ ةمأ ®­خ متنك 361 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014r. ع دمصلا د©ع دماح قيلعت 368 ئرج لاؤسÜ سمÎةرهاظو شعادو لصوملا ®4ح 
داحلإلا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014s. له 370 ئرج لاؤس Éملاعلل ةمحر دمحم ناÙ®؟ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014t. لا 46س شعاد تملعت نيأ نم 372 ئرج لاؤسâ؟ءاس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014u. ام 373 ئرج لاؤس Å ؟سوؤرلا عطقل ةسسؤملا صوصنلا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014v. اذامل 374 ئرج لاؤس øù؟الصأ ةعتملا )جاوز( دمحم ع . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014w. اذام 375 ئرج لاؤس Çلمعلا نع مالسإلا لوقÎراحتنإلا تاÃ؟ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014x. لمعلا له 376 ئرج لاؤسÎراحتنإلا تاÃ؟مالسإلا  لالح ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014y. ص دمحا روتكدلا عم صاخ ءاقل 378 ئرج لاؤس©d لوألا ءزجلا :روصنم . Al-Hayat 
TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014z. ص دمحا روتكدلا عم راوحلا 379 ئرج لاؤس©d اثلا ءزجلا :روصنمé

 . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014aa. فومالسإلا 382 ئرج لاؤس$'Îقح : اÎ؟ ةفارخ ما ةق . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014ab. أ 383 ئرج لاؤسøبنلا ة®­سلا نع را$Ãة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014ac. ئادنملا نم 384 ئرج لاؤسÎا ةئباصلا ةí حيسملا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014ad. جس يود± فئار 385 ئرج لاؤسÙ® حلاÿÃدوعسلا  ةÇة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014ae. له 389 ئرج لاؤس Éع دمحم ناÜ ظع قلخÎ؟م . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2014af. برغملا نم ةرهوجو ةنيمأ را©تخا 390 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2014ag. ظن 380 ئرج لؤسÿÃمالسإلا  ةرماؤملا ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013b. لا 295 ئرج لاؤسW'X©مالسإلا ةÎلاو ةÿÃءا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013c. ملا لشف له 297 ئرج لاؤس=ùالسإلا عوð ؟ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013d. زانخلاو ةدرقلا دافحا 298 ئرج لاؤسÃر . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013e. له 300 ئرج لاؤس Çدألا دقن زوجÇ؟ نا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013f. ن عمجم لوح ةلئسأ 302 ئرج لاؤسÎقÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013g. سملا ةاسأم 304 ئرج لاؤسÎيحÙ®  روسÃا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013h. مألا قداصلا وه نم 305 ئرج لاؤسÙ® ؟ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013i. نرقلا وذ وه نم 306 ئرج لاؤسÙ®؟ردنكسالا مأ شروك ؟ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013j. مالسإ ا±اهرإ ­6تعت نطسوب تا®­جفت له 308 ئرج لاؤسÎ؟ ا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013k. اعدلا 312 ئرج لاؤسÇمالسإلا ةÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013l. ح 317 ئرج لاؤسúمالسإلا  ةالصلا كرات م . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013m. سلا مالسإلا 318 ئرج لاؤسÎله : .ا Å ±ادÇاهنلا ةÇ؟ ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013n. قطنملاو نيدلا  ةمدقم 319 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013o. راتلا وه ام 320 ئرج لاؤسÃ؟ مالسإلا نم دوقفملا خــــ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013p. مالسإلا ةفالخلا مهو 321 ئرج لاؤسÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013q. مالسإلا  ةمرحملا ةلئسألا 322 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013r. سملا اذامل 323 ئرج لاؤسÎك مه نويحJ؟ءادفلا ش . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013s. 4م 324 ئرج لاؤس» Çإ مد لحà؟ مالسإلا  ناس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013t. ام 325 ئرج لاؤس Å ؟ مالسإلا ضقاون . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013u. السإلا ملاعلا طوقس" باتك ةشقانم 326 ئرج لاؤسð ". Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013v. لا عم راوح 327 ئرج لاؤسGدمصلا د©ع دماح بتا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013w. يواحطلا لا®­م ةروتكدلا عم راوح 333 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013x. ام 334 ئرج لاؤس Å ؟ نيدلا ةفسلف . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2013z. ا مالسإلا لوخد 339 ئرج لاؤسí لا عم راوح ، مGيدنجلا لداع بتا . Al-Hayat 
TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013ab. فلسلا عم «4صق 341 ئرج لاؤسÎداهجلا ةÇلوألا ءزجلا :ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2013ac. فلسلا عم «4صق 342 ئرج لاؤسÎداهجلا ةÇاثلا ءزجلا : ةé

 . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012a. لا لوحت له 247 ئرج لاؤسÿ'رعلا عيé6 اí السإ ءاتشð ؟ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012b. لئاوألا نودترملا 248 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012c. دلاو مالسإلا 250 ئرج لاؤسÇطارقومÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012d. ناملعلاو مالسإلا 254 ئرج لاؤسÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012e. جلا ةلئسألا نم تاونس سمخ 255 ئرج لاؤسÿÃةئ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012f. دقلا دهعلاو راثألا ملع 264 ئرج لاؤسÇم . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012g. سملا 265 ئرج لاؤسÎم  ةسائرلا تا©ختناو نويح . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012h. دجلا دهعلاو راثألا ملع 266 ئرج لاؤسÇد . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012i. دنع نم لوسر دمحم له 270 ئرج لاؤس P ةرظانم ؟ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012j. ؟ مهل ه©ُش مأ حيسملا بلُص له :ةرظانم 271 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012l. ح تحت م 273 ئرج لاؤسúا ناوخإلا مí ؟ نيأ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012m. نآرقلا  يددعلا زاجعإلا 275 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012n. لتقلا خ$يش 277 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012o. مارآلا ةغللاو نآرقلا 278 ئرج لاؤسÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012p. لا ءاطخأ 279 ئرج لاؤسâنآرقلا  خاس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012q. دألا ءاردزإ نوناق 280 ئرج لاؤسÇنا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012r. دألا يردزي مالسإلا 281 ئرج لاؤسÇنا . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012s. لا ءاطخأ 282 ئرج لاؤسâنآرقلا  خاس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012v. ع ةرظن 288 ئرج لاؤسÜ مألا ةفالخلا$Ãسا©علاو ةÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012w. لا حلصت له 293 ئرج لاؤس=ùÃمالسإلا ةعÎاعملا ملاعلل ةH ؟ . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2012x. ب ةرظانمÙ® يرك± رمع خيشلاو ناطلس ءافو ةروتكدلا . arabicgospel ABN. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011a. س^دقلا ةس¶نك ةثداح 196 ئرج لاؤسÙ® . Al-Hayat TV. 
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DARING QUESTION, 2011b. سملا ل©قتسمو عضو 197 ئرج لاؤسÎيحÙ®  لا=ùلو روتكدلا عم ، طسوألا قÎد 
سراف . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011c. ب داهش;سإلا 198 ئرج لاؤسÙ® سملاÎحÎفسوي 6?ان روتكدلا عم ، مالسإلاو ة . Al-
Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011d. مح قيفوت روتكدلا عم صاخ ءاقل 199 ئرج لاؤسÎله : د Ç؟ مالسإلا حالصا نكم . Al-
Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011e. لعت 200 ئرج لاؤسÎع تاقÜ وت ةروثàمو س . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011f. د عم مالسإلاو باهرإلا 202 ئرج لاؤس. Éراجنلا لما . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011g. حلاو تارهاظملاو خ$يشلا 203 ئرج لاؤسúما . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011h. ناثلا ةداملا 204 ئرج لاؤسÎيملا روتسدلا نم ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011. لوألا ءزجلا : نوملسملا ناوخإلا 205 ئرج لاؤس . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011i. اثلا ءزجلا : نوملسملا ناوخإلا 206 ئرج لاؤسé . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011j. جلا 207 ئرج لاؤسWÃمالسإلا  ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011k. جلا 208 ئرج لاؤسWÃاثلا ءزجلا : مالسإلا  ةé
 . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011l. رألا له 209 ئرج لاؤسÃ؟ نوملسم نويسو . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011m. حتل م نوملسملا لخد له 210 ئرج لاؤسÿÃرألا رÃ؟ نويسو . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011n. راتلا قئاثولا  حيسملا بلص 211 ئرج لاؤسÃخÎة . Al-Hayat TV. 
DARING QUESTION, 2011o. ب بلصلا 212 ئرج لاؤسÙ® سملاÎحÎمالسإلاو ة . Al-Hayat TV. 
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